THE MIDDLE PATH FOR THE FUTURE OF THAILAND: TECHNOLOGY IN HARMONY WITH CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT By by Robert B. Textor et al.
=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 1 of 219 ===
THE MIDDLE PATH FOR THE FUTURE OF
THAILAND:
TECHNOLOGY IN HARMONY WITH
CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT
By
Sippanondha Ketudat
with the methodological and editorial
collaboration of
Robert B. Textor
and the consultation of
William J. Klausner
M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya
and
Sidhinat Prabudhanitisarn=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 2 of 219 ===
Institute of Culture and Communication
East-West Center
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.
Faculty of Social Sciences
Chiang Mai University
Chiang Mai, Thailand
1990
Copyright © 1990 by the East-West Center
All rights reserved=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 3 of 219 ===
A NOTE OF THANKS
We gratefully acknowledge the generosity of the
East-West Center in authorizing this
digital edition of this book.
Persons desiring copies of the original printed version may obtain them
by contacting:
Publication Sales Office
East-West Center,
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hi 96848-1601
Tel: 808-944-7145
Fax: 808-944-7376
Email: ewcbooks@ewc.hawaii.edu=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 4 of 219 ===
Prepare as best you can for the future,
And do not let your arrangements constrain you,
When the time for action arrives.
Suttantapitake No. 27,
Kutthanikayassa Chatakung Pathamo,
Paragraph 1636, Page 338.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 5 of 219 ===
DEDICATION
This monograph is respectfully
dedicated to
my father and first teacher,
GROUP CAPTAIN PHYA DHAYARNBHIKART
(TIP KETUDAT)=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 6 of 219 ===
CONTENTS
PREFACE: Dr. Godwin C. Chu, Assistant Director, Institute of Culture and
Communication, East-West Center...13
FOREWORD: Dr. Snoh Unakul, Chairman, Council of Trustees and Board of
Directors, and Dr. M. R. Akin Rabibhadana, Staff Anthropologist, Thailand
Development Research Institute...16
INTRODUCTION: Robert B. Textor...20
  I.1.  The Purpose of This Book...20
  I.2.  The Author...22
  I.3.  The Consultants...25
  I.4.  Facing Alternative Potential Futures for the
         Thai People...27
  I.5.  Facing the Problem of Tempocentrism...28
         I.5.1.  Tempocentrism Defined...29
         I.5.2.  Bangkok as an Example of Yesteryear's
                   Tempocentrism...33
  I.6.  Cultivating the Art of Anticipation Through
          Ethnographic Futures Research...35
          I.6.1.  Anticipation Distinguished from Conventional
                     Prediction...36
          I.6.2.  Evaluating an Anticipatory Effort...38
  I.7.  Essential Elements of an Ethnographic Futures
         Research Interview...39=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 7 of 219 ===
  I.8.  The Basic Structure of This Research
         Project...42
         I.8.1.  Population and Culture...43
         I.8.2.  Horizon Date...43
         I.8.3.  Domains of Culture...43
         I.8.4.  Technology as a Driving Force...44
         I.8.5.  Underlying Assumptions...44
  I.9.  Acknowledgements...45
CHAPTER ONE: BASIC WORKING PHILOSOPHY...48
  1.1.  The Adaptiveness of Thai Culture Through Openness,
           Freedom, Tolerance, and Selective Borrowing...48
  1.2.  The Thai Polity as an Automatically
           Self-Correcting Mechanism...51
  1.3.  Emphasizing Technology in Harmony with Culture
          and Environment...55
  1.4.  Emphasizing Technology for Sufficiency, Not
          Luxury or Greed...57
  1.5.  Reducing the Existing Gap of Inequity...58
  1.6.  Emphasizing Technology for Production, Using
          Local Resources...61
  1.7.  Keeping in Touch with World Developments in
          Technology...62
 1.8.  Understanding the World Context of Technological
          Potential...63=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 8 of 219 ===
  1.9.  Understanding the Thai Context of Technological
          Potential...66
  1.10. Responding to the Needs of Both Rural and Urban
           Thai Cultures...67
  1.11. Promoting Development Gradually But
           Deliberately...68
  1.12. Preserving Freedom of Choice for Both Present
           and Future Generations...70
  1.13. Attacking Problems Rather Than Merely Coping
           with Them...72
  1.14. Developing Leaders Who Are Both Expert and
           Ethical...73
CHAPTER TWO: THE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO...75
  2.1.  Demography...75
          2.1.1.  Quantitative Projections...75
          2.1.2.  Distribution Projections...77
          2.1.3.  Qualitative Projections...80
  2.2.  Technology and Economy...83
  2.3.  Energy...88
          2.3.1.  Petroleum Energy and Feedstocks...88
          2.3.2.  The Context of All Energy
                     Planning...90
          2.3.3.  Gasohol...91
          2.3.4.  Solar Energy...93
          2.3.5.  Hydrogen-Based Energy...94=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 9 of 219 ===
  2.4.  Environment and Ecology...96
  2.5.  Transportation...99
  2.6.  Tourism...102
           2.6.1.  The Bases of the Tourist Industry...102
           2.6.2.  Implications of Tourism for Culture Change...104
           2.6.3.  The Problem of Prostitution...105
  2.7.  Information and Communication...106
          2.7.1.  The Use of Existing Information
                     Technology...107
          2.7.2.  The Use of the New Information
                     Technology...108
  2.8.  Politics, Law, and Government...109
  2.9.  Social Structure...113
          2.9.1.  Relations Among the Classes...114
          2.9.2.  Relations Between the Sexes...115
          2.9.3.  Relations Within the Family...116
  2.10. Education...118
           2.10.1. The Role of Higher Education...118
           2.10.2. "Distance Learning" at the Tertiary
                        Level...120
  2.11. Buddhism and Other Belief Systems...121
           2.11.1. Buddhism and Education...122
           2.11.2. Reinterpretation and Reform of Buddhism...123
           2.11.3. Buddhism and Development...124
           2.11.4. Spirit Worship...126=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 10 of 219 ===
  2.12. Thai Identity...126
            2.12.1. Empathy and the "Caring Heart"...127
            2.12.2. Joyfulness...129
            2.12.3. The Decline of Hierarchical Rigidity...129
            2.12.4. Harmony and the Avoidance Of Confrontation...132
CHAPTER THREE: THE PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO...134
  3.1.  Thailand's Internal Assets...134
  3.2.  Thailand's External Dangers...136
  3.3.  Key Dynamics in the Pessimistic Scenario...139
          3.3.1.  Demography...139
          3.3.2.  Resources And Environment...140
          3.3.3.  The Vicious Downward Moral Spiral...142
          3.3.4.  Corruption and Its Further Consequences...143
  3.4.  The Political Response...146
  3.5.  Concluding Remarks...147
CHAPTER FOUR: THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO...149
  4.1.  External Context...149
  4.2.  Internal Situation...152
  4.3.  Political Leadership...153
CHAPTER FIVE: PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND POSSIDICTIONS
FOR THE FUTURE...156
  5.1.  Economic Growth with Stability...158
  5.2.  Economic Growth with Diversity...159=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 11 of 219 ===
  5.3.  Economic Growth with Participation...160
  5.4.  Economic Growth with Decentralization...161
  5.5.  Socio-Economic Equity...162
  5.6.  Development, Education, and Training...164
  5.7.  Development and the New Technologies...164
  5.8.  Development in Harmony with the Environment...166
  5.9.  Development in Harmony with Culture and Ethics...167
CHAPTER SIX: THREE TOP POLICY PRIORITIES...170
  6.1.  Actively Attacking Challenges and Problems
          at Their Roots...170
  6.2.  Re-Designing Human Resources Development...174
          6.2.1.  Selectively "Re-Thai-Izing" Thai Education...175
          6.2.2.  Selectively Promoting Equity, Relevance, and
                     Quality in Thai Education...176
  6.3.  Building Thailand's Role in the Wider World...180
        6.3.1.  The Role of Small Nations to Date...181
        6.3.2.  Thailand's Existing Capacity to Contribute...182
        6.3.3.  Enhancing Thailand's Capacity To Contribute...183
  6.4.  To the Horizon...185
AFTERWORD: THE FUTURE BEGAN YESTERDAY: Sippanondha
Ketudat...187=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 12 of 219 ===
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX: Robert B. Textor...193
  A.1.  The Handbook on E.F.R...194
  A.2.  Previous Use of E.F.R. in Thailand...195
  A.3.  Some Basic Definitions...197
           A.3.1.  Futures Research...197
           A.3.2.  Culture...198
           A.3.3.  Cultural Futures Research...199
           A.3.4.  Ethnographic Futures Research...200
           A.3.5.  Projection...201
           A.3.6.  Forecast...202
           A.3.7.  Scenario...202
  A.4.  Interview Structure...204
           A.4.1.  Emphasis on Flexibility and  Openness...204
           A.4.2.  The Three Scenarios...205
           A.4.3.  Probing For Clarity, Comprehensiveness,
                       Contextualization, and Coherence...207
  A.5.  The Advantages of Flexibility...210
  A.6.  The End Product...211
BIBLIOGRAPHY...213=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 13 of 219 ===
PREFACE
Dr. Godwin C. Chu, Assistant Director
Institute of Culture and Communication
The East-West Center
Dramatic events in Asia since the end of World War II can be characterized in
one phrase: rapid and fundamental change.
China emerged from the ruins of the war with its economy in shambles and its
traditional social fabric torn apart.  The Communist revolution broadened and
accelerated the process of change by enforcing a series of radical social and
economic transformations from which the country is still barely recovering.
Japan, defeated and devastated by two atomic bombs, survived the bleak post-
war years of hunger and poverty and, in part due to social and economic reforms en-
couraged by the U.S. occupation forces, has risen from the ashes of war to become
one of the world's most vibrant economic powers.
Elsewhere in Asia, a wave of independence movements put an end to more
than a century of Western colonization in this vast continent.  Newly independent
countries in the region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore,
have each gone through the growing pains that inevitably accompany the transition
from colonial rule to indigenous sovereignty.
In some countries political independence has been followed by phenomenal
economic growth.  In other countries, the initial promise has given way to political
discord and economic degeneration.  Whatever the path toward economic
development, most of these countries share common experiences that are
characterized by the infusion of modern technologies, the outreach of mass=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 14 of 219 ===
communication, expanding urbanization, and rising aspirations, compounded by a
growing population and a deteriorating environment.
These forces of social and economic change realign the traditional structures
of incentives and constraints that are deeply embedded in most of these Asian socie-
ties.  They have the potential of redefining and redrawing the contours of traditional
cultures.  They also provide a unique opportunity for observing and studying the
processes of cultural change in a fast moving context that is rarely available in
history.
The East-West Center in Honolulu, through its Institute of Culture and
Communication, has been undertaking a serious of empirical studies of cultural
change in Asian Countries since 1986.  Initially begun in Thailand, these studies now
cover China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  The United States has recently
been included in the enlarged scope of these studies.  In each country, we have
planned longitudinal social surveys of values and beliefs for before-and-after
comparative analysis of cultural change.
The Thai project stands out in our research design because, in addition to a
longitudinal survey, we are conducting four companion studies: a retrospective
snapshot of traditional rural Thai culture in the northeastern province of
Ubolraadchathaani some thirty years ago; an in-depth study of on-going cultural
change in rural communities in the northern province of Chiang Mai; an analysis of
values and value conflicts reflected in modern Thai short stories; and the present
study, a look into the future of Thai culture.
This monograph, presenting the findings on a range of future scenarios of Thai
culture, both optimistic and pessimistic, is the joint product of two outstanding
scholars who are intimately knowledgeable about the people of Thailand.  The
combined credentials of Professors Sippanondha Ketudat and Robert Textor are hard=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 15 of 219 ===
to match.  Their work has been undertaken in consultation with three other scholars,
Professors William J. Klausner, M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya, and Sidthinat
Prabudhanitisarn, all of whom specialize in Thai culture.
In terms of its contribution to knowledge, this monograph pulls together
decades of personal research experience and offers to policymakers and scholars in
Thailand, and concerned scholars elsewhere, an imaginative yet well grounded
perspective on what might happen to the culture of the Thai people if its present
course of change is left unattended by a guiding hand.
Funding for this study has come primarily from a generous personal grant by
Mr. and Mrs. Laurance Rockefeller administered by the East-West Center.  The
Center has provided matching support through its research and administrative staff.
Godwin C. Chu, Ph.D.
Coordinator
Culture Change Project
East-West Center
September 1990
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 16 of 219 ===
FOREWORD
Dr. Snoh Unakul
Chairman of the Council of Trustees and
Board of Directors
and
Dr. M.R. Akin Rabibhadana
Staff Anthropologist
Thailand Development Research Institute
This book appears at the right time, when Thai society is seeking for a
direction for her future.  The last eight decades have been a period of rapidly
accelerating change in Thailand.  The rate of change has increased substantially
within the last 25 years, and a process of profound social and economic
transformation has begun.  The most obvious manifestations of the change have been
in economic activity, but there is a growing realization that cultural and
psychological phenomena have been affected as well.  On the one hand, there has
been a steady growth of the Thai economy with recent rapid growth of industry and
unprecedented expansion of exports.  On the other hand, we are facing increasing
income disparities, depletion of natural resources, and conflicting values.  At this
critical period of fundamental change, there is an urgent need for policy direction
which will enable the Society to cope with these changes and make possible
sustainable development.  This book, The Middle Path for the Future of Thailand:=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 17 of 219 ===
Technology in Harmony with Culture and Environment, is more than welcomed
in providing valuable advice and warnings to policy-makers.
This book is a product of Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR), which has
been developed by Robert B. Textor.  It is the fourth is a series which aims to
understand how to deal with the Thai future.  According to the method of EFR, the
author is asked to construct three scenarios of the society in the future, in this
particular case, those of Thailand in the year 2020.  These scenarios are the
“optimistic,” the “pessimistic,” and the “most probable.”  Unlike a forecast or
prediction, the first two scenarios need to be merely possible in the judgement of the
author.  The last one, however, is the one which is judged to have the highest
probability of occurring.
Different from conventional prediction, EFR is not performed with respect to
how just a few variables will behave over a relatively short time span, and within
narrowly circumscribed and explicitly stated scope conditions.  EFR looks at a whole
sociocultural system over a time span of a generation.  Thus, rather than prediction,
"anticipation” (defined as the building of reasonable, plausible, conditional visions of
the future) is practiced. Anticipation involves assumptions about the causal roles of
events, things, and human endeavours in generating the future.  It has to depend on
value judgements, which need not be mere expressions of emotions or exhortations to
better behavior, but ones that can be subjected to logical examination.
This book is an ethnography, although of a future scene, and shares many
features with traditional ethnography. The EFR method is cultural, holistic,
comparative, macrotemporal, and emically-etically balanced.  It uses informants for
the study of a society just as traditional ethnography does.  The selection of
informants is one of the most important factors contributing to accurate description of
the society.  It would seem to be even more important in the case of EFR.  This is=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 18 of 219 ===
because the “probability” of scenarios would depend upon the informants’
knowledge and understanding of the society, the extent and broadness of their vision,
and their sensitivity and objectivity.
The selection of Dr. Sippanondha Ketudat as the informant and author of this
book was an excellent one. Very few people have has such wide and varied
experiences.  With an excellent background in physics, both teaching and research,
he later switched to a direct and active involvement in Thailand’s educational and
development policies and programs.  He has occupied such influential positions as
Deputy Director of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Secretariat,
Secretary-General of the National Education Commission, Deputy Minister, and
Minister of Education.  He has initiated a number of needed educational reforms.  His
involvement with national development policy has been intense and of long duration.
He has served in numerous positions of public trust, and various consultative bodies,
including the Executive Committee of the National Economic and Social
Development Board.  Recently, within the last decade, he has been appointed first
President of the National Petrochemical Corporation, Ltd.  In this capacity, he is also
involved with private sector activities, and will be helping to influence Thailand’s
development for decades to come.
His messages in this book will undoubtedly contribute much to the
formulation of national policy in this critical period.  Policy-makers will certainly
gain from his visions, recommendations, and cautions, as appearing in the three
different scenarios.  Being a policy-maker himself, Dr. Sippanondha has also added
specific advice to policy-makers in Chapter Six, “Three Top Policy Priorities.”  We
are certain that the study will attain the EFR objective, which is to help produce more
prudent public policy.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 19 of 219 ===
During this critical period, amid confusion arising from rapid and enveloping
change, a new direction is sought for by most concerned people.  The Thailand
Development Research Institute is also involved in a major research project on
“Thailand Towards the Year 2010.”  One of its modules deals with Socio-Cultural
Change and Political Development in Thailand, 1950-1990.  It will examine the
underlying patterns of socio-cultural change and development, and attempt to
determine the course which cultural change may take in the next years.  Although the
approach of the TDRI project is different from EFR, we are certain that the
information and visions provided by Dr. Sippanondha will be very useful as a
framework, and in providing clues for seeking data, for TDRI research. Similarly,
being the first description of the future of Thailand by such a prominent individual,
well grounded in several fields, well versed in development theory, and well
experienced in its practice, the book, the Middle Path for the Future of Thailand:
Technology in Harmony with Culture and Environment, will benefit greatly
those who are planning for the future of Thailand, and those who are seeking for a
direction for Thai Society towards sustainable development, stability, prosperity, and
a better quality of life for all.
S. U.              A. R.
Bangkok, Thailand
October, 1990=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 20 of 219 ===
INTRODUCTION
Robert B. Textor
This book was conceived in 1987 at a meeting at the Institute for Culture and
Communication of the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, chaired by Dr.
Godwin C. Chu, Assistant Director of the Institute.  It is one of a series of studies of
culture change in Asia, as described by Dr. Chu in his Preface.
I.1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK
The purpose of this book is to present a set of carefully thought-out images of
alternative middle-range sociocultural futures for Thailand, in order to stimulate
informed discussion of crucial issues of public policy.  We hope that this study will
have a positive effect on the overall future of Thailand over the next few decades.
Unlike most works in the field of futures or planning, this work is not a specialized
study of the Thai economy, demography, or technology.  Rather, it is a study of
alternative futures for the Thai way of life as a whole, and for Thai well-being in a
total sense.
The basis of the monograph is a set of broad sociocultural scenarios depicting
different ways in which Thailand's future might emerge into reality, either positively
or negatively.  These scenarios were elicited by means of interviewing the author, Dr.
Sippanondha Ketudat, in accordance with a method called "Ethnographic Futures
Research" (Section I.6 below).  These interviews were conducted by myself as
ethnographic collaborator, with help from three consultants to be introduced below
(I.3).  After each interviewing session, I drafted summaries of Dr. Sippanondha's
scenarios, using a computer.  He then edited these drafts.  Most portions of the=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 21 of 219 ===
manuscript went through a number of discussions and editings in order to achieve a
reasonable degree of clarity, comprehensiveness, contextualization, and coherence.
My daily contact with Dr. Sippanondha took place during five weeks in
Thailand in 1988, and again during a few days in the United States in 1989.  Our
interviews, conducted in many sittings, consumed a total of 25 to 30 hours of joint
working time.
1
Except for this Introduction and the Appendix, the author of this entire work is
Dr. Sippanondha.  The ideas in this monograph are his, and the purpose of the
monograph is to provide as clear, accurate, comprehensive, and integrated a
statement as possible, of his images and preferences concerning alternative sociocul-
tural futures for the Thai people.
Neither Dr. Sippanondha nor I expect that all readers will agree fully with his
2
choices of particular domains of Thai life to cover in his scenarios.  Probably, not a
few readers will disagree with some of the images and preferences he articulates.
Almost certainly, some will consider certain aspects of his optimism to be
unfounded.
Such disagreement is natural enough, given the enormous complexity of the
sociocultural change processes he has chosen to cover.  Not only would complete
                                            
     1Final re-writing and publication of this monograph were
delayed by my decision in the autumn of 1989 to take early
retirement as Professor of Anthropology at Stanford University,
and to move to Portland, Oregon in order to pursue full-time
research.  This move demanded much of my time, and forced me to
postpone work on the manuscript for several months.
     2In this Introduction and in the Appendix, the following
pronouns have the following references, unless another reference
is clear from context.  "I" refers to Textor; "we" to Sippanondha
and Textor jointly; and "you" to the reader.  In the main body of
the book—Chapters One through Six—"I" refers to Sippanondha.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 22 of 219 ===
agreement on such matters be impossible, but we would not even regard it as
desirable—for it is our hope that this publication will help bring about clear,
comprehensive, informed, and reasoned public discussion about alternative futures
for Thailand.  It is in the nature of the political process that people will disagree about
such alternatives—and about the public policy decisions that could be, and ought to
be, made in the near future, so as to make it more likely that when the middle-range
future eventually becomes the present, that present will constitute a reality that the
Thai people will find welcome, satisfying, and fulfilling.
3
The reason for publishing an English version of this book, in addition to a Thai
version—is to make Dr. Sippanondha's ideas available to non-Thai scholars, writers,
administrators, diplomats, and others interested in Thailand—or interested in gaining
knowledge that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, in other nations.  It is important, I
feel, that Dr. Sippanondha's seminal ideas about technology, culture change, and
development be made accessible to a world audience.
I.2. THE AUTHOR
In 1987 when Dr. Chu asked me to serve as ethnographer/ collaborator for this
study, one of the first tasks I faced was to decide who ought to be invited to become
the author.  It was clear to Dr. Chu and me that whoever the choice was, he or she
                                            
     3I, too, did not invariably or totally agree with Dr.
Sippanondha, either with respect to the degree of coverage of
various domains of the Thai way of life, or with respect to actual
positions taken.  My guess is that the same was true of the three
consultants.  All this is unsurprising and unimportant.  What is
important is that we approached the process of interviewing Dr.
Sippanondha as honestly as we could, respecting the principle that
the content of the book was to be what he wanted it to be.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 23 of 219 ===
would need to be a "renaissance" type of person, well grounded in several fields, well
versed in development theory, and well experienced in its practice.
Unhesitatingly, I decided to invite Dr. Sippanondha Ketudat, and was truly
pleased when he accepted.  His objective qualifications for this role are outstanding,
and it is important that they be briefly stated here.
Dr. Sippanondha was born in Bangkok in 1931, and as an adolescent became a
Thai Government Scholar by national competitive examination.  This enabled him to
study at the University of California at Los Angeles (B.S. 1953), and at Harvard
University (A.M. 1954; Ph.D. 1957 in Physics).  Since then he has held post-doctoral
research appointments in nuclear physics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, and the Technische
Hochschule Darmstadt in Germany.
Dr. Sippanondha taught at Chulalongkorn University from 1958 to 1972 and
again briefly during the Eighties.  In 1984, by Royal Proclamation, he was appointed
Professor Emeritus of Physics.
Even as a young lecturer at Chulalongkorn, Dr. Sippanondha took a deep
interest in development problems, and would spend weeks of his vacation time in
remote upcountry villages, offering in-service training in science education to
provincial school teachers, as well as familiarizing himself with village culture and
problems.
As a young man Dr. Sippanondha also fulfilled the Thai Buddhist cultural
ideal and became ordained as a monk, opting to do so at a temple with a strong
intellectual tradition.  He became a serious scholar of the Dharma, and remains so to
this day, long after leaving the order.  He is deeply concerned to find ways to bring
the essence of the Lord Buddha's teachings more effectively to bear upon modern
problems and challenges.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 24 of 219 ===
In the late Sixties Dr. Sippanondha's interest in development led him to a mid-
career switch from teaching and research in theoretical and experimental physics, to a
direct and active involvement in Thailand's educational and development policies and
programs.  He served as the Secretary of the Graduate School at Chulalongkorn
University.  Shortly thereafter he became Director of Thailand's University
Development Commission, with responsibility to coordinate the establishment of
appropriate graduate schools throughout the growing national university system.  For
a while he served as Deputy Director of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education
Secretariat, an experience that gave him an unusual knowledge of other Southeast
Asian nations and their problems, and a well-grounded comparative perspective.  He
then became Secretary-General of the National Education Commission, in which
capacity he provided leadership in identifying and planning a variety of needed
educational reforms at all levels of schooling.  In the early Eighties Dr. Sippanondha
was made Deputy Minister, and then Minister of Education, and in these capacities
was able actually to implement most of the reforms earlier identified.  By general
consensus, Dr. Sippanondha Ketudat has earned a prominent and permanent place in
the history of Thai education.
Dr. Sippanondha's credentials for international and comparative analysis are
also rich.  During the Seventies and early Eighties he served as short-term consultant
on education and development to the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation,
the Canadian International Development Agency, the World Bank, and UNESCO.
Within Thailand, Dr. Sippanondha's background covers the entire gamut of
national development policy.  Throughout the Seventies and Eighties he has served in
numerous positions of public trust, notably on various university councils and boards
of trustees.  He has also served on various consultative bodies, including the
Executive Committee, within the structure of Thailand's leading economic and social=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 25 of 219 ===
planning agency, namely the National Economic and Social Development Board.  In
addition, he has twice been appointed a Senator.
In 1984 Dr. Sippanondha was chosen to be first President of the National
Petrochemical Corporation, Ltd. (NPC), an innovative billion-dollar venture created
to develop Thailand's petrochemical wealth equitably and efficiently, for the benefit
of all the Thai people.  This firm is unusual in that it is owned partly by a government
agency (to insure equity), and partly by private investors (to insure entrepreneurial
creativity and efficiency).  The NPC is a crucial part of the pioneering Eastern
Seaboard Development Program for the creation of a new industrial zone.  In his
present position Dr. Sippanondha is helping to influence Thailand's development for
decades to come, by leading in the development of the entire chain of the
petrochemical industry, using natural gas fractions as feedstocks, essential to the
nation's industrialization.  (For details, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1).
Throughout all these experiences Dr. Sippanondha has found time to remain a
scholar and social thinker.  A few of his more recent publications and public lectures
are listed in the Bibliography.
The above presentation should be sufficient to demonstrate that Dr.
Sippanondha brought to the present project an unusually broad intellectual
background, the scientific rigor of training in physics, a rich theoretical grounding in
education and development processes, and the practical experience of having
successfully managed an enormous government ministry and one of the most
dynamic industrial firms in Southeast Asia.
I.3. THE CONSULTANTS
In addition to myself as ethnographic and editorial collaborator, three
consultants participated in the initial two days of interviewing, and later made=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 26 of 219 ===
suggestions on various drafts of the manuscript.  These three scholars were, like the
author, rich in relevant credentials, which may be briefly summarized as follows.
♦  Professor William J. Klausner holds a bachelors, masters, and law
degree from Yale University.  He is a foundation official, writer, and expert on Thai
culture who has resided in Thailand for 35 years and dedicated an entire career to
understanding and facilitating development programs designed to meet Thai needs as
Thais define those needs.  He serves as Adjunct Professor, special class, in the
Chulalongkorn University Faculty of Political Science, and also teaches in that
institution's Faculty of Law.
♦  Professor M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya holds a PhD in Political
Science from Northern Illinois University and is a member of the professoriate of
Chiang Mai University.  He is richly experienced in qualitative research on public
policy problems.  Recently he completed a term as Director of his university's multi-
disciplinary Social Research Institute, where he exercised leadership in planning and
executing development-oriented research projects.
♦  Professor Sidhinat Prabudhanitisarn, a sociologist with a PhD
from Stanford University, is also a member of the professoriate of Chiang Mai
University.  He is deeply experienced in both quantitative and qualitative research on
development in both the urban and rural sectors of Thai society.  Currently he is
conducting in-depth research on the development process in two Northern Thai
villages.
Both Dr. Bhansoon and Dr. Sidhinat were co-authors of the first study in the
present "Ethnographic Futures Research" genre to be published on the basis of
fieldwork in Thailand (Appendix, Section A.2.).  Hence, both were well prepared to
become immediately and productively involved in the present project.  The two of=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 27 of 219 ===
them have kindly offered to draft the Thai language version of this monograph, with
final editing by Dr. Sippanondha.  Publication will occur in early 1991.
Though our three consultants provided valuable help, it bears repeating that
Dr. Sippanondha is the sole author of this work.  While the scope of this monograph
may to some degree reflect the questions asked by the collaborator and consultants,
the actual positions taken are those of Dr. Sippanondha alone.
I.4. FACING ALTERNATIVE POTENTIAL FUTURES
FOR THE THAI PEOPLE
Inevitably, there will be a Thai future.  But what kind of a future it turns out to
be will depend in part on how squarely Thais today face their future potentials, and
how imaginatively and intelligently they proceed to invent and design the kind of
future they want.  The ethical intent of this monograph is to help Thai citizens assert
their claim to the Thai future by facing their future opportunities, dangers, and
problems as squarely as possible.
We believe that Thais can maximize chances for a desirable future, and
minimize chances for an undesirable one, if today they take the trouble to develop
reasonably clear and concrete images, or anticipations, of the major sociocultural
futures for Thailand that could occur, and, within that range, of the futures that they
judge to be relatively more desirable.  A people without a clear image of what it
wants to realize in the future, is hardly likely to end up liking what does become its
reality as the future becomes the present.
All this is especially true in the present era of world history, in which the pace
of change is ever more rapid, the effects of change ever more inter-connected, and
the scope of change ever more pervasive.  Indeed, our era is unique in the sense that
the experience of the past is often not useful, and sometimes downright useless, as a=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 28 of 219 ===
precise or confident guide to the future—which fact only underlines the vital
importance of cultivating the art of systematic anticipation (I.6).
  We hasten to add, though, that we are under no illusions about Thailand's
being fully free to pursue its own invented, anticipated, or preferred future.  There
are, of course, many constraints upon the nation's freedom, such as the complex
processes of military, political, and economic competition among the great
powers—which obviously set limits on the freedom of the one percent of humankind
who are Thai to realize the kind of future they want.  Moreover, it would be naive to
ignore the fact that the Thai polity, like most, is far from perfectly responsive to the
desires of its citizenry.
On the other hand, we argue that many Thais tend to see the Thai polity as
having less capacity to shape the future of Thailand as a sociocultural system than we
believe is in fact the case.  Though Thailand's international political and economic
options are circumscribed, that should not be allowed to obscure another vital fact,
namely that within fairly wide limits the Thai polity is free to pursue its own
preferences in a number of domains, some of which are of crucial importance—for
example, education.  Thai leaders may, if they wish, decide in total detail what shall
be taught in the nation's schools.  Considerable freedoms also exist in other areas,
such as demographic, economic, and environmental policy—and in all these areas we
believe that Thais should assume that they can deal effectively with their own
sociocultural future, and should make every effort to do so.
I.5. FACING THE PROBLEM OF TEMPOCENTRISM
We come now to the concept of "tempocentrism."  This concept is crucial to
the logic undergirding the entire Ethnographic Futures Research methodology used=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 29 of 219 ===
in preparing this book.  Tempocentrism has to do with our paying too little attention
to the future, or paying attention but in the wrong way.
In introducing this concept, we may start by asking a straightforward question:
If paying systematic, careful attention to possible, probable, and preferable alterna-
tive futures is so important, why don't more people practice it more of the time?  We
shall provide two answers to this question.
Our first answer is that many people do in fact pay attention to, or imagine,
alternative futures, much of the time.  The human organism is unique in the animal
kingdom in its capacity for elaborated futures consciousness.  It is probably true that
the great majority of human beings in the great majority of extant cultures of the
world do attend to the future, including the more distant future, at least from time to
time.  Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that one of the basic functions of human
culture is to equip the individual or group to conceptualize future opportunities and
dangers, and lay plans to deal with them.
I.5.1. TEMPOCENTRISM DEFINED
Our second answer to the above question is that when human beings do
engage in anticipation, they often do so in inappropriate ways—that is, tempocentric
ways.  Tempocentrism refers to a complex psychocultural state in which we become
"centered" in the wrong temporal frame, as it were.  In this state, we are, first of all,
typically unaware of the very inappropriateness of the time frame we are using, or
why it is inappropriate.  We lack the clarity of awareness, sense of salience, and
strength of motivation necessary to attend to, and reach adequately informed policy
judgments about, longer-range phenomena or issues of broader scope.  However
bright or educated we might be, we become so wrapped up in matters such as
running a government, meeting a payroll, getting promoted, winning a spouse,=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 30 of 219 ===
beating the cost of living, or surviving until the next harvest—that we do not attend
to problems such as:
♦  Is there a true AIDS epidemic impending in Thailand?  A cancer
epidemic in Bangkok?
♦  Can Thailand tolerate an 8% loss of forest cover each year, with
consequent effects not only on the timber industry itself, but on climate, drainage,
and agriculture as well?
♦  Is it wise to let foreign firms, or Thai firms, "externalize" their waste
disposal costs by dumping poisons into the nation's waterways?  Do the benefits
exceed the costs?  For whom?
♦  Because a particular robotic technology is available, and potentially
commercially profitable, is this sufficient reason for the Thai polity to allow it to be
used in a society with considerable underemployment?
♦  Can the nation afford to continue overproducing university graduates
with limited employability without experiencing serious political instability?
♦  Is the current unprecedentedly heavy private foreign investment in
Thai industries likely to result in the Thai polity becoming less able than before to
take charge of the Thai sociocultural future?  During the Eighties the nation accepted,
and indeed invited, prodigious infusions of foreign capital and technology, which
helps explain why GNP growth in 1988 reached an astonishing 11%.  If such
powerful techno-economic trends persist, what will happen to Thailand's long-
standing and cherished cultural heritage—to the Buddhist religious values that are
central to Thai culture, to gentleness of manner, to respect for individual autonomy?
The phenomenon of tempocentrism is considerably more complex, however,
than mere failure to attend to crucial aspects of a nation's more distant sociocultural=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 31 of 219 ===
future.  Tempocentrism is also present when people do attend to the more distant
future, but in doing so fail to allow for possible or probable changes in the context of
life as of a particular future point in time.  Examples come easily to mind.
♦  There is the Italian worker who purchased an annuity arrangement
twenty-
4five years ago guaranteeing him a monthly retirement income for life of
what, at that time, seemed like a princely sum—only now to find that he had failed to
allow for inflation, and hence must spend his declining years in deprivation and
misery.
♦  There is the American automobile salesman who almost religiously
believes, contrary to all objective evidence, that the world will never run out of
abundant oil.
♦  There were the French generals between the two World Wars who
held devoutly to the doctrine that the Maginot Line would keep the Germans
out—only to watch helplessly in 1940 as the latter's military forces did the obvious,
and moved easily over and around those magically anointed fortifications.
People of this sort are futures-oriented, yes—but tempocentric at the same
time.  It would be inappropriate to look upon them as stupid; many such people are
highly intelligent and otherwise professionally competent.  But they are
tempocentric.
In a sense, tempocentrism is the temporal analog of the spacial notion of
ethnocentrism.  In the case of ethnocentrism, people are cognitively and emotionally
unable to deal with another, quite different, sociocultural system that exists
contemporaneously with, though often spacially separate from, their own.  In the case
of tempocentrism, the isolation is temporal rather than spacial, and people are
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similarly unable to deal with their own sociocultural system as it could or might
become different through time.
Tempocentrism, like ethnocentrism, involves a whole complex of attitudes,
values, and habits.  Just as ethnocentrism is much more than an occasional or isolated
"prejudice," so tempocentrism is much more than an occasional or isolated "lack of
foresight."  Rather, tempocentrism is a whole system of attitudes or tendencies that is
quite deeply rooted in the personality and/ or the culture.  In most cases, people's
tempocentrism is not likely to change very much unless they experience trauma,
followed by appropriate learning.
All of this is not to deny that tempocentrism and ethnocentrism in fact do
provide a certain psychological comfort:  they help us reduce anxiety, and so make it
easier to get on with the immediate tasks of daily personal life.  Worrying about the
long-range effects of dumping detergents into Thailand's waterways hardly helps get
today's laundry done.  For just such reasons, most of us are tempocentric most of the
time, just as we are ethnocentric most of the time.
However, the critically important point is that neither ethnocentrism nor
tempocentrism is appropriate as a conscious or unconscious stance for a leader,
planner, or educator, or indeed for a socially active citizen—especially in a world in
which the pace of sociocultural change is constantly accelerating.  A hundred years
ago, the great King Chulalongkorn was expediting modernizational change in
Thailand at what was then an unprecedented rate.  Indeed, he moved far faster and
more radically and effectively than many have perhaps suspected, as Wyatt (1969)
explains.  However, the rate of change today is many tens of times more rapid—so
rapid that unless there is deliberate and systematic anticipation of possible
consequences and side-effects of this or that policy or process, these consequences
are likely to become established facts, and indeed serious problems, before leaders=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 33 of 219 ===
and citizens are even adequately aware of their existence—let alone prepared to deal
with such problems through appropriate policies and programs.
I.5.2. BANGKOK AS AN EXAMPLE OF YESTERYEAR'S
TEMPOCENTRISM
A telling example of tempocentrism in action is not hard to find: Bangkok
today.  While one easily finds much to admire about the educational, intellectual, and
cultural achievements evident in today's Bangkok, it nonetheless remains a fact that,
to more and more Thais at all socio-educational levels, Bangkok has come to be
perceived as unlivable.  More and more Thais who have the opportunity to leave
Bangkok are in fact doing so—citing polluted air and water, congested traffic, and
crowded living arrangements as their reasons, along with such emergent phenomena
as exacerbated exploitation, crime, social delinquency, and cultural decay.
It is not for us here to judge these charges against Bangkok.  It is sufficient to
point out that when Thais themselves, in ever-increasing numbers, render these
judgments about their capital city, this strongly suggests that some leaders, planners,
and intellectuals in the past were possibly tempocentric with respect to some policy
decisions that were then being made.  They failed adequately to foresee what some of
the major consequences and side-effects of those policies would be.
A slight digression at this point might be helpful.  The present study projects
forward about 30 years—from 1990 to 2020.  We may better appreciate what this
means if we take a moment to look backward about the same length of time—to the
Fifties.  In 1955 I was a graduate student from Cornell University conducting a
UNESCO-sponsored field study on urbanization in Thailand (Textor 1961).  In this
connection, I had occasion to interview a number of the national leaders of the time,
as well as experts and technocrats who had access to those leaders.  While it would=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 34 of 219 ===
be inappropriate for an outsider either to defend or criticize those leaders, it would
not be amiss to record here my impression that, contrary to what some critics today
might contend, a number of those leaders did seem, on the whole, to be quite
genuinely concerned about the welfare of the Thai people, and especially of those
who dwelt in Bangkok.  Within the limits of political realities as they perceived those
limits, a number of these leaders seemed genuinely prepared to work hard, and even
to take some risks, to promote this well-being.  Above all, these leaders were
determined to bring "progress" (khwaamcaroen) to the Thai people—a term
implicitly defined as embodying a process toward greater physical ease and material
comfort attained through the use of technology involving increased use of inanimate
energy.
Most of those leaders are now dead.  If they were able to return and observe
the realities of their future Bangkok—the Bangkok of today—many of them would
certainly be shocked by the numerous unintended negative consequences of their
policies.
Why bother to make this point?  Certainly not to suggest airily that if only the
leaders of Thailand in 1955, and the technocrats and intellectuals who had some
influence over them, had somehow been purged of their tempocentrism, everything
would be delightful and pleasant in the Bangkok of today.  Such a proposition would
be patently absurd.  Clearly, the policy decision-making and -executing process is
more complex than that, and involves numerous other inputs besides informed
awareness or imaginative anticipation—such as, for example, those stemming from
the sheer competition among political and economic interest groups.  Nor would it be
fair to brand all leaders or all planners in the Bangkok of 1955 as tempocentric.
However, I do contend that (within limits imposed by structures of political and
economic competition and advantage-taking) a greater capacity to visualize=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 35 of 219 ===
alternative sociocultural futures for the Thailand of 1990, which some leaders of the
Thailand of 1955 conceivably could have possessed and acted upon, could have had
some influence, and perhaps very considerable influence, in shaping a Bangkok
which Thais today would find appreciably more to their liking.  Tempocentrism was
indeed a problem then, just as it is today, and the course of prudence today is to
cultivate anticipatory skills to deal with the problem.
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I.6. CULTIVATING THE ART OF ANTICIPATION THROUGH
ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH
It is our conviction that the sort of tempocentrism outlined above can best be
counteracted if the leaders of a nation cultivate the "art of anticipation."  This term
was invented by a team of scholars at the University of Sussex in Great Britain, who
have published an excellent book on this subject (Encel et al.: 1975).  The art of
anticipation, vigorously and carefully practiced, can be extremely helpful to a
community or nation attempting to maximize the opportunities and benefits, and
minimize the dangers and costs, inherent in the current era of rapid demographic,
technological, economic, and ecological change.  While the art of anticipation is
certainly no panacea, it is surely a valuable skill for use in overcoming
tempocentrism and facing alternative futures affirmatively and creatively.
                                            
     5Tempocentrism was hardly absent, either, among certain foreign
consultants who were active in Thailand a generation ago.  For
example, in the early 1960s the Sarit Government engaged an
American consulting firm, the Litchfield Group, which recommended
that Bangkok become an "automobile city" (Fry and Thurber 1989:
28).  If the consulting group had come instead from some other
Western nation—Austria, for example—one wonders if such a
preposterous recommendation would have been forthcoming.  For a
related comment, see 2.5.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 36 of 219 ===
I.6.1. ANTICIPATION DISTINGUISHED FROM CONVENTIONAL
PREDICTION
Research that involves the art of anticipation must be clearly distinguished
from research that involves "prediction" in a more conventional social science sense.
While disciplined prediction is one of the hallmarks of good social science, such
prediction is usually performed:
♦  with respect to how just a few variables will behave,
♦  over a relatively short time span, and
♦  within narrowly circumscribed and explicitly stated scope
conditions.
Examples of such conventional predictions are seen in the case of the social
psychologist predicting which of his subjects in a small group experiment will turn
out to be the "sociometric star"; or the economist predicting next season's barley
prices.
All this is as it should be.  The focus of this monograph, however, is different.
We are looking at a whole sociocultural system over a time span of a generation.
When the number of variables is so great, the time span so long, and the scope
conditions so difficult to specify, we believe that "prediction" in the conventional
social science sense is impossible—at least with currently available methodologies,
and perhaps forever.  We do not even attempt it.
6
Instead of attempting prediction, then, we choose to engage in anticipation,
defined as the building of reasonable, plausible, conditional visions of the future.
                                            
     6For a carefully reasoned argument on complexity and the limits
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These take the form of projections, forecasts, and scenarios, plus the identification of
key policy questions that must be faced in the near future if chances are to be
maximized in the farther future, for the achievement of valued ends, and minimized
for disvalued consequences.  For a technical discussion, see the Appendix, Section
A.3.
For an introduction to the notion of anticipation as I use it, let us now return to
the Sussex group.  In their book, The Art of Anticipation, these scholars observe:
[Anticipation] is not, and cannot be, a purely objective exercise.  The
future does not exist; [anticipators] try to invent it.  In doing so, our
presuppositions about what ought to happen are intertwined with
assumptions about what will and what can happen.  [Anticipating] is an
attempt to gain what Baier calls "meliorative knowledge"; hence it
involves assumptions about the causal roles of events, things, and
human endeavors in generating the future.  Such knowledge depends on
value judgments, which are not merely expressions of the emotions or
exhortations to better behaviour, but are susceptible to logical ex-
amination....   (Encel et al. 1975:14; emphasis in original).
The present monograph has been created in just this anticipatory spirit, using
the methodology of Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR).  The consultants and I
have interviewed a highly informed, concerned Thai leader in considerable depth, in
the EFR mode.  We have elicited from him his expectations and preferences as to the
middle-range Thai future.  We have, in short, used EFR as a catalytic device to help
Dr. Sippanondha create "meliorative knowledge."=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 38 of 219 ===
I.6.2. EVALUATING AN ANTICIPATORY EFFORT
Given that this book does not render predictions in the conventional social
science sense, the question arises as to what criteria are appropriate to use in
evaluating the materials Dr. Sippanondha has created.  Clearly, each of you will
employ the criteria you see as most appropriate.  In my view, though, it is clear that
the appropriate criteria are not those of the more tightly predictive social sciences,
much less those of Dr. Sippanondha's discipline of physics.
Rather, I recommend that this book be judged by the criteria set forth above by
the Sussex group.  I suggest that as you read this book, you ask yourself questions
like the following.  Has Dr. Sippanondha:
♦  provided appropriate statements as to what, by his values, "ought to
happen"?
♦  provided plausible "assumptions about what will and what can
happen"?
♦  made useful and valid assumptions about "the causal roles of events,
things, and human endeavors in generating the future"?
♦  Given expression to value judgments which, far from being "merely
expressions of the emotions or exhortations to better behaviour, ... are susceptible to
logical examination"?
♦  in short, created useful "meliorative knowledge."?
7
                                            
     7In this connection, a word should be said about the matter of
factuality.  Given my epistemological position that there are no
future facts, I contend that Chapters One through Six should be
judged as to factuality only in that Dr. Sippanondha contends that
they:
♦  are grounded in social facts about Thailand in the
past and present; and
♦  factually represent his currently-held cognitive and=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 39 of 219 ===
To put it even more briefly, I believe that Dr. Sippanondha's ideas can and
should be judged by whether they are plausible
8, and by whether they are likely to
help produce more prudent public policy.
I.7. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC
FUTURES RESEARCH INTERVIEW
It is appropriate here to introduce, as briefly as possible, the essential elements
of an Ethnographic Futures Research interview of the type I administered to Dr.
Sippanondha.  If you are not interested in methodology, please proceed to the next
section.
An EFR interview is a private, one-on-one, interactive, semi-structured, open-
ended inquiry process.  In our case it lasted many hours in a number of sittings.  All
                                                                                                                                                
evaluative "positions" with respect to alternative futures for
Thailand.
     8The question of the plausibility of Dr. Sippanondha's
projections suggests the related question of the "validity" of
those projections.  If we construe the concept of validity in its
conventional social science sense, then it would appear that the
only way to assess the validity of Dr. Sippanondha's projections
would be to wait patiently until the future becomes the present,
i.e., until about A.D. 2020.  This is hardly a practical proce-
dure.
However, even this definition of the concept of validity
requires qualification, because it leaves out of consideration the
phenomena of the so-called self-fulfilling and self-negating
prophecies.  For example, it is quite possible (and, we hope,
probable!) that this monograph, or other studies like it, might
themselves alter the course of future history by helping to bring
about policy changes in the short run which would not otherwise
have been made—with the result that longer-run change processes
will then emerge in ways different than might otherwise have been
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interviews and editorial commentaries were tape-recorded, and we ended up with
more than a dozen tapes of material.
Stated as briefly as possible, the goal of my EFR interview with Dr.
Sippanondha was to:
ELICIT SCENARIOS from him that would make clear
his IMAGES and PREFERENCES with respect to
POSSIBLE or PROBABLE future CULTURES for
Thailand, as of an approximate time horizon in the
MIDDLE range future.
The term ELICIT means that I turned as much of the structure and content of
the interview over to Dr. Sippanondha as possible.  My task was to assist him in
insuring that his interview summaries (protocols) were reasonably clear,
comprehensive, contextualized, and coherent (A.4.3).  The interview "belonged" to
him, and the protocol was his intellectual creation.  My role was to try to insure that
he was as free as possible to move in directions of his own choice, and to construct
scenarios in terms of his own categories.  In my judgment, this is precisely what he
did.
Despite this emphasis on elicitation, the EFR interview, like all interviews,
does have some structure.  At the beginning, Dr. Sippanondha and I agreed upon
certain "domains" that he wanted to cover (Section I.8.3 below), and from time to
time I would probe to insure that he covered them as thoroughly as he thought
necessary.
The term MIDDLE-range future in our case referred to the period between the
present and a "horizon date" approximately thirty years into the future.  The horizon=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 41 of 219 ===
date is the year by when, the interviewee projects, certain changes can, might, or will
have occurred; certain existing practices can, might, or will have died out; and so on.
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The term POSSIBLE means that Dr. Sippanondha's scenarios were judged to
be realistic rather than utopian or dystopian.  However, he, not I, did the judging as to
what lay within, and what beyond, the bounds of realism.
The term IMAGE refers to Dr. Sippanondha's mental picture—percept or
concept—as to what a given domain or aspect of the Thai future would or could be
like.
The term PREFERENCE means that, within the range of realism as defined
by Dr. Sippanondha, I sought to learn the kind of sociocultural system that he, on
balance, preferred.  Unlike some futures research methods, EFR places as much
emphasis upon what the interviewee wants, as upon what he expects.
The term PROBABLE refers to the fact that, after I had elicited Dr.
Sippanondha's Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios, I sought his Most Probable
Scenario—which indicates which future culture, out of a wide range of possibilities,
he judged to be relatively most likely—quite apart from the question of desirability.
The gap that typically emerges between the Most Probable Scenario on the one hand,
                                            
     9While EFR can be used with a wide variety of horizon dates,
depending on one's research purposes, I have found the middle-
range horizon date to be most useful for most purposes, because:
♦  it is far enough into the future that the inter-
viewee's imagination is freed from the tempocentric limitations of
over-attention to the real or perceived constraints of the
present; but
♦  it is not so far into the future as to destroy the
interviewee's motivation.  It is near enough so that he takes the
interview seriously, since he, or at least his children, can
reasonably expect to live that long, and hence stand to gain or
lose from the sociocultural arrangements that become reality by
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and the Optimistic or Pessimistic Scenario on the other, can often throw strong and
useful light on current issues of public policy—on the need for wise policy decisions
in the short range, that can make the optimistic middle-range goals more likely to
occur, and the pessimistic consequences less likely.
The term CULTURES means that I encouraged Dr. Sippanondha to build his
scenarios in terms of the whole Thai sociocultural system, and in terms of his
premises concerning how such systems change.
The term SCENARIO means that I sought to learn both:
♦  Dr. Sippanondha's perceptions of the nature of the hypothesized Thai
sociocultural system as of the approximate horizon date; and
♦  his assumptions or models as to how the projected changes in
cultural arrangements are likely to come about, i.e., as a consequence of what driving
forces, what causal linkages, what public policies, etc.  In other words, I asked him,
when necessary, how he would "ground" his projections.
This summary of the EFR approach is extremely brief, but perhaps adequate
for the general reader.  Further details are given in the Appendix and Textor (1980a,
1991).
I.8. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THIS
RESEARCH PROJECT
Every EFR project is characterized by five basic elements.  In the present case
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I.8.1. POPULATION AND CULTURE
The population whose future is being discussed is that of Thailand, currently
around 55 million, and likely to be around 75 to 90 million by the horizon date.  The
culture whose future is being discussed is the largely Buddhist Thai culture, although
we take into account the fact that the population of Thailand also includes a number
of non-Buddhist Thai minorities, as well as ethnically non-Thai minorities.
I.8.2. HORIZON DATE
In this study, the approximate date by when various changes are projected to
occur is roughly one generation into the future.  This is defined as Buddhist Era
(B.E.) 2563, or Christian Era 2020.
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I.8.3. DOMAINS OF CULTURE
The domains of culture that Dr. Sippanondha decided to include in his
Optimistic Scenario are: Demography; Technology and Economy; Energy;
Environment and Ecology; Transportation; Tourism; Information and
Communication; Politics, Law and Government; Social Structure; Education;
Buddhism and Other Belief Systems; and Thai Identity.  As a glance at the Table of
Contents makes clear, a number of these domains embrace two or more sub-domains.
In Chapters Three and Four, the Pessimistic and Most Probable Scenarios, Dr.
Sippanondha found it suitable to collapse these domains into a smaller number of
broader categories.
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I.8.4. TECHNOLOGY AS A DRIVING FORCE
Around the world today technology is unquestionably one of the most
important forces driving broad sociocultural change.  For this reason, and because
Dr. Sippanondha has long been involved in planning and employing technology in
order to promote modernization and development in Thailand, it is not surprising that
he has devoted much attention to it in his scenarios.
I.8.5. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
Every discussion of the future, whether in the EFR mode or any other, must
proceed from certain assumptions, and it is useful to make some of these explicit.
Among those underlying the present study are the following:
♦  As of the horizon date there will still be an independent Thai
political, social, and cultural entity occupying the same territory as today.
♦  There will be no thermonuclear holocaust, or major use of chemical
weapons, which would destroy so much of the world system as to render the
anticipation exercise meaningless.
♦  There will be no world-wide ecological collapse.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 45 of 219 ===
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Since I began my specialization in the Thai language and culture during the
1950s, I can truthfully say that the Thai people have enriched my life greatly.  My
part in producing this monograph represents an effort to give something in return.  In
my entire career as a Thailand specialist, no research undertaking has given me more
satisfaction than this one.  If this book succeeds even slightly in enhancing the
awareness of Thai leaders and citizens, as part of a process in which they
take firmer charge of their national and cultural future, I shall feel amply rewarded.
Robert B. Textor
Professor of Anthropology, Emeritus
Stanford University
3435 N.W. Luray Terrace
Portland, Oregon 97210
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CHAPTER ONE:
BASIC WORKING PHILOSOPHY
This chapter lays the groundwork for the three "scenario" chapters that follow.
It outlines the basic working philosophy I will use in viewing the future of my
country optimistically, pessimistically, and most probably, in Chapters Two, Three,
and Four, respectively.
1.1. THE ADAPTIVENESS OF THAI CULTURE THROUGH
OPENNESS, FREEDOM, TOLERANCE,
AND SELECTIVE BORROWING
The Thai people have a long history of openness toward other cultures,
tolerance of cultural differences, and willingness to learn from the outside world.
Historically, we have shown a readiness to borrow elements from other cultures,
elements that will fit our culture and help meet human needs.  In our pre-modern
period we adopted, adapted, and integrated a variety of cultural elements from the
Indians, Chinese, Khmers, Mons, Burmans, Indonesians, and Malays—and various
features of our present Thai culture clearly reflect these borrowing processes.
This tendency to borrow increased markedly with the coming of Western
political and military hegemony to Southeast Asia during the Nineteenth Century,
and we adopted many elements of Western science, technology, law, management,
commerce, education, and politics.  Indeed, if we had not, we probably could not
have succeeded in preserving our independence from European colonialism.
Historically, our pattern of cultural borrowing has shown a marked "both-and"
rather than "either-or" proclivity.  Our tendency is toward harmony rather than=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 49 of 219 ===
dichotomy, toward keeping much of the old and blending it with much of the
new—rather than toward anything like blanket rejection of the old in favor of total
acceptance of the new.
Of course, one might argue that this tendency toward harmony and integration
is not peculiar to Thailand, but it is true of cultures in general.  One might argue that,
around the world, when Culture A borrows elements or emphases from Culture B, it
is usually like this.  Even if one were to grant this point, however, I would still argue
that this harmonizing pattern is more pronounced in the case of Thai culture than is
generally true among cultures around the world.
It must be quickly added, though, that the Thai cultural propensity to
synthesize and harmonize does have its limits.  Thais do not doggedly seek to
preserve everything in their tradition just because it is traditional, nor do they seek to
adopt every new cultural element presented to them by other cultures just because it
is novel.  The process of cultural borrowing and integration is much more selective
than that.
In my view, this overall Thai emphasis on harmony is traceable, in part, to the
particular and peculiar way in which Theravada Buddhism has become integrated
into our culture.  Buddhism is, unlike Christianity or Islam, a non-exclusivist
religion.  In Thailand, one can be a good Buddhist without the necessity of
renouncing all other faiths.  Indeed, there actually are Thais who espouse both
Christianity and Buddhism, yet are accepted as Buddhists by other Thais who
espouse only Buddhism.  For members of some of the world's other major faiths,
such a degree of non-exclusivism would be intolerable.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 50 of 219 ===
Related to this non-exclusivist pattern is an emphasis on the Thai Buddhist
way of "knowing" (ruu).
11  This way is broader than what most Westerners have in
mind when they use this word.  It means cognizing, yes, but it also means
emotionally apprehending and intuitively understanding: heart to heart, heart to
society, heart to nature—as well as sensing in a psychomotor way.  Thai "knowing"
is, then, more of a "both-and" synthesizing and empathizing process, and less of an
"either-or" analyzing and self-detaching process—than is Western "knowing."
A handmaiden of this "both-and," non-exclusivist orientation, and of Thai
empathy, is tolerance.  When a Thai individual, X, begins to borrow patterns of taste
or behavior from an outside culture, there is a marked tendency for other Thais, even
though they themselves do not borrow these patterns, to tolerate X's act of borrowing.
This tolerance is part of the strong and broad Thai cultural emphasis on freedom,
autonomy, and individuality.  Often, of course, X's borrowing will turn out to be
short-lived.  In other cases, it will become permanent, but remain idiosyncratic.  In
still other cases, such borrowing becomes more widespread, sometimes sufficiently
so that, in due course, the borrowed pattern may properly be regarded as having
become part of Thai culture.
                                            
     11This way of knowing has been influenced, for example, by the
attitude found in Buddhist scriptures toward believing, and
deciding what to believe.  The Lord Buddha taught his followers
never to accept an idea, even if preached by a charismatic
religious personage, on blind faith—never to accept an idea unless
they truly understood that idea, and unless it made good sense to
them on the basis of their own experience.  Faith must be rooted
in reason.  In Thailand today there is no essential dichotomy or
serious conflict between religious belief and scientific commit-
ment.  A modern Thai, such as myself, can, without strain, be both
a scientist and a Buddhist.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 51 of 219 ===
This psychological tendency to empathize and tolerate is clearly related to the
above-mentioned Thai cultural tendency to synthesize, harmonize, and integrate the
old and the new, the inherited and the borrowed.  The result is that, in many respects,
the Thai people are quite freely enabled both to continue to enjoy old richness
resulting from past culture-building efforts, and also to add new richness borrowed
from the culture-building efforts of outsiders.
For all these reasons, it is in a sense true to say that, "to be Thai is to be open
to change."  And one reason Thais are relatively unafraid of change is that they
expect that whatever change may result will not be abrupt or precipitous, but rather,
harmonious.  Indeed, one could argue that a high degree of openness without a
cultural proclivity toward gradualness and harmony would substantially increase the
risk of sociocultural collapse—especially in the current Information Age in which
ideas pour across cultural boundaries in exponentially accelerating fashion.
Thus, to summarize, while some non-industrial nations have been undermined
by openness to outside influence, we, on balance, have been enriched.  This thought
undergirds much of the working philosophy I present in this chapter, and explains
why it was natural for me to sub-title this monograph "Technology in Harmony with
Culture and Environment."
1.2. THE THAI POLITY AS AN AUTOMATICALLY
SELF-CORRECTING MECHANISM
The type of resiliency suggested above is also reflected in a number of features
that the Thai polity has developed over more than 700 years of history to insure
survival, stability, continuity, and independence.  With me, it is simply an article of
both working philosophy and taken-for-granted faith, that these features will remain
effective as our nation moves into a highly modernized and technologized future.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 52 of 219 ===
A brief digression is in order.  In sharing my thoughts on these features of the
Thai polity with the non-Thai reader, I must stress the importance of suspending
ethnocentric value judgments based on the standards of some other culture.  What I
am about to say is best understood in terms of the totality of Thai culture—not some
foreign culture.
The ultimate essence of our polity is "nationhood, religion, and monarchy"
(chaad, saadsanaa, phramahaakasad).  Loyalty to these three symbols is of the
highest order.  The Thai people are held together by an intense loyalty to the
monarchy, a loyalty supported by a strong cultural propensity toward tolerance,
harmony, and compromise.  The king is, among other things, the guardian of our
Buddhist faith, and this serves symbolically to link polity and faith.
Our present king has reigned longer than any other sovereign in our entire
history: at this writing, forty-five years.  He is indefatigable, travels constantly among
his people, and knows our country better than anyone.  He is deeply committed to
development and to sufficiency for all.  He cares about his people, and they know
that he cares.  Thais of all social classes love and revere him.  He is the symbol par
excellence of the national identity of our people, the continuity of our tradition, the
stability of our polity, and the hopes we hold for our national future.
Our polity has also been preserved by its civil and military servants
(khaaraadchakaan).  For centuries, both civilian and military officials have been
bulwarks of the stability and continuity of our nation.  In our long history we have
never observed the sort of strict separation between military and civil officialdom
that has characterized many other polities.  Indeed, in numerous historical
situations—especially those involving the subjugation or control of border areas—the
same official often served in both civil and military capacities, depending on the
needs and exigencies of the moment.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 53 of 219 ===
Up until the replacement of the absolute monarchy by a constitutional one in
1932, it was this tripartite cooperation among the monarchy, the civil administration,
and the military officer corps that insured our independence from foreign powers.
Since 1932, the formal power of the monarch has decreased, although his influence
has remained strong.  In addition, the tripartite arrangement has been broadened by
the addition of a fourth element, namely the intellectuals, including especially those
educated in the West.  The influence of this newer group has grown rapidly since the
regime of Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in the early 1960s, when the
government turned toward a decidedly more development-oriented stance, and hence
felt an ever greater need for scientific and technical expertise.  After the change of
government instigated by university students in 1973, student intellectuals tended to
share in some of the influence of this overall intellectual group.
Throughout our history, the outstanding feature of our polity has been its
tendency toward equilibrium.  Whenever the system has gotten out of balance, there
has been a gyroscopic tendency toward achieving a new equilibrium and harmony.
Each new equilibrium will incorporate the effects of the perturbation that caused
it—but the vital point to understand is that it will be a genuine equilibrium.
Since the mid-1980s there appears to have emerged a fifth constitutive group
in the Thai polity, namely that of wealthy businessmen overtly and directly involved
in elective politics.  My assumption is that this element is in the process of becoming
part of the Thai equilibrating process.
The Thai military deserve further comment here.  Today, they constitute a
large reservoir of development-relevant personnel.  They are relevant in part because
they are educated and skilled, and in part because they are more disciplined than the
other constitutive groups.  When I look at the military, therefore, I see them as an
asset to our continuing national independence and stability, yes, but also to our=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 54 of 219 ===
continuing national development—and not as a necessary evil somehow to be
tolerated.  In taking this position, I definitely part company with many Western
observers and some Thai popular writers.
It is a mistake, I believe, to regard the Thai military leadership as being
exclusively narrow in an intellectual sense.  Many senior military officers are quite
the opposite.  Nor should one regard them as being exclusively rightist in political
orientation.  Many, especially those who have served in the poverty-stricken
Northeastern countryside, are much more keenly alert to the plight of the nation's
villagers than is the average Bangkok civilian intellectual.  Many military officers
are, indeed, pro-poor and pro-reform.
But above everything else, the Thai military are pro-independence, -stability,
and -continuity.  In our history they have been a key force for equilibrium, whenever
the balance of power has leaned either too far left or too far right.  True, this
balancing role has been carried out, in part, by means of coups d'etat.  True, too, such
behavior by the Thai military has not always appeared, to the Western democratic
eye, to be very democratic or constitutional.  However, given that Thai freedom is
best understood in terms of the totality of Thai cultural reality, and that written
constitutions are not well established in Thailand, this balancing role of the military
has, in my judgment, generally served the best interests of the nation.
For reasons such as these, in my working philosophy I tend simply to assume
that there will be continued involvement of educated, disciplined military
personnel—not just in preserving national stability and independence, but also in
promoting overall development.
Having said this, let me add that I do see as a more ultimate possibility the
gradual withdrawal of the military from politics.  This process will not be completed,
however, until long after the end of the projection period used in this monograph, and=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 55 of 219 ===
only after some other set of institutions—political, educational, religious, or
whatever—has matured to the point where it can provide the discipline and moral
leadership needed to preserve stability and continuity.
There is in the Thai mythology a supernatural entity named "Phra Sajaam
Theewaathiraad," who is a sort of guardian angel for our entire nation.  This
supernatural figure is a mystical symbol fusing the elements of nationhood, religion,
and monarchy.  People of more traditional outlook believe in him as a living super-
natural being.  Others, including myself, tend to regard him allegorically, as a symbol
of our shared faith that stability, continuity, and independence, through continuing
processes of equilibration, will characterize our national future.
1.3. EMPHASIZING TECHNOLOGY IN HARMONY WITH
CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT
A fundamental guideline in my working philosophy is that the technology we
use in Thailand should be planned in such a way as to do the minimum possible
damage to the natural environment.  To the extent that damage might occur, it should
be possible for the environment to recover, and for technology and environment to
come to a new, sustainable balance.
The same guideline applies to culture, which, like the environment, is a
resource that has evolved over a long period in such a way as to achieve a certain
equilibrium and to meet mankind's needs in an effective, satisfying manner.  If a new
technology is introduced which upsets the culture of Thailand, these upheavals
should be minimized, and it should be possible for the new technology, as it becomes
part of Thai culture, to come into balance with the rest of the culture—that is, with
Thai values, religion, standards of aesthetic taste, notions of propriety, norms of
social organization, etc. (A.3.2).=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 56 of 219 ===
I can exemplify my thinking on this matter by relating it to the important
current debate as to whether Thailand could become, should become, or should want
to become, the fifth Asian "Newly Industrialized Country" (NIC)—after the four so-
called "tiger" NICs: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Let me start by stating that I consider much of this debate to be highly
misleading, because various people clearly have quite different things in mind when
they employ this simple label of "NIC."  Such a shorthand term cannot possibly
characterize all the salient features of the kind of Thailand one would want to see in
the future, in sufficient detail to be meaningful.  For one thing, the Thai resource base
and population distribution are generally different from those found in the four
existing NICs.  With the partial exception of South Korea and Taiwan, the NICs have
agricultural resource bases that are extremely limited.  California-sized Thailand, by
contrast, has an immense and rich agricultural base—as well as "hinterland
problems" of rural underemployment that are virtually unknown in, say, Singapore.
For many such reasons as these, if one is to use this label at all, one must do so with
much greater care and specificity than has so far usually been the case.
Dr. Amnuay Virawan (1988) has offered a minimal definition of a NIC that I
find useful for the time being, namely that it is:
a country with $2,000 or more Gross Domestic Product per
capita in monetary terms and [in which] the manufacturing
sector generates more income than any other sector.
As soon as one goes beyond such basic economic parameters, however, one
confronts serious complexities.  For example, all four of the "tiger" countries have
accomplished their growth through the exercise of governmental power that is far=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 57 of 219 ===
more authoritarian than that which would be appropriate to Thai culture.  If such
political methods are what proponents of NIC status for Thailand have in mind, then
NIC status is part of my Pessimistic, not Optimistic, Scenario.  If such proponents do
not have such authoritarian methods in mind, they must still assume a rather heavy
burden of proof in showing how Thailand could manage such rapid economic growth
without resorting to such methods, and in a manner that would be otherwise
reasonably consistent with our overall cultural value system.
12
1.4. EMPHASIZING TECHNOLOGY FOR SUFFICIENCY,
NOT LUXURY OR GREED
On an individual scale in everyday life, it is possible for a person either to live
as an abstemious hermit, or to lead a luxurious lifestyle.  A hermit's life is only
possible if one detaches oneself from society, while the extravagantly material life
overutilizes a society's natural resources in an unjustifiable way.  Neither life path is
in harmony with the interdependent nature of our present and future world.
In thinking about our global natural resources, I hold to the philosophy
espoused by Mahatma Ghandi, who once said, "The world has enough resources to
satisfy everyone's needs but not his greed."  I find it helpful to express the essence of
this Ghandian notion, in shortened form, as the principle of "eat sufficiently, live
                                            
     12I acknowledge that for some time a commonly held position
among political scientists has been that economic growth often
leads to the development of an infrastructure conducive to
democracy in the longer run.  This phenomenon is currently
observable in Taiwan, for example, where people today enjoy
considerably more freedom than ten years ago.  Since we Thais
would prefer to continue enjoying the degree of freedom we have
already achieved, however, as compared to the lesser degree so far
achieved by Taiwan, my question remains valid.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 58 of 219 ===
sufficiently" (kin phau dii, juu phau dii)—and use it as a fundamental ethical
yardstick for the measurement of true and just developmental change.  The principle
applies, I feel, at both individual and societal levels everywhere, both now and in the
future.
1.5. REDUCING THE EXISTING GAP OF INEQUITY
Thailand during the 1980s has been a society in which the notion of
"sufficiency for all" has in fact not been practiced, especially by some of those in a
position to influence public policy.  There are many influential people in Thailand
who uncritically accept as natural the current reality in which one Thai may enjoy
enormous luxury while another, despite hard work, cannot earn enough to provide
adequate basic nutrition for his or her children.  Indeed, in 1986 approximately 25
percent of our people were living below the poverty line, defined in terms of norms
established by a United Nations agency.
True, one may take heart that this percentage had decreased from about 42
percent in 1968 (Sippanondha 1988b, Snoh 1989).  However, the satisfaction one
takes in this accomplishment must be tempered by due regard for another stubborn
fact of life, namely that the development process in recent decades has rendered
Thailand's overall income distribution more skewed than before—not less.  That is,
while the development process to date has lifted some Thais above the level of abject
poverty, this gain has occurred simultaneously with an exacerbation of the already
highly skewed income distribution in which a small number of Thais received very
high incomes.  (For details, see Medhi 1988, and Sukanya and Somchai 1988.)
I regard this problem of equity as fundamental to my Optimistic Scenario.  I
take the position that, all else equal, every major decision made by the Thai gover-
nment ought somehow to promote more equity—or at the very least ought NOT to=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 59 of 219 ===
make existing inequity worse.  I readily grant that all this is more easily said than
done, but this tenet nonetheless remains basic in my working philosophy.
Whenever a new technology is introduced from the outside, or developed
within Thailand, the first question one must ask is: How can one be sure that this new
tool will be used for the benefit of the society as a whole?  Of course, people in
Thailand, as elsewhere, do naturally enough tend to seize a new tool for the purpose
of serving their own interests and those of their immediate group.  The results of this
are often very positive.  However, depending on circumstances, the results can also
be unfortunate—particularly in cases where the new technology is "high," since high
technology is typically capital-intensive.  And, in a nation such as ours, where wealth
is already very unevenly distributed, too often the result will simply be that the few
who are rich enough to gain access to the new tool more quickly, will proceed to use
it to further enrich themselves—so that income and wealth become even more
inequitably distributed, at least over the short and middle term.
Suppose, for example, that a new type of microelectronic remote sensing
device were to be introduced, which could be used by the Forestry Department to
identify trees in our hardwood forests that could be cut without sacrificing
sustainability and without causing undue environmental damage.  Quite probably, it
would not be just the Forestry Department that would get hold of the new tool.  It is
quite conceivable that certain "mafia" groups would also gain access to it, and
proceed to use it to improve the accuracy of their calculations as to how to profit
maximally from forest cutting—even if unsound from a forestry management or
ecological standpoint, and even if illegal.
The same principle might apply also to technology that is not "high," and to
various kinds of infrastructural innovation.  For example, there are certain parts of
Thailand that are laced with more roads per area than many American states.  While=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 60 of 219 ===
it is true that these roads were initially built, at great expense, primarily for purposes
of national security, they were also intended to encourage general development by
providing farmers with access to markets and social services.  However, one of their
unforeseen consequences has been that, once built, they have been used for anti-
social purposes as well—for example, by illegal timber cutters to gain access to
valuable timber and move it out to markets much more efficiently and profitably than
would otherwise have been possible.  With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear
that, from a purely ecological standpoint, it would have been better if fewer of these
roads had ever been built in the first place.
The ultimate moral is simple.  Somehow or other, Thai society must seek
deliberately to find ways to insure that technology will be used to provide sufficiency
for all, as a higher priority than providing greater riches for the already wealthy.  This
suggests that the higher the technology, the greater the potential for social harm, and
hence the more likely the need for some kind of moderating intervention by
government.  Such intervention might often simply take the form of some kind of
action to insure access to a given type of technology for less privileged Thais, so that
they may have a more nearly equal opportunity to grow into the new social
arrangements that will follow, and eventually to share in the overall benefits of these
arrangements.  Yet, in considering what kind of intervention would be optimal, it is
essential that we bear continually in mind that such interventions, if too strong, can
sometimes induce inefficiency and corruption by government officials.  This whole
matter will be discussed further in the scenarios that appear in Chapters Two, Three,
and Four.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 61 of 219 ===
1.6. EMPHASIZING TECHNOLOGY FOR PRODUCTION,
USING LOCAL RESOURCES
In general, I believe that investment in technology that raises people's
productivity should be more strongly encouraged than investment in technology that
raises their consumption levels—especially of luxury items.  For example,
biotechnology that helps an ordinary farmer become more productive should be
favored over computer technology that allows middle class urban people to play
computer games.
All else equal, investment in technology that will take advantage of our natural
and human resources is to be preferred over investment in technology that simply
takes advantage of our relatively low labor costs.  Thus, a factory which employs
local people in canning lynchees, longans, or other tropical fruits that grow well in
Thailand, might contribute more to the nation in the long run, than a microelectronic
assembly plant where all the materials and parts are imported, and the only Thai
contribution is cheap semi-skilled labor.
However, in the latter example, if a foreign computer firm agrees to train Thais
in scientific, technical, and managerial skills, and if that agreement is actually
enforced, then the assembly plant might still serve Thailand's development needs
quite well, because many Thais would learn useful modern skills that would almost
certainly promote general technological modernization.  Such skills might well be
adaptable to a wide variety of emerging work-roles, not just in microelectronic
assembly itself, but also in a host of other productive operations where
microelectronics are used, or will in the future be used—such as in canning vege-
tables, manufacturing durable goods, or managing a commercial firm.
Some of the same considerations apply to the so-called "import substitution"
strategies that Thailand has pursued in the past—often quite successfully, though=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 62 of 219 ===
sometimes with the necessity of paying heavy prices for access to foreign
technology.  While import substitution is important because it permits the nation to
save on foreign exchange, the kind of import substitution that is most worthy of
encouragement, all else equal, is that which utilizes our natural and human resources
to the fullest.  For example, the current plan to use some of our natural gas to provide
feedstocks for the development of the domestic plastics industry will help to reduce
the current heavy foreign exchange burden for imported plastic materials, currently
running at some eight billion baht per year (2.3.1).
In short, in planning our national development we must optimize across
several key criteria, including technology that will:
♦  utilize our natural and human resources;
♦  enhance production by the least privileged members of our society;
and
♦  impart skills that will in turn contribute to general processes of
modernization and development.
1.7. KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH DEVELOPMENTS
IN WORLD TECHNOLOGY
Thailand has some excellent scientists, but in most organizations they are too
few in number to form the sort of "critical mass" that would be needed to make basic
contributions to world science.  Moreover, the nation also generally lacks a suitable
infrastructure to support concentrated basic scientific research.  For such reasons,
Thailand cannot compete internationally with such nations as Japan in most scientific
areas, such as, for example, superconductor research and development.  In this area=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 63 of 219 ===
alone, at the present time thousands of Japanese scientists and technologists are at
work, in an open-ended, well-supported research and development atmosphere.
However, what Thailand can and must do, at the very least, is to insure that in
its universities and other organizations there are sufficient numbers of scientists and
technologists, in every major field, who will be able to monitor the major
developments that are taking place elsewhere in the world, and to reproduce sig-
nificant results.  In this way, when a particular new technology becomes available,
there will be in Thailand the requisite pool of knowledge to enable the nation quickly
and adroitly to take advantage of new opportunities, and avoid whatever pitfalls
might be inherent in the process of adaptation.
It should be added that, in a limited number of fields, we do have the necessary
critical mass to make basic scientific contributions.  In these fields, we can and
should keep pushing forward, not only toward the discovery of scientific truth, but
also toward findings of immediate practical benefit to Thailand.  We can do this, for
example, in the chemistry of natural products, linking them to pharmaceutical
applications.
1.8. UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD CONTEXT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL
Thailand is a small country.  We Thais must survive in a world situation over
which, in most respects, we have no control and little influence.  Even so, we can
seek to serve our own legitimate interests by the careful monitoring of changes in the
world situation, and timely adjustments of our own policies.  Scientists and
technologists participating in the overall planning of Thailand's economic and social
development must constantly keep this world context in mind, and must constantly=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 64 of 219 ===
remain alert to the possibility that various aspects of this context might change quite
suddenly, and might take even experts by surprise.
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What is this context?  I shall here attempt only to sketch a few key aspects of it
in briefest outline.  To begin with, it is a context in which there are two military
superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  Recently relations between the two have
improved dramatically, but Thailand must be ever alert to the possibility that a
reversal could occur.  In similar fashion, the increasing political role of Japan in
world affairs, paralleling that country's remarkable increase in economic power,
requires careful monitoring—especially as related to China, with its billion-plus
people and enormous economic potential.  In recent years Thailand's economic
relationship with Japan has been growing steadily more intensive, and this trend will
probably continue for some time to come.  Increased interaction between Thailand
and the Eastern European bloc is a distinct possibility, as these nations develop
market economies and more liberated political systems.  Relations with the U.S. and
the European Economic Community are already strong, and will continue—with the
added complexity of a re-unified Germany.  Canada and Australia are likely to
become heavier trading partners, as are certain countries in Africa.  At the same time,
the possible geopolitical instability of the oil-rich Arab states must be closely
monitored and analyzed.
                                            
     13Three recent examples stand out: the dramatic unfolding of
Eastern European liberation; the fundamental reversal of policy in
the Peoples Republic of China concerning individual freedom of
expression; and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, followed by the
imposition of United Nations sanctions.  All these dramatic shifts
in the world context occurred during the period in which the
manuscript for this monograph was being prepared.  It is probably
fair to say that even expert students of Eastern Europe, China and
the Middle East were largely taken by surprise by the profundity
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Thailand will approach all these possibilities primarily by itself, but
secondarily as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
ASEAN membership offers genuine opportunities to pool the collective bargaining
power of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines, so
as to get better deals from the outside world, and to resist multinational corporations
who often play one country off against another on such matters as minimum wage
rates and the export of pollution.  ASEAN-sponsored joint economic ventures have
not made much progress to date, but might in the future.
The notion is heard in many circles that the future of the world hinges on
developments in the so-called "Pacific Basin."  According to some formulations, the
heart of the Pacific Basin will consist of Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Thailand, and our ASEAN partner nations.  The periphery of the area, due in
large part to the economics of bulk shipping, will consist of nations like Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.  In recent years the economies of the
heartland nations have been growing at a rapid rate, and some scholars project that in
due course they will become a powerful trading bloc at the center of the entire world
economy.  Whether one takes this projection literally or not, it is clear that those
seriously concerned with Thailand's economic future must remain constantly alert to
both the opportunities and the risks involved in the Pacific Basin phenomenon, with
its possibilities for new economic and political relationships, especially with Japan
and China.
Crucial to all of Thailand's development planning are three important facts of
life: the balance of trade, the exchange value of the Thai baht, and the world price of
oil.  With respect to the first two, we are heavily subject to international vicissitudes.
With respect to the third, there are some small things we can do to develop our own=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 66 of 219 ===
petroleum resources and use them wisely, both to safeguard our energy future and to
stimulate our manufacturing industries.  I will deal with these matters in 2.3.
1.9. UNDERSTANDING THE THAI CONTEXT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL
My working philosophy distinguishes rather sharply between science and
technology.  Scientific knowledge is universal and therefore easily transferable from
culture to culture.  Technological knowledge, by contrast, is not.  Technology must
be nurtured indigenously in order to avoid inadvertent undesirable side-effects.  If
Thailand is to benefit maximally, and suffer minimally, from the introduction of new
technology from abroad, it is essential that Thai scientists and technologists have a
broad understanding of the actual economic, political, social and cultural context in
which the introduced technology must take root.  To put it another way, the Thai
scientist must be prepared to bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and
practical technological application.
This means, among other things, that the Thai scientist must be prepared to
communicate with, and understand, the perspective of the entrepreneur who seeks to
implement new technology and make money thereby.  A gap exists today between
the scientist who works for a university or government agency, and the businessman.
Neither trusts the other.  The scientist suspects the businessman of being blindly and
single-mindedly greedy.  The businessman suspects the scientist of being unrealistic
and expert only in book learning.  This gap needs to be bridged, if the Thai people as
a whole are truly to benefit from new technology.  Further comments on this matter
appear in 5.3.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 67 of 219 ===
1.10. RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF BOTH
RURAL AND URBAN THAI CULTURES
Thai culture has two basic variants, the urban-modern and the rural-peasant or
-post peasant.  A persistent problem has been that political policy-making and
planning roles have largely been in the hands of urban-modern Thais, who often have
had little awareness of, or respect for, the rural subculture.  For example, even though
there is much that is non-scientific about the modern-urban lifestyle, it is certainly, in
general, more firmly grounded in scientific rationality.  The rural subculture is, on the
whole, clearly more firmly committed to non-scientific beliefs (2.11.4).
To choose but one example of what this urban-rural gap means in practice, it is
noteworthy that the role of ghosts is much more elaborated and emphasized in the
rural than the urban culture.  Urban, scientifically or technically trained change
agents working in villages often fail to appreciate this fact in its full context.  They
often fail to realize that fear of ghosts, though non-scientific, does have positive
social stability preservation functions—such as keeping maidens in the house after
dark, which serves to restrict illicit or promiscuous sexual relations, which in turn has
a positive effect on family solidarity.  Similarly, fear of ghosts is effective in keeping
people from stealing, poaching on their neighbor's property, or committing all sorts
of other infractions.
The crucial point is that unless urban-reared change agents understand the
nature and function of these rural beliefs, they can hardly expect to introduce positive
change.  These beliefs help give meaning to rural life.  Yet they are not immutable.
The same peasant who attributes disease to a ghost will also accept a modern=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 68 of 219 ===
therapeutic or preventive injection—and find ways to integrate the latter into his or
her personal belief system.
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Members of both subcultures are, on a world-wide comparative basis, quite
flexible and open to change (1.1).  Rural people will be more likely to change if
urban change agents treat them and their beliefs with respect.  And in doing so, the
urbanite will discover a way of life that, though poor in a material sense, is rich in
other values.
In my working philosophy, no set of planned or induced changes can possibly
be considered positive, and worthy of social support, unless it simultaneously
improves the lot of the Thai people as a whole, regardless of subculture.  I hold to
this principle not only as an ethical value, but also as a pragmatic premise, for
programs of planned change that truly take the values and world view of our rural
subculture into full account are much more likely to produce successful and enduring
results.
1.11. PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT GRADUALLY
BUT DELIBERATELY
When a polity seeks to promote development, there are several possible ways
of proceeding.  Taking abrupt, strong measures may strike at root causes but will, in
general, create numerous negative side-effects.  Taking weak measures may seem
painless at the moment but will often result only in the need to face even larger prob-
lems later on.  Our Buddhist religion stresses the "middle path" (madchima
patipathaa), and I find this a useful general guideline in approaching development in
                                            
     14In this process of accommodation, the broad cultural
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Thailand.  Especially because of the two-culture, rural-urban nature of Thai society,
my working philosophy is deliberately gradualistic.  I am opposed to "great leaps
forward" of the type that failed in China.  I am also opposed to rapid guided change
of the type that produced dramatic results in Singapore—because I think the overall
social cost of such success has been too high.
Development is a process that can only be viewed broadly.  It is a matter of
providing stimuli so that those who wish to build a better life for
themselves—"better" as judged by their values at that point in time—may do so.
Development also implies participation; one does not simply "receive" betterment:
one participates in the process of bettering oneself while others are also participating
in order to better themselves.  For true development to take place, the political
structure must allow for participation by the populace at every level, from the local to
national.
It is here that the need for gradualism becomes especially evident, for if a
development program or movement is to be truly participatory, it must allow time for
people to get involved, and to change their habits at a reasonable pace.  By contrast,
fundamental change that occurs overnight can only be accomplished, if at all, by non-
participatory, authoritarian means.  And, in my lexicon, such change is simply not
"developmental."  This entire matter is discussed further in 2.8.
Development, to me, means that people will end up experiencing considerably
more overall gain than loss.  A gradual approach is likely to result in less overall loss,
because people will be able to monitor changes in their situation through time, and to
adjust their behavior and defend themselves against undue loss—for all change is
bound to produce some loss along with the gain, and it is the task of an enlightened
government to insure that this loss is more or less equitably shared.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 70 of 219 ===
The principle of fairness applies not just to classes, but to generations as well.
I am utterly opposed to "sacrificing" a whole generation for the supposed benefit of
later generations.  I believe that every Thai ought to be able to expect improvements
in his or her family situation during his or her lifetime.  The development process
must result in a broader array of life opportunities for all—if not in the short term,
then surely in the middle term.
Gradualism does not, however, imply stagnation or indefinite delay.  Nor does
gradualism imply random change, or planless change.  For a developing nation like
Thailand, gradualism must be deliberate and focused.  Deliberate gradual change can
result in great benefit to people during the span of a single lifetime, as witness the
improvement in the condition of the average Thai during the reign of King
Chulalongkorn, from 1868 to 1910.  This wise monarch transformed life in our
country and saved our independence in the process.  Yet his gradualism was such that
older traditional forms were not arbitrarily or unnecessarily trampled upon, and the
older generation did not become estranged from the younger to any serious degree.
And when one looks at the broad sweep of Thai history since the death of this great
leader, one concludes that Thailand's evolutionary and gradualistic modernization
and development have on the whole been quite successful—when compared with the
record in most other developing countries.
1.12. PRESERVING FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR BOTH
PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
Individual freedom and autonomy constitute a core value in Thai culture, and
one which I deeply share.  For this reason, in thinking about the Thai future I look for
ways to insure that generations of Thais yet unborn will, upon reaching adulthood, be
able to make their own individual and collective decisions freely.  This means=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 71 of 219 ===
making decisions in accord with their values, as of that point in the future.  Since
their values, as of a particular point in the future, might differ from my values today,
I consider it only appropriate that today's generation should do all it can to avoid
imposing its values on future generations.  Cultures change, and the Thai value
system of A.D. 2020 will almost certainly be different, in important respects, from
the Thai value system of today.
I would be less than honest, though, if I did not acknowledge that this whole
matter is further complicated by the fact that I do hold certain values deeply.  All else
equal, it is natural enough that I should wish to see the upcoming generation share
some of my most deeply held values.  In a sense, that is what one's "value
commitment" is all about.  And that is why, as an educator, I am concerned about the
sorts of values that are transmitted through the schools and media.  Even so,
however, my transcendent value is that the young should be educated in such a way
that, upon adulthood, they can wisely make their own value decisions.
In 1973-75 the Government of Thailand appointed a National Education
Reform Commission, of which I served as Chairman.  Members of the Commission
included many of the nation's leading intellectuals.  The Commission discussed this
very problem thoroughly, and arrived at a consensus along the lines I have just
outlined.  We agreed that the students of today should not be indoctrinated as to
what values to hold, but rather, should be educated in how to make wise decisions
based upon clearly articulated values.  A young person is like a fruit tree, to be
fertilized and watered so that it will grow freely and naturally—rather than like a
Japanese bonsai to be meticulously molded and manicured.  I consider this stance to
be not only consistent with the specifics of our Thai culture, but also humane and
wise in a universal sense.  It is a fundamental part of my working philosophy.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 72 of 219 ====== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 73 of 219 ===
1.13. ATTACKING PROBLEMS RATHER THAN MERELY
COPING WITH THEM
Undergirding the remainder of this monograph is my working assumption that
the best way to promote a bright future for Thailand is to move away from the older
orientation found among many Thai planners, and to move toward a new one.  The
older orientation (phaen rab), which is still dominant, emphasizes responding to "is-
sues and problems" after they have arisen, and somehow coping with them.  This
approach might often succeed in reducing the symptoms of a problem, but it will
seldom get at root causes.
  The newer orientation (phaen ruk) is that of affirmatively pursuing
opportunities and attacking risks.  It is essentially an active approach designed to
identify opportunities and take full and systematic advantage of them, while at the
same time reducing risks as much as possible.  It aims to produce results by seeking
out problems and their root causes, and by dealing with these in terms of an
integrated set of prioritized goals.  It seeks fundamentally to improve society's
general capacity to deal with problems.
In short, the older approach tends to emphasize taking minimal risks, and
coping with immediate problems, while the newer approach sees opportunities in
problems, and tends to emphasize bolder, more focused and coordinated efforts
toward basic solutions.  An example of the older approach would be to build a few
more elevated crossings at especially congested traffic intersections in Bangkok.  An
example of the newer approach would be to build a whole new monorail system of
cheap, clean, convenient rapid public transit.
In this monograph, my discussion of this newer approach reflects my
experience over the past few years as President of the National Petrochemical
Corporation, Ltd., and over the past several years as a member of the Executive=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 74 of 219 ===
Committee of the National Economic and Social Development Board.  In both
capacities, I have been an advocate of the "Eastern Seaboard Development Scheme."
This Scheme, dating from the early Eighties, is the first integrated regional
development scheme to be based on this newer approach, and for this reason it has
raised no little amount of controversy.  I will refer to this Scheme at various points in
the pages that follow, and will return to a discussion of the general "attack" strategy
in Chapter Six.
1.14. DEVELOPING LEADERS WHO ARE BOTH
EXPERT AND ETHICAL
Especially if the "attack" strategy is to be followed, but even if it is not, the
pressing need for Thailand (and many other countries) is to develop and provide
leaders who are both expert and ethical (thang keng thang dii).  An expert is a person
who has not only a worm's eye view of a particular technical area and a deep
understanding of the issues in this area, but also a bird's eye view of the surrounding
national and international context of economic, ecological, political, social, and
cultural factors.
An ancient problem in all societies is that if a person is truly expert, he or she
might choose to use that expertise for personal enrichment or aggrandizement, rather
than for societal benefit.  On the other hand, in today's complex world, no matter how
ethical and socially dedicated individuals may be, if they lack appropriate expertise,
the tangible results of their selfless labors are likely to be meager indeed.  It is vital,
then, that our educational institutions be so shaped as to create people who are both
expert and ethical—and our political institutions so shaped as to insure that such
persons, once available, have a reasonable chance to move into positions of
leadership.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 75 of 219 ===
In short, what Thailand needs is culture change, such that ordinary people will
simply find a leader unacceptable unless he or she is demonstrably both expert and
ethical.  On the prospects for developing such culture change, and such leadership
resources, hangs much of the basic rationale for my Optimistic Scenario, to which I
now turn.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 76 of 219 ===
CHAPTER TWO:
THE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO
This chapter and the next two present three scenarios concerning Thailand's
future, namely the Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Most Probable Scenarios (I.7 and
A.4.2).  Of the three chapters, the present one will be by far the longest.  One reason
for this is that I am, in my own view of myself, very much an optimist at heart.
2.1. DEMOGRAPHY
I will deal with demography first quantitatively and then qualitatively.  In the
quantitative approach, I will look at the number and distribution of Thais that I
consider desirable, possible, or unavoidable as of the approximate horizon date of
A.D. 2020 or B.E. 2563.  In the qualitative approach, I will look at the kinds of Thais
that might be born into the world, and at how the quality of their lives might be
affected by this or that type of public policy or cultural practice.
2.1.1. QUANTITATIVE PROJECTIONS
Like most Thais today, I am "anti-natalist," in the sense that I regard it as a
high national priority that our nation seek to bring its population growth rate
substantially down as rapidly as is technically feasible—consistent with the values of
our culture.
Optimistically, by the horizon date the population of Thailand will be as low
as 75 million, and not higher than 85 million.  The lower figure assumes a population
growth rate of 1.5% per annum in 1990, declining to 0.5% over 30 years.  The higher=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 77 of 219 ===
figure assumes a growth rate of 1.5% per annum in 1990, declining to 1.1% over the
projection period.
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I would very much like these numbers to be lower, but that would seem to be
clearly beyond the realm of possibility.  True, it is theoretically conceivable that
Thailand's population could be even lower than 75 million in A.D. 2020, but in my
judgment this could only be the result of either:
♦  Nuclear war, major epidemics, or ecological catastrophes of a type
which, in this study, I assume will not occur (I.8.5); or else:
♦  Very harsh birth control measures of a type that has been practiced
by such nations as Singapore or the People's Republic of China, which would be part
of my Pessimistic, rather than Optimistic, Scenario.
In other words, given the emphasis on personal freedom that underlies this
entire Optimistic Scenario, I see no hope that the population of Thailand, as of the
horizon date, could be smaller than 75 million—much though I would prefer a lower
figure from the standpoint of having more resources available to provide the Thai
people with improved services, and opportunities to enhance the quality of their lives.
Even this projection assumes that the Thai people will continue to employ
contraceptive methods such as the condom, the pill, the diaphragm, and tubal
ligation, which had become conventional by the mid-Eighties.
Abortion is a different matter.  I do not project a future in which there will be,
for example, widespread availability of government-financed abortion clinics; such a
strategem would not fit my personal values and hence has no place in my Optimistic
Scenario.
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I regard it as almost inevitable that, at various times during the projection
period, a variety of new technologies for birth control will be invented somewhere in
the world, and will become available to the Thai people.  However, whether
variations of these new technologies belong in my Optimistic Scenario is proble-
matic.  I refer here to such widely discussed possibilities as the "morning after" pill,
plus a variety of other devices, procedures, and medicaments which one can scarcely
imagine at this time, but which nonetheless seem highly likely to emerge as the
Biotechnical Revolution gains momentum.  All I am prepared to say at this point is
that, optimistically, Thai scientists and technologists will stay in close touch with
these developments; and Thai leaders, philosophers, and ethical and religious
thinkers will engage in timely, proactive, honest, informed discussion as to whether
such methods are consistent with the needs and values of the Thai people at that time.
2.1.2. DISTRIBUTION PROJECTIONS
I move now to a broad set of questions concerning how the Thai population
will be distributed geographically.  Optimistically, I project a future Thailand where
those who prefer urban life will be able to find useful and satisfying urban
employment, while those who prefer rural life will have an opportunity to live in
rural settings without undue feelings of economic deprivation or social isolation.
Optimistically and realistically, I project that by about A.D. 2020 the population of
Thailand will change from its present distribution of approximately 75% rural and
25% urban residents, to a 50-50 distribution.  Without some such geographic shift, I
do not see how significant industrialization could occur.  And significant
industrialization is essential to my Optimistic Scenario because, without it, the
overall productivity and competitiveness of the Thai economy would not be adequate
to support an overall rise in the basic standard of living which I see as essential to the=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 79 of 219 ===
realization of "sufficiency for all" (1.4).  That is, many of the more complex
manufacturing operations that Thailand will need to undertake can only be successful
in places where infrastructural and technological support is adequate, and this will
typically mean, only in cities—indeed, perhaps only in a few moderately large cities.
My Optimistic Scenario does not, however, visualize Thailand's industrial
development as occurring only in urban areas.  I also project a considerable increase
in simple yet important industrial production–and productivity—at the village level,
organized in the form of family firms, community cooperatives, or various types of
coordinated regional networks.  Whatever particular forms of organization may
emerge, rural industry carries with it the important prospect that thousands of rural
people will thus be able to realize a better economic lot in life without facing the
hazards and stresses of urban employment, and that thousands of rural families
whose members prefer to continue living together will be able to do so.  In principle,
I regard any economic arrangement that can keep families together voluntarily as
good for the quality of life in Thailand.  Such arrangements will help insure against
the disastrous phenomenon experienced in some developing nations, in which the
cities drain away too many people in their most productive years, leaving behind
principally the very young and very old to carry on village community life—a
situation which can result in rapid cultural decay.
Much of the rural industry I am here visualizing will be agro-industry or aqua-
industry, whose very nature requires that people remain on or near the soil.  This
factor, in particular, will help prevent Thailand from becoming over-urbanized, and
help provide a healthy balance between industrial and agricultural production.
Optimistically, the population shifts here envisioned, involving the sort of
demographic mobility that permits people to optimize their economic and quality-of-
life preferences, will be part of a larger process of closing the economic equity gap=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 80 of 219 ===
between urban and rural dwellers (1.5).  Assuming steady improvement in transpor-
tation and communication, life in the rural areas will become more humane and
rewarding, relative to life in the cities, than was the case in 1988.
Moreover, the distribution of Thailand's urban population will also change, as
more and more urban dwellers will reside in various middle-sized cities, rather than
in the primate city of Bangkok—which by the Eighties was already much too large,
too congested, and too polluted.  Optimistically, through wise macro-planning and
effective controls, these cities will avoid some of the more extreme problems of
congestion, pollution, and crime that have plagued Bangkok.
It is of course impossible for all this urban migration to occur painlessly.  The
disruption of family and community life, and the loss of some sources of religious
and customary satisfaction, are prices that Thailand cannot hope to avoid more than
partially.  However, the Thai government and society can seek to minimize this pain,
and to cushion the shock in various ways.
Essential to such minimization and cushioning is wider and deeper
understanding of these urbanization processes and how to handle them.  While
social scientists have already told us much about these processes in a general way,
we need to understand much more about how they work in specific Thai situations.
And essential to developing this understanding is effective applied research by our
universities, teacher training institutions, and other research organizations.
Optimistically, these organizations will rise to the challenge, and do so not
only by baseline studies, but by actual hands-on participation in on-going pilot
projects designed to find the best ways to help people maximize the economic and
other benefits of urban residence and industrial employment, while minimizing the
sacrifice in quality of life.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 81 of 219 ===
2.1.3. QUALITATIVE PROJECTIONS
What about the quality of the people who will be born into Thai society?  This
depends on various factors, of which the most obvious is how Thai society nurtures
and educates those who are born into it.  Much of this process occurs in schools and
school-like programs, public or private, formal or nonformal, and this is a subject I
will discuss under "Education" (2.10).
In addition, much education and enculturation also occurs informally in the
home.  Every family has its own "hidden curriculum" of learning opportunities and
stimuli which it offers to its young members.  In Thailand, as in any nation, there is
great variation from family to family as to the richness of these opportunities and
stimuli.
The above reflections about education are clearly related to demography.
From the standpoint of building a richer and better-adapted cultural life for all the
Thai people, it is certainly desirable that married couples who are highly educated,
and who can provide a rich "hidden curriculum" in the home, not reproduce at a rate
drastically lower than couples who have been educationally less fortunate.
Optimistically, the general moderation of family size that will follow upon the heels
of birth control practiced widely by Thais of every social and educational class, will
avoid a serious problem of this type.
Definitely not a part of my Optimistic Scenario is any program, such as that
recently broached by a national leader in Singapore, which would put heavy
government pressure on educated women to marry, or on educated wives to have
more children than they would otherwise freely decide to bear.  This type of
government intervention would run profoundly counter to Thai values, including my
own.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 82 of 219 ===
So far, my qualitative projections have dealt with fairly conventional
phenomena.  In addition, though, we must now consider highly unconventional
possibilities which pose a whole set of bewildering new problems, namely those
posed by the biogenetic aspects of the on-going Biotechnical Revolution.  I must
stress, as firmly as I can, that this Revolution is real.  It is here to stay.  It will almost
inevitably open up a wide range of new choices.  People in Thailand and throughout
the world will suddenly find themselves capable of doing things that, just a few years
earlier, they had not dreamt to be even remotely possible.  Some of these new pos-
sibilities, if pursued, will result in situations that conflict with traditional values—or
even "modern" values.  That is, the Biotechnical Revolution will make possible all
sorts of interventions into human gene plasm that simply did not exist during the
centuries when our Thai values were crystallizing into the form we know and honor
today.  While our culture does indeed provide a rich and systematic set of general
ethical standards to guide us into this unknown future, we will be forced to apply
these standards in the context of a bewildering array of concrete new possibilities that
are utterly without precedent in our historic experience.
This is not my area of technical specialization, but I will share with you
examples of some of the kinds of problems I expect to arise.  Let us start with gene
therapy.  To take but one example, some Thais suffer from a disease whose explicit
genetic causation is already known, namely thalassemia.  The day will doubtless
come when the gene therapist will be able to cure this terrible and otherwise
untreatable disease by removing certain cells from the patient, manipulating the gene
content of these cells, and then re-inserting the healthy cells back into the patient's
body.  Such therapy is "gene" therapy in the sense that it could not be successful
without invading the patient's genes.  This is an example of what medical scholars=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 83 of 219 ===
call "negative" gene therapy because it "negates" some obviously undesirable, indeed
horrible, human affliction.
In the future, medical science will no doubt be able to cure a number of gene-
specific diseases in this manner.  It will also be able to prevent such diseases from
occurring to people who would otherwise be genetically predisposed toward them.
In cases where the disease is obviously painful, crippling, and life-shortening, I see
nothing in our Buddhist way of life which would, or should, stand in the way of our
utilizing such gene therapy.  Indeed, in the case of thalassemia, such research and
development work has for some years been going forward in Thailand itself, as for
example in the laboratory of Prof. Prawase Wasi, who has attained worldwide
renown in this area.
We must, however, look further into the future.  Well before A.D. 2020, it will
no doubt be possible to practice a greatly increased array of gene therapies.  Some of
these will quite possibly be of the "germ-line" type—that is, the type that alters not
only the genes of a particular living person, but also those of all of his or her
descendants.  Suppose, for example, that a young Thai married couple wants germ-
line gene therapy.  Suppose further that the type of germ-line therapy they desire is
what medical scholars call "positive," in the sense that it adds something that did not
exist before, and that the couple considers desirable.  In such a case, there is no
debilitating or painful disease to be removed, but rather, something new to be added,
something that would not otherwise occur.
Let us illustrate with an extreme example.  Suppose that this Thai married
couple, for idiosyncratic reasons of their own, wants a child with blond hair and blue
eyes—and is able to achieve its desire.  It is easily conceivable that as this child
grows up, he or she will deeply regret this unusual condition for the rest of his or her
life.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 84 of 219 ===
The use of such extreme forms of "positive" gene therapy is not a part of my
Optimistic Scenario.  Given the values that I hold today, I do not want this sort of
"therapy" to be practiced.  Nor do I want it to be legally tolerated.  However,
notwithstanding the repugnance I feel toward such technological possibilities, I do
hold to the principle that future generations should be allowed to make such
decisions for themselves, based on the values that they hold at that time (1.12).  The
Thai society of that time should make its own decisions as to whether to permit,
discourage, or prohibit such practices.
Just where the line should be drawn between "negative" and "positive" gene
therapy is a problem that will pose many dilemmas in the future.  Consider the
possible example of a young married couple, both of whom are physically frail and
come from families of frail people, who request gene therapy that will bring them
normally muscular children—not superpersons, but simply normal, robust kids.  In
the Thailand of A.D. 2020, should such therapy, if available, be legal?  Should the
government provide it free in low-income cases?  Again here, my position is that
such choices should be left to the Thais of 2020 to decide, on the basis of the values,
norms, and laws that prevail at that time.
Finally, my Optimistic Scenario envisions an ongoing process in which Thais,
both urban and rural, representing the entire span of socio-educational levels, will
take a proactive, informed interest in these bioethical issues, with the end in view of
building a degree of advance consensus concerning the medical, ethical, and
philosophical issues that will inevitably be posed.
2.2. TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMY
As indicated in 2.1.2, I see the key to "sufficiency for all" to lie in
industrialization, including agro- and aqua-industrialization.  This means, first and=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 85 of 219 ===
foremost, finding ways in which Thailand as a whole can deploy capital, technology,
and human resources in such combinations as to be efficient and effective in
enhancing sustainable productivity and promoting economic equity in harmony with
nature and culture.  Basically, my Optimistic Scenario projects that Thai leaders,
public and private, will select the right technology for the tasks to be
accomplished—whether or not such technology is "high."
Aiding in this process will be a steadily rising level of sophistication among
the general labor force.  This will be a consequence both of better education reaching
more people, and of a growing realization by management that true competitive,
sustainable success requires that a company give a high priority to human resources
development.  Optimistically, capital, management, and labor will come to value
harmony above strife.  Increasingly, factory workers will participate in
technological and production decisions affecting them, and will do so in a
cooperative rather than confrontational spirit, in somewhat the same manner as
characterizes many Japanese firms today.  Workers, whether organized in unions or
otherwise, or not at all, will be protected by company policies emphasizing long-run
growth and prosperity—rather than, as often in the past, quick profits.
Optimistically, a pattern will become increasingly prevalent in which running a
company "according to the Dharma" of Buddhism (or the ethical code of some other
great religion), will serve to promote an equitable sharing of the fruits of annual gains
in productivity.  By such processes will the nation's total industrial productivity rise
steadily from year to year.
The fact that Thailand has a large domestic population means that many
industries can be developed that will serve both a domestic and a foreign market.  If,
through economic growth, 75 million Thais become sufficiently affluent so that they
can afford to purchase Thai-made motor bikes, solar hot water heaters, plastic water=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 86 of 219 ===
piping, or whatever, the result will be that numerous Thai factories will enjoy a much
enhanced basis for accomplishing economies of scale, and achieving stable viability.
  While high technology will sooner or later have an important place in
Thailand's future, most of the technology the country will be using during the projec-
tion period will involve production processes that are less capital-intensive, and more
labor-intensive, than is normally implied when one thinks of "high" technology.
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As suggested in 2.1.2, optimistically the Thai state and politico-economic
leadership will plan and administer the nation's industrialization policies in such a
fashion as to encourage the siting of appropriate factories in middle-sized regional
cities such as Chiang Mai, Pitsanuloke, Nakorn Sawan, Khonkaen, Korat, Chonburi,
and Songkhla-Haad Yai.  The problem in the past was that most governmental
planning was sectoral rather than regional.  It focused on a particular sector for the
entire nation, rather than multi-sectoral growth for a particular region.  The result was
that balanced overall growth of industries in the nation's smaller cities—even those
that were reasonably supplied with such infrastructural facilities as roads, telephones,
machine shops, repair shops, etc.—had progressed considerably less far than might
otherwise have been the case.
Only in the 1980s did Thailand begin to do some of its planning on a regional
basis, namely in the case of the Eastern Seaboard Development Scheme, covering the
provinces of Chachoengsao, Chonburi, and Rayong.  Among the key objectives of
this scheme are to establish a major regional industrial base outside of Bangkok, and
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conceivable that textile firms in Thailand might tempocentrically
invest heavily in low-technology textile manufacturing facilities,
only to find themselves a few years later competing with a Korea,
or even a China, where computer assisted design and manufacturing
would confer such enormous productivity advantages as to leave
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a more direct and convenient transportation corridor between the outside world and
impoverished Northeast Thailand, so as to stimulate development in the latter area.
The scheme further calls for the creation on our mainland of two deepwater
ports—the first that our country has ever had—at Laem Chabang and Map Ta Phut,
which will greatly reduce trans-shipping costs into and out of the country.
Optimistically, this regional planning approach will prove its value and be adopted in
other regions, with effective input from local residents.
For those millions of Thais who remain on the soil, an Optimistic Scenario is
not difficult to ground, for in recent decades Thai farmers have proven themselves to
be remarkably receptive to opportunities to try out new crops.  Many farmers who a
generation ago depended almost solely on rice for cash income, have since
diversified to a variety of new crops.  Not too long ago grapes were an imported
luxury; today Thailand exports them.  There is every reason to suppose that this
innovation-mindedness will continue into the indefinite future.  Optimistically,
success will breed success, especially in the all-important sense of adding to the total
capital pool, hence making it ever easier for impoverished farmers to secure that sine
qua non of innovative success: long-term developmental loans at non-usurious
interest rates.
Given Thailand's sunny, moist climate, there are possibilities for the practice
of many agricultural specialties.  The availability of cheap plastic sheets will
encourage greenhouse type cultivation (2.3.1).  Various forms of so-called intensive
agriculture, involving the deep and intensive working of small plots of soil to
produce enormous returns per unit of area, are also a possibility.
Capping all of this is the possibility that, well before the horizon date,
biogenetic technology will make it possible deliberately to tailor wholly new species
of plants and animals that will:=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 88 of 219 ===
♦  be highly suitable to the Thai natural and human environment;
♦  have highly valuable survival and productive characteristics; and
♦  be free of undesirable side-effects.
No longer will scientists and technologists be restricted by a constraint built
into conventional "plant breeding" approaches (highly useful as these have been),
namely that the new type of plant or animal must be the result of a cross between two
or more closely related species.  If the Biogenetic Revolution fulfills its promise,
there is every reason to expect that genetic material from widely differing species can
be used in the tailoring process.  While it is not possible to say just when this or that
particular tailoring potential will become available, it seems likely that at least some
of these capabilities will be available to Thai scientists and technologists, and to Thai
producers, within the projection period.
A similar hopeful panorama lies ahead in the related area of aquaculture.
Already Thailand has become one of the leading aquacultural nations of the world, if
not the leading one.  A problem has arisen, however, in that the seashore aquaculture
used in the production of prawns for export has done serious damage to the brackish
wetlands that are necessary to the overall ecology of the area.  Seawater irrigation
and conservation measures are urgently necessary, and, if they are to be successful,
require the strong cooperation of the entrepreneurs who have developed this industry.
While it is by no means certain that these conservation measures will be implemented
in time to save the area ecologically, a distinctly hopeful sign is that many of the
entrepreneurs in question are people who live in the area itself.  Many of them can
thus be expected to have a strong vested interest in the sustainability of the industry
they have created.  This makes them sharply different from the so-called "forest
mafia," who live in cities far from the forests they are destroying, and who are=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 89 of 219 ===
interested in enormous quick profit killings, rather than moderate profits and long-run
sustainability of yield from a rich variety of species.
2.3. ENERGY
Since energy is utterly essential to expanding and modernizing the Thai
economy, this section will be a somewhat detailed one.  I will not take space to deal
with the already-established energy sources that have been in use for some time, and
are well integrated into the Thai way of life—namely wood and charcoal, hydroele-
ctric power, and low-sulfur lignite.  Instead, I will concentrate on four "emerging" or
potential energy sources that could conceivably be crucial in the future—namely
petroleum, gasohol, solar energy, and hydrogen-based energy.
2.3.1. PETROLEUM ENERGY AND FEEDSTOCKS
The recent history of Thailand's energy policies provides a basis for
considerable optimism.  Just ten years ago, the nation had to import some 90% of its
energy, while by 1988 this figure had dropped to 60%.  The key to this
accomplishment lay in the decision of Thai policy makers to build what was then the
longest and most expensive undersea pipeline in the world, extending some 425
kilometers along the floor of the Gulf of Thailand to off-shore natural gas fields.
Today the nation is in much better shape financially, thanks in part to this bold
development plan, as well as to contextual changes, such as in the baht exchange rate
and the world price of oil.
The situation concerning domestic oil has been different.  To date, Thailand's
oil production, from both off-shore and on-shore wells, has been limited, and verified
oil fields are small and scattered.  However, it does not seem unreasonable to project
optimistically that, with proper incentives, oil exploration and production will be=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 90 of 219 ===
greatly accelerated, and that Thailand will achieve something close to self-sufficiency
in energy, particularly with the use of new extraction and refining technologies.
If we assume that the world price of oil will be around $20 to $25 per barrel at
1990 values, and that there will be a 5% to 8% annual increase in Thailand's energy
demands, then it is reasonable to estimate that the nation's total economically
recoverable petrochemical resources will be sufficient to meet national demand for
30 to 40 years.  If one projects a steeper rate of increase in the rate of use, both for
energy and for products made from natural gas derivatives (such as plastics), then 20
to 25 years would be a more realistic figure.
The inescapable fact that these natural gas resources are non-renewable has
forced difficult choices.  Should the nation use its natural gas only domestically, or
should it also engage in some export?  The government has decided that that portion
of our natural gas resources that is to be used for energy, will be used primarily for
domestic purposes.  This policy contrasts with those of Indonesia and Brunei, for
example, which export liquified natural gas to Japan.
However, the same hydrocarbon materials that flow from natural gas and oil
wells can also be used to make feedstocks for industry, for use in manufacturing a
wide variety of products such as plastics, polyesters, and paints.  Should a portion of
the nation's petroleum resources be allocated for such purposes?  The government
has decided to use as much natural gas fractions for such feedstocks as possible.  I
support this policy, for it will result in the production of hundreds of kinds of finished
plastic goods which will not only significantly improve the domestic standard of
living, but will also conserve, and bring in, much-needed foreign exchange.
Justification for this policy is found in an analysis of the value that is added when a
country or company converts natural gas into feedstocks, and feedstocks into finished
products.  This added value can exceed the value of the raw natural gas by an=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 91 of 219 ===
impressive factor, which may range from four to as high as 100 times, depending on
the type of product.  Moreover, the policy of establishing primary industries with a
secure natural resource base, thereby completing the entire chain of elements
required for a petrochemical industry, will spur the general growth of Thai industry
for decades to come.
2.3.2. THE CONTEXT OF ALL ENERGY PLANNING
A slight digression is appropriate at this point.  As one deals with energy
policy problems, one learns that there is a certain common context in which all such
problems are embedded, as I have earlier suggested in more general terms (1.8).  In
all of my thinking about energy policy designed to improve the productivity and
living standard of the Thai people, I find myself closely examining two crucial
contextual factors: the world price of oil, and the baht exchange rate.  Since these two
factors are not subject to Thailand's control, they impart a certain roulette-like quality
to the process of viewing our economic future.
This slippery international context is obviously a complex and technical
matter, and a detailed discussion is not possible here.  Suffice to suggest that in
thinking about this context, one would do well to put aside any "free enterprise"
biases or assumptions.  There is NO such thing as a totally "free" enterprise
petroleum industry anywhere in the world—though some nations certainly do come
closer to this extreme than others.  The truth is that every oil-producing and -refining
country uses various legal and administrative devices to influence selling prices.
These devices take a variety of forms, including subsidies, tax deductions, tax credits,
depletion allowances, and the use of proceeds from one derivative product to
compensate for losses on another.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 92 of 219 ===
2.3.3. GASOHOL
Having briefly examined our major non-renewable energy resource, I move
now to the question of whether alternative renewable sources of energy can be
developed.  As an illustrative example, let us look at the prospects for gasohol as a
fuel for automobiles, busses, and trucks.  Here, the example of Brazil is instructive,
for in that country the government has subsidized gasohol production even when the
world crude oil price was low—with encouraging results reported to date, in terms of
efficiency, reduction of air pollution, and foreign exchange savings.  Since Thailand
is, like Brazil, a tropical nation, it makes sense to ask whether it, too, could develop
gasohol.
Technically speaking, there is no question that Thailand could produce large
amounts of gasohol.  Thai scientists have already demonstrated this experimentally.
But the crucial question is not technical alone.  Rather, we must ask whether it would
make overall sense—technically, commercially, and ecologically—for Thailand to
move in this direction.
In terms of air quality, there is little question that Thailand would gain—for
gasohol burns much more cleanly than gasoline.
The difficult part of the question, however, is the economic part.  Here, my
short answer is that gasohol could not become competitive unless and until the world
price of crude oil were to rise above $30 or $35 per barrel.  An advantage that
Thailand possesses in this respect is that it can regulate or stabilize the domestic
price of such oil, through its Oil Reserve Fund—and the existence of this
stabilization capability would in itself serve to enhance the incentive of investors to
develop a useable gasohol fuel.
There are, of course, also other considerations to face, such as the conversion
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of burning gasohol.  (The cost of retrofitting existing automobile engines would
doubtless be sizeable, and probably prohibitive.)
One must also consider the economics of land use.  Since gasohol is
essentially transformed solar energy, and since solar energy is highly diffuse, the
production of plants that would yield gasohol would doubtless require that enormous
tracts of land be devoted to this purpose.  Whether this would represent, in an overall
sense, the most economically efficient, ecologically sound, and socially desirable use
of our ever-scarcer land resources would be highly debatable.
At this point, however, I would urge that we avoid tempocentrism in our
thinking.  We must be alive to the notion that if there are vast new technological
break-throughs, the foregoing economic reasoning will have to be fundamentally re-
thought.  Where would these break-throughs come from?  Clearly, from the new
biogenetic technology, with its capacity for tailoring new living organisms designed
to optimize across several desired factors.  It is readily conceivable that through
biotechnology some totally new type of plant could be engineered, that would require
a substantially smaller commitment of land area while still not exhausting the soil.
And perhaps the tailored plant could be designed for use on land not otherwise
economically valuable.
Another exciting possibility lies in possible breakthroughs in fermentation
technology.  For example, new micro-organisms might be genetically engineered
which would greatly increase the speed or thoroughness of the fermentation process,
and thus raise efficiency and lower production costs for gasohol—quite apart from
whether the feedstocks used were genetically engineered.
One factor that could enhance economic and commercial feasibility would be
to develop a feedstock which, after being used in the production of gasohol, still
remains useful for some other purpose, such as the manufacture of fertilizer or paper.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 94 of 219 ===
One can also imagine the use of a plant as raw material for gasohol which, in
the ground, will have unusually effective soil-restoring, erosion-retarding, or air
purifying features.  In such a case, it is always possible that substantial government
assistance could be offered, and justified on ecological grounds.  Such government
assistance might take any of several forms, such as low-interest loans or tax
incentives.
There might also be a deliberate government policy to promote localized
gasohol production, so that the bulk of the gasohol used in certain regions of the
country would be produced in that region, thus saving fuel transportation costs.
Energy to run a gasohol extraction plant—and also to produce other products, such as
animal feed—could come from gasohol itself.
For all of these reasons, then, it does not seem to me to be beyond the realm of
credibility that by the horizon date Thailand might be using substantial amounts of
gasohol for various purposes, and that the gasohol industry might have become more
or less self-supporting and self-sustaining.
2.3.4. SOLAR ENERGY
Since Thailand has ample strong sunlight, it is reasonable to look briefly at
solar energy as a supplementary source.  The nation has already done research and
development work in this area, and indeed a few new homes and hotels have been
built with solar energy collectors, which work reasonably well in providing hot water
for domestic use.  The more serious question, however, is whether solar energy,
collected via photovoltaic cells or however, could make a really substantial
contribution to the nation's total energy needs, either for consumption or production.
So far, given existing technology, the answer would appear to be No.  The basic
problem with solar energy is that it is diffuse, so that Thailand would need to fill very=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 95 of 219 ===
large tracts of land with solar collectors before it could realize enough solar energy to
make a significant contribution to meeting its total energy needs.
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However, recent developments have occurred, in the direction of ever more
efficient photovoltaic cells.  Optimistically, Thailand will monitor these
developments carefully, and be prepared to seize opportunities when and if the
technological breakthroughs, and cost of energy from alternative sources, would
justify investing in solar energy devices and networks.
2.3.5. HYDROGEN-BASED ENERGY
A tantalizing possibility is that of obtaining plentiful cheap energy by forcing
hydrogen and oxygen to combine together under the right conditions.  The
technology for doing this has already been conceptualized and developed, but not to
the point of commercial practicality.  The key problem is that when these two
elements are brought together (to make water), they explode.  The explosion must be
contained and controlled.  Somehow, this problem must be solved.
It is useful heuristically to compare this case to that of nuclear fission.  In the
latter case, the problem of generating energy while avoiding explosion was indeed
solved, by means of the nuclear reactor.  I hope fervently that the equivalent of the
nuclear reactor will be found in the case of hydrogen and oxygen.  If the necessary
devices and processes can be made cheaply available, it will be blessing for all
mankind, because hydrogen and oxygen are, of course, in totally ample supply
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throughout the world, and because there would be no pollution or waste disposal
problem as in the case of nuclear energy.
In addition to the above method involving the combining of hydrogen with
oxygen, there is also the possibility of fusing hydrogen nuclei with each other in a
nuclear fusion reaction.  So far, this feat has proven impossible to achieve, except
very briefly in a few expensively equipped laboratories, using technology that could
never be replicated on a mass basis.
Could this situation change?  In principle, Yes.  What would change it?
Conceivably, supermagnets made of superconductors might make possible the
formation of magnetic fields strong enough to bring about small but effective
amounts of fusion.  These nuclear processes would confer large energy advantages.
That is, the energy required to make the reaction happen would be far less than the
energy that would be produced.  Further, hydrogen-generated energy could itself be
used to run the generation process.  The end result would be ample safe energy at
affordable cost.
Any such hydrogen-hydrogen fusion technology would, of course, be utterly
revolutionary for the same reasons as above: the raw materials are free for the taking,
and there would be no pollution or other harmful side-effects.  Indeed, if such a
technology were ever to be fully utilized throughout the world, it would wipe away
many of today's most fundamental inequities, which are based on distinctions
between nations fortunate enough to be rich in the sources of energy, and those not so
blessed.  This could, in turn, vastly change the balance of political power in the
world.
These various exciting energy possibilities form a backdrop for my thinking
about Thailand's energy future, and about the constraint that we really cannot plan on
having natural gas available for more than 20 to 40 years.  I consider it highly likely=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 97 of 219 ===
that one or more of these new possibilities will come to fruition well before we run
out of natural gas, and this consideration is part of the rationale for my favoring the
extensive use of natural gas to generate industrial feedstocks (2.3.1).  While there is
no justification whatever for wasting our petrochemical resources, there is, I think, a
solid case for using our non-renewable assets for legitimate consumption needs and
otherwise-reasonable industrial development goals.  In my judgment, the
opportunities outweigh the risks.
2.4. ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY
One important environmental victory that has already been won by means of
exploitation of our natural gas resources is that liquid petroleum gas (LPG) today
powers all of the one hundred thousand taxicabs in the Bangkok area, vehicles that
formerly used principally Diesel fuel.  Since LPG is relatively non-polluting, the air
in Bangkok is today bearable.  In effect, a domestic non-renewable resource has been
used to replace an imported non-renewable resource, namely gasoline.  What made
this change easy and swift was that it embodied no economic sacrifice.  To the
contrary, taxi drivers now pay about half as much for fuel per kilometer as before.
This example suggests a further question: Is it ever good policy to use non-
renewable energy sources to replace renewable ones?  Intuitively, one's answer
would probably be No.  However, I depart from this conventional wisdom in one
particular case, which has to do with urgent action to save what is left of our forest
resources while there is still something left to save.
The over-cutting of our forest lands has become a problem of the utmost
urgency.  In recent years we have lost forest cover at a terrifying rate.  While in the
early Sixties 51 percent of our total land area was forest-covered, by 1988 that figure
had dropped to 19 percent.  While some of this loss is attributable to land-starved=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 98 of 219 ===
Thai farmers clearing areas for permanent cultivation, or to hill tribesmen practicing
slash-and-burn agriculture, much of it is attributable to illegal felling of timber by the
forest mafia.  Denuded forests have resulted in lessened rainfall, excessive run-off,
and soil deterioration.  The net social result has been, and will be, strongly
negative—for farmers almost immediately, and for the entire nation in the longer run.
Unfortunately, to date our society has not found a way to punish these miscreants, or
even to require them simply to make good the damage they have done.
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Another cause of deforestation is the use of large amounts of firewood and
charcoal for cooking.  In this vein, I project optimistically that well before the
horizon date millions of Thai homes will be cooking with liquid petroleum gas
instead.  While we have seen that the nation has at least 20 years of natural gas
supply left (2.3.1.), our forests will be almost totally gone well before that time, if the
current rate of destruction persists.  Therefore, it makes overall good sense
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Thailand.  A sudden mudslide snuffed out the lives of almost 100
people.  The slide was caused by heavy rains falling on steep
hillsides that had been clear-cut for timber profits, and then
planted with shallow-rooted rubber trees.  The incident shocked
the national consciousness.  The cabinet issued an emergency order
revoking and cancelling, for the time being, all forest
concessions throughout the country.  This action was unprecedented
in Thai history, and is particularly impressive when one considers
that the cabinet was generally considered to be distinctly pro-
business.
I see in this tragic episode a step in the evolution of
national policy toward the environment.  Unfortunately, however,
the inevitable immediate result of this attempt at a "quick fix"
has been a sudden steep increase in the price of timber.  This in
turn has made illegal timber cutting, in blatant defiance of the
law, more profitable.  The entire episode thus points up the
inadequacy of responding to the symptoms of a problem, rather than
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ecologically to use non-renewable energy sources in this instance, so as to help give
our forests time to renew.
This example, by the way, is a good illustration of the use of the newer
"attack" approach to problem solving (1.13).  In the first place, it is neither desirable
in terms of Thai values, nor politically possible, simply to instruct people not to use
firewood or charcoal.  Rather, some sort of inducement is needed, such as providing
an alternative type of fuel that is cheaper, cleaner, or more convenient.  LPG meets
these requirements, but to make it available and accepted on a mass basis will require
appropriate policy and careful planning.  Specifically, it will require that public
policy deal with the context of the problem: with the need to market LPG cooking
fuel actively and skillfully, and to do whatever is necessary in the context of Thai
culture to insure that the public is educated to the value of using this fuel.  If all these
measures are reasonably successful, the use of charcoal and firewood will decline,
especially in the cities and among families with a more modern life-style.  Of course,
there will also be large numbers of rural Thais who continue to use firewood gathered
locally, and charcoal produced locally.  Even so, the net overall effect of this
initiative could be highly beneficial.
Optimistically, the nation will catch up with the deforestation problem.  Public
opinion will demand better protective laws and tighter law enforcement.  The general
raising of the nation's educational level will have a positive effect in inculcating
among the nation's young a firm basic ecological understanding of deforestation and
related problems, and a moral attitude condemning deforestation.
Also assisting toward gradual solution will be the creation of an array of new
jobs available to unemployed or underemployed rural poor people so that they will
feel less inclined to do illegal work for the forest mafia.  It is my perception that the
great majority of the Thai people definitely prefer to avoid illegal or socially=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 100 of 219 ===
destructive employment when legal and constructive alternatives are available to
them.
Some further grounds for optimism are found in massive planting programs
that might be undertaken by the government or the private sector.  Optimistically, the
sorts of trees planted will include a diversity of nitrogen-fixing, soil enriching species
which will mature rapidly, serve rain-inducing and ground-holding functions well,
and provide timber that brings a good price.  This means that in many instances
exhausted stands of, say, teak, will be replaced with less exotic, yet still useable,
species of trees.  The technical understanding necessary for such reforestation is
already available.  What is not yet available is the ecological understanding of how
all these new species will interact with each other—and, optimistically, some of our
best scientists and technologists will be set to work through time on just these
problems.
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Of the various domains in this chapter, none presents greater obstacles to
optimism than forestry.  After all, even assuming that millions of relatively quick
maturing species of trees are planted, they will not be harvestable until at least A.D.
2010.  I shall return to this stubborn domain in Section 3.3 of my Pessimistic
Scenario.
2.5. TRANSPORTATION
Improved transportation is basic to Thailand's aspirations for industrialization
and modernization.  The past 30 years have seen rapid development of our
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now collaborating with experts in Finland on reforestation.  Even
though trees grow slowly in Finland due to the cold climate there,
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transportation infrastructure, and there is no reason to believe that the next 30 years
will be fundamentally different.
Thailand is fortunate to possess a number of large rivers that have traditionally
been used to ship bulky agricultural and other products to and from the market, and
for 150 and more years we have augmented these natural waterways by digging an
extensive canal network.  Optimistically, we will further develop this infrastructure,
employing more appropriate boat designs and superior powering and steering
technologies—for example, those that push a craft through the water will be
substituted for traditional pulling technologies.  Further, when our nation succeeds in
curbing the over-cutting of its forests, the silting of our river-beds will become a less
serious problem, and one that will be dealt with by improved dredging technologies.
The early Twentieth Century ushered in railroad transportation.  Then, in the
1950s, came an extensive development of all-weather regional highways.  Optimisti-
cally, both these means of transportation will be developed further during the
projection period.  However, a problem inevitably arises whenever a new major route
of either type is constructed: land speculation.  Investors, eager for windfall profits,
rush to "buy cheap, sell dear"—and such investors include not just urban
sophisticates, but also villagers.  This is truly a serious national problem, because
money invested in quest of such windfall profits is money not available for
investment in true productive capacity.  Nonetheless, optimistically Thailand will
manage to keep this problem under sufficient control, through the use of wise
legislation and sound planning, and useful transportation routes will be opened in
areas most in need of them.  For example, there will be good new routes, rail or
highway, connecting Thailand's first deepwater ports now being built at Laem
Chabang and Map Ta Phut, directly with the impoverished Northeast, obviating the
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We come now to urban transportation.  One of the most vexing transportation
problems the nation faces concerns getting millions of Bangkokians to and from
work.  Those Bangkokians who must commute long distances to work are in a truly
difficult situation.  Anyone who has found himself in a bus in downtown Bangkok
during rush hour will have no difficulty appreciating just how frustrating and soul-
numbing the present situation is.  And even those who own air-conditioned cars are
deeply stressed by grid-lock traffic jams.
  Optimistically, the Thai government will give high priority to improving
public urban transportation, rather than spending large amounts of money for
flyways and expressways that primarily benefit the small minority who own private
automobiles.  There is reason for optimism that such a policy priority will be
rendered more feasible by new technology, especially that which utilizes new
superconductive materials.  If "room temperature" superconductor materials become
available at affordable prices, this might make possible new forms of public
transportation that previously had not been economically feasible, such as levitated
rail transportation, perhaps of the type already demonstrated in pilot projects in
Japan.  Optimistically, within not too many years, overhead levitated skytrain public
transportation will be available to all Bangkokians.  Since levitated transportation is
free of wheels-to-rail friction (though not air-drag friction), energy costs will be
dramatically lower.  Such transportation will be rapid, cheap, convenient, and non-
polluting.
It is instructive to compare a hypothetical future Bangkok with the present
Vienna, Austria.  Vienna offers a streetcar system that is so efficient and convenient
that many middle class Viennese who could afford a private automobile, choose not
to own one—because it is not necessary.  It took Vienna, using conventional electric
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conceivable that Bangkok might achieve the equivalent of this system in a decade or
two, through taking advantage of the economies to be made available by
superconductor technology.  If so, the enhanced convenience of public transportation
will make it highly probable that the use of private automobiles will actually
decrease—with overall results that will be heartily welcomed by all who live in our
capital city.
2.6. TOURISM
Following closely on the heels of vastly improved international air
transportation has been an economic phenomenon of profound importance: tourism.
During 1987, the "Year of the Tourist," Thailand hosted over three million visitors,
principally from Europe, America, Japan, and other Asian nations.  The average
tourist spent $100 a day and stayed six days.  Tourism has actually become the
number one foreign exchange earner of our economy—ahead of garments, rice, gems
and jewelry, tapioca, and rubber.  This is truly an historic phenomenon: no expert on
the Thai economy would have projected, thirty years ago, that within a generation
tourism would displace rice as the primary source of foreign exchange.
2.6.1. THE BASES OF THE TOURIST INDUSTRY
What explains this phenomenon?  Although there has been encouragement by
government, this alone is hardly an adequate explanation.  Other factors are also
important.  Foreigners obviously find Thailand attractive because the Thai people
who serve as their hosts are renowned for their relaxed friendliness and hospitality.
Sojourning in Thailand is also economically attractive; hotel rooms and meals are not
prohibitively expensive.  Even fastidious foreigners on limited budgets can find
economical accommodations if they seek them out.  The climate is also attractive to=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 104 of 219 ===
people from the northern industrial countries during wintertime.  And there are
beautiful beaches and mountains to be enjoyed.
Furthermore, the artistic and other outward aspects of Thai culture—from
temple architecture to traditional music and dance—are objects of genuine beauty,
and command the sincere respect of many visitors.  Compared with the traditional
cultures of other Southeast Asian nations—most of which suffered serious erosion at
the hands of European colonialism—that of the Thai is relatively intact, and different
enough from others to serve as a magnet of some power.
But the attraction is bilateral.  As indicated in 2.1, the Thai people have long
been known for their interest in strangers.  They have a general tolerance toward
foreign people and foreign ways, and remarkably little of the hesitation, prejudice,
judgmental criticism, or discrimination that is often found in other countries around
the world.  All this helps explain why Thailand has become one of the more popular
tourist destinations of Asia.
Another magnet of great power, which most commentators shy away from
discussing, has to do with night life.  Thai men have traditionally enjoyed night life
and attendant sexual services, and many male visitors from abroad also find this a
definite attraction.  For some, it is the principal attraction.  Estimates of the number
of female prostitutes in Thailand range up to 200,000 and beyond, and doubtless
many of these—though a minority—derive a substantial portion of their incomes
from tourist patrons.  The fact that a considerable portion of the profitability of the
tourist industry can be traced to this particular attraction, poses complex ethical
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2.6.2. IMPLICATIONS OF TOURISM FOR CULTURE CHANGE
With respect to tourism in general, the government role has been
straightforward; it has sought only to encourage tourism.  There have been few if
any government attempts to limit or control this phenomenon.  The implicit premise
underlying existing government policy has been straightforward: the more tourists,
the better.
But is this really so?  What have so far been the consequences of rampant
tourism for the Thai people?  One may summarize many of these consequences
under two major headings: economic dependency and culture change potential.
The dependency phenomenon varies enormously from one type of case to
another.  To the village handicraftsman, tourism might provide simply a welcome
"add-on" to the regular domestic or export market for his goods.  For many hotel,
restaurant, and personal service workers, however, tourists are the market, and if this
market were to disappear, hundreds of thousands of these people would be severely
hit.  And in major tourist centers, such as Pattaya, Chiang Mai, and Phuket,
thousands of other types of people whom one would not normally regard as being
tourist-dependent, in fact are so—less directly, yet still substantially.  These include
car rental agents, doctors, lawyers, bankers, architects, and real estate agents, as well
as barbers, dressmakers, and construction workers.
Tourism is fundamentally different from most other forms of foreign trade in
that it has high culture change potential, because it involves large numbers of people
in direct person-to-person contact.  This contact is at its greatest in such centers of
tourism as Bangkok and Chiang Mai, and at beach resorts on the Gulf of Thailand
and the Andaman Sea.  More and more Thais, of varying social class origin, whose
parents had virtually no face-to-face contact with foreigners, now have frequent
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perceptions of foreigners, perceptions heretofore deriving primarily from foreign
movies and imported television programs, which often deal mainly with crime,
greed, violence, and trivia.
Associated with this rapid growth of tourism is the ever-increasing tendency
for world organizations to hold conventions in Thailand.  Many educated Thais who
have little opportunity to travel abroad are in this way brought into contact with new
professional, technical, intellectual, and commercial ideas.
This person-to-person contact is the kind that is most likely to produce
changes in attitudes and values that might eventually add up to culture change—for
these foreigners directly and interactively model types of behavior that are in many
ways sharply different from traditional Thai ways.  While all foreigners doubtless
have some degree of influence, it would appear that the most influential are the
Japanese, other East Asians, and Americans.  The impact of tourism on our culture is
already noticeable in certain subsections of our society, even to the casual observer.
This is clearly a subject worthy of intense study by professional researchers, and deep
understanding by our national leaders.
Such research should ask hard questions, such as: Is it healthy for Thai
handicraftsmen to produce traditional products, and for traditional dancers to perform
dances—when the primary or even the sole motivation is the tourist's dollar or yen or
mark?  Does the traditional art form gradually cease to come from the heart, and lose
its status as a thing of beauty, worth pursuing for its own sake?  Will valued
traditions become atrophied through the loss of traditional bases for motivation?
2.6.3. THE PROBLEM OF PROSTITUTION
Another tough problem is posed by the reality that thousands of male tourists
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and complaisant prostitutes.  This is clearly a problem with moral dimensions.  It also
has implications for national public relations, for foreigners whose knowledge of the
Thai people is superficial might to some degree come to equate being Thai with
being a prostitute.
It may well be true, as some observers have said, that many Thai prostitutes
(perhaps to some extent unlike their Western counterparts) "sell their bodies but not
their souls," and feel less sense of self-loss over the way they make their living than
outsiders might assume.  However, other observers have held that this is not
generally true, but is merely a convenient euphemism serving to justify the status
quo.
However this may be, one thing is sure: the root cause of the sex-for-sale
phenomenon is poverty, and the key solution will be the elimination of poverty.
Optimistically, this is just what will happen—slowly but surely.  This optimism is
grounded in analogous historical situations in post-war Japan, and, more recently, in
such "newly industrialized countries" as South Korea and Taiwan.
Having said all this, however, I must add my feeling that there is much more to
be asked, and learned, about this deeply complex and troubling phenomenon.
Indeed, to oversimplify, I regard prostitution in Thailand as a kind of national
sickness, and one that we have so far not squarely faced.
2.7. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
Much of what Thailand can do with the proper use of information technology
can be revolutionary in its sociocultural results.  This is true both of "conventional"
mass media technology and, even more so, of the "new" microelectronically based
technology, which is often of a non-mass, individual, and highly interactive nature.
Each of these types of technology deserves our serious attention.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 108 of 219 ===
2.7.1. THE USE OF EXISTING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Optimistically, the great positive potential of existing forms of communication
technology—print, radio, film, and television—will be realized in substantial part.
Fueling these positive changes will be a largely literate population (the adult literacy
rate in 1988 already having risen to 91%), as well as a steeply growing number of
university-educated Thais (the two Bangkok "open" universities in 1988 currently
having combined enrollments of over 500,000 students).  Under such circumstances,
a market demand has been emerging, and will continue to emerge, for all the media
to provide solid news and responsible news analysis, as well as sophisticated
educational content—with a corresponding decrease in emphasis upon crime, sex,
and sensationalism.
In this broad change process, the press and television are central, because they
are, de facto, relatively free of government domination.  The recent historical record
provides grounds for optimism.  During the last two or three decades the periodical
press has been responding to the growth of this educated populace by producing
progressively better products, and optimistically this pattern of steady improvement
will proceed apace.  As for television, by the end of the Sixties it had begun seriously
to challenge radio's popularity, first in the larger cities and then, gradually, through-
out most of the rural areas.  Television's impact has been profound, and there is no
reason to project that this increase in influence will not persist.  Quality, however, is
a separate matter.  Whether television will tend unduly to purvey imported low-grade
dramas from Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,, or move toward high-grade dramatic
and educational content, is problematic—but I have enough confidence in the quality
of those who make such programming decisions to feel that it is not utopian to
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Radio is different, because in 1988 this medium was largely government
controlled.  It would indeed be utopian to project that radio will play a leading role in
this broad process of positive evolution.  Radio will, though, play a useful supporting
role.  For example, it will continue to provide traditional drama, such as the likee and
lakhaun, which can have the effect of reinforcing morality and increasing empathy
on the part of rural populace for the larger world of nationhood and modernity.
2.7.2. THE USE OF THE NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
We move now to the so-called "new information technology."  During the past
several years thousands of Thais—especially scholars, administrators, and business-
men—have eagerly adopted various aspects of this new technology.  A telling
example is that in 1981, at the time of an Ethnographic Futures Research study at
Chiang Mai University (Bhansoon, Sidhinat, and Textor 1984: 51-2), there was not a
single microcomputer to be found anywhere on that university's campus.  Today
there are at least a hundred.
There is little doubt that by the horizon date computers will be a commonplace
part of life in the modern and urban sectors of Thai society.  The same will also be
true of computer networks, which will permit people to work together toward the
solution of shared problems.  Of course, as with most new technology, the adoption
process will be uneven, and it is likely that this technology will only minimally filter
down to ordinary citizens and non-specialists within the projection period.
As more and more Thais become habituated to more and more computer
applications, the nature of communication in the society as a whole will almost
certainly change in important respects.  Optimistically, these changes will be in the
direction of enhanced access to information and knowledge, so that more people will
be able to benefit from the total stock of existing information and knowledge.  The=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 110 of 219 ===
more people there are who have convenient access to important data, information,
and knowledge, the greater will be the total capacity of Thai society to create new,
useful knowledge.  It is hard to see how Thai society as a whole could fail to benefit
from this general process.
Optimistically, access to the new information technology will have a
substantial democratic effect through time.  As more and more intellectuals, teachers,
scholars, leaders, and citizens gain more and more access to data and information
relevant to public policy, they will be in an improved position to defend their own
rights and interests, and, more generally, to participate in improving public policy.
2.8. POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT
The context in which solid progress can be made in improving Thailand's
politics, law, and government is that in which international tensions will be at a low
level.  Assuming a Thailand relatively free of such tension, and the distortive
pressure it would place upon the Thai polity, I find it easy to project a number of
positive developments.
However, such developments will be evolutionary in nature.  Truly
fundamental change would be beyond the bounds of realism during the projection
period.  We have lived under a constitutional monarchy for 58 years, and our
progress has been quite slow.  Another 30 years will not produce radical change,
partly because most Thais do not want it, being instead oriented toward the "middle
path" (madchima patipathaa).  The changes that will occur will take the form of
alternations in the parties in power, and limited policy oscillations from left to right.
The traditional rallying cry, "Nationhood, Religion, and Monarchy," will continue to
be the dominant motif--one which enhances stability and permits people to get on
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Some good leaders will arise, but the Thai political system is such that they are
not likely to retain power for more than four to eight years or so—long enough to set
directions, but not long enough to follow up systematically so as to insure steady
socio-economic development.  Even when such good leaders are in power, their
ability to set new directions is more limited than a Western observer might
think—because of the necessity to trade off heavily with other politicians, and
business groups, in order to stay in power.  Although I project, optimistically, that
"gun for hire" type politicians will not be numerous, businessmen in politics will be
commonplace, whether I like it or not, because economic power will unavoidably be
extremely useful in winning elections and gaining political influence.
Optimistically, as education and communication develop, there will be a slow
but steady growth of meaningful rice-roots participation in the political process.
Protected and encouraged by laws favoring more decentralization and local initiative,
local townspeople and villagers will gradually acquire greater sophistication and
confidence in opposing the more inequitable and exploitative actors on the local
political scene.
20  Local leaders who are "both excellent and ethical" (1.14) will
increasingly perceive positive political change as attainable, and worth the risks and
sacrifices needed to attain it.  Marginally but steadily, they will proceed to take those
risks and make those sacrifices.  In dealing with parliamentary candidates, local
                                            
     20In 1975 the Kukrit Cabinet took a historic step in
legislating, for the first time, that a portion of the tax
revenues would be redistributed to rural Thais in the form of
grants which local village or subdistrict councils could, within
limits, use for local development as they decided.  This policy
was further extended during the Prem Cabinet in 1980 and
thereafter.  This policy has greatly strengthened a culture change
process in which local villagers' interest in local government has
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citizens will become more sophisticated in identifying ideas and programs that will
genuinely contribute to the general local well-being in a stable and lasting way.  And
as local leaders and citizens gradually develop more sophistication, and become less
easily overawed and mystified by urban politicians, the quality of their elected
representatives will slowly improve.  This evolution of countryside politics, already
increasingly visible over the past decade or two, will grow in scope and effectiveness
over the projection period, to the general benefit of all Thais.
The Cabinet and the Parliament will remain the "visible" national government.
This visible government will handle national affairs in the accustomed way.  In
addition, it will handle an increasing number of regional problems, especially those
involving, for example, whole river valleys that may include several provinces.
The "invisible" government will consist of the bureaucracy, intellectuals, and
university students.  Those intellectuals who have knowledge or skills directly
relevant to policy problems will be at an advantage, since government has now
become so technical that every cabinet will need such experts to carry on its work.
This invisible government may or may not include the military as well,
depending on circumstances.  The civil bureaucracy, however, will continue to hold
great power, and to be able essentially to forestall the execution of public policy
passed by Parliament, if such policy is deemed—by the bureaucrats—to be
unworkable (1.2).
Despite these built-in systemic constraints, optimistically I project
considerable positive change.  There will be more political information available, and
an increased tendency for voters to exercise their franchise in a more informed and
sophisticated way.  Political parties will come to be based more on coherent bodies of
principle, and less on the personalities of individual leaders.  In passing laws,
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anticipate problems—rather than simply, and often belatedly, reacting to problems
after they have already become serious.  Parliament will, through able leadership,
become more and more sensitive to those areas—especially high technology—where
opportunities must be seized quickly or forever forfeited, where risks are often
difficult to assess long in advance, and where side-effects are likely to be serious and
far-reaching.  It is in these areas of high change potential that there is greatest need
for proactivity, and for guiding change.  Optimistically, the right national leaders will
emerge at the right times, and Thai public policy will meet its challenges, attacking
problems rather than reacting to them (1.13).
As time passes, power within Thailand will become more diffuse, and less
centered in the hands of the bureaucracy.  Moreover, a similar process of devolution
will occur within the bureaucracy itself.  Much of the power now concentrated in the
hands of the Ministry of Interior will be more broadly diffused throughout the
bureaucracy, so that there will be countervailing forces within the entire government
organization, and hence an opportunity for a variety of bureaucratic subcultures to
influence overall policy and practice.  Given that the tradition of the Ministry of
Interior has been, since its establishment in 1892, primarily one emphasizing control
rather than development, the net result of this process will be an increase in the pace
of true development (1.11).  Indeed, even within this ministry itself, my optimistic
projection is that civil servants will gradually become more development-oriented.
Over the centuries, Thai culture has tended to be non-legalistic, and to place a
relatively greater premium on preserving the stability of a relationship, than on
meting out precise justice in the Western sense.  This pattern has been consistent with
that of placing a strong negative value on open, face-to-face confrontation, especially
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With the advance of Western colonialism in the Asian region during the
Nineteenth Century, however, King Chulalongkorn found it imperative to reform
Thai law and justice, and, with the benefit of consultation from numerous Western
legal experts and jurists, a far-reaching reform and codification of Thai law resulted.
This led to the happy consequence that during the 1920s the onus of extraterritoriality
was finally lifted from the Thai people.
The modern Thai judiciary is relatively independent and free from meddling
by the executive or legislative branches of the government.  It is also relatively
professional and definitive in the way it carries out its business.  While granting that
the enforcement of law has been known to suffer from interference by local mafia
and from other forms of coercion, I nonetheless see the judiciary as grounds for
considerable optimism for the slow but steady growth of democracy in Thailand,
protected by benevolent laws competently interpreted.
The ever-increasing modernization and monetization of the economy will,
however, bring with it unavoidable negative consequences.  It is only to be expected
that life in Thailand will become more legalistic and litigious—and that is indeed
what has been happening in recent years.  Only recently, for example, there have
appeared in the press stories of brothers suing each other for large sums of
money—something that would have been unthinkable just a generation ago.
2.9. SOCIAL STRUCTURE
I will deal with only three aspects of this complex topic, namely relations
among the classes, between the sexes, and within the family.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 115 of 219 ===
2.9.1. RELATIONS AMONG THE CLASSES
Since the onset of coordinated national development programs in the Sixties,
the economy and occupational structure of Thailand have diversified greatly; educa-
tional opportunity has expanded; and the middle class has grown.  While formidable
problems do persist in terms of a skewness in the distribution of income and wealth,
the general dynamism of the economy and society do provide some grounds for an
overall optimism that social mobility opportunities will improve and that a person
born poor will be able to rise in socio-economic status through hard work and
professional merit.
Optimistically, during the projection period Thailand will experience a
diminution in the percentage of its citizens living in outright abject poverty—a
process already evident in the Seventies and Eighties.  The nation will be led by
statespersons sincerely committed, at the very least, to slowing the rate of increase in
the gap between rich and poor.  However, it would be utopian to project that the
distribution of income in Thailand will become substantially more nearly equitable
by the horizon date, given the mode of capitalist development to which the polity is
firmly committed.
To begin actually to reduce this gap, progressive property and inheritance
taxes would be required.  The current situation may be summarized as follows.
♦  The current income tax can be described as reasonably progressive,
running from a minimum of 5% of net income on those who need to pay it at all, to a
maximum of 55% for the portion of net income over two million baht per year.
   ♦  The current property taxes are fixed rate and small.  They do take
into account the appreciation in value of a piece of property and, like the income tax,
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♦  At present there is no inheritance tax.  There is, however, a small 2%
transfer and registration fee, and a .5% stamp duty.
I believe it would be utopian to project the attainment of true fairness in the
property and inheritance taxes within the projection period.  The basic reason for this
is that these two taxes get at accumulated wealth as distinct from recent income, and
thus fundamentally threaten the social position of a small number of extremely
wealthy Thai families.  While these families might begrudgingly accept a progressive
tax on recent income, they will not accept one on accumulated wealth, which is the
ultimate basis of their total power and influence within Thai society.  And the
bedrock political reality is that they are prepared to bring this very power and
influence to bear in the political process, in order to preserve this very wealth.
Given the stubbornness of this aspect of our political economy, the most
optimistic projection I judge to be realistic is that there will be some moderation of
the income gap between the extreme rich and poor during the projection period.  This
will come about, in part, due to an increasing realization on the part of owners and
managers that treating one's employee well and fairly is, in fact, good business—in
the long run.
2.9.2. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SEXES
My Optimistic Scenario for this subdomain is that the status quo will continue,
more or less.  That is, as a Thai male, a Buddhist, and a humanist in the Thai
tradition, I am inclined to accept the present situation with respect to relations
between the sexes.
This position will probably upset a small minority of Thai readers, and puzzle
quite a few non-Thai readers.  Therefore, some explanation is needed, in cultural
terms.  My perception is, frankly, that the great majority of Thais, of either sex and=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 117 of 219 ===
including those with the highest levels of formal education, share my belief that rela-
tions between the sexes in Thailand are not a problem of any great seriousness.  In
this respect, they view their own sociocultural system quite differently than do many
Westerners, especially those actively involved in the feminist movement.
There is, however, one major exception, and that has to do with poverty, both
rural and urban.  Wherever there is poverty, it is the women and children who end up
being most severely exploited.  As discussed in 2.6.3, poverty explains prostitution,
and I certainly agree with numerous social critics that any female forced by poverty
to rent her body involuntarily, is being exploited by society.
Aside from this single but important exception, I believe that the status quo
will prevail.  At the same time, as a Thai, a Buddhist, and a humanist, I fully
acknowledge that many very worthy Thais, especially feminist women scholars,
writers, and social critics, are not satisfied with the status quo.  Optimistically, as
time moves forward, as economic justice improves, and as democracy flourishes, the
disagreements between such feminist Thais and persons like myself can be gradually
and positively adjusted.
2.9.3. RELATIONS WITHIN THE FAMILY
I live in a kin-based compound in central Bangkok with more than fifty of my
relatives, embracing four generations.  I greatly value the warmth and unity of this
co-residential extended family.  It is deeply rooted in traditional Thai culture and
makes possible not only economic cooperation, but also the raising of the young by
more than one senior generation—thus providing strong emotional support and a
sense of belonging.  Further, it provides for the care of the elderly infirm by family
members who love them.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 118 of 219 ===
I wish I could find a way, in this Optimistic Scenario, to ground a projection
that somehow the extended family will survive—but that would be, in my judgment,
utopian.  In the great majority of cases, it will not—not even in the countryside,
except under unusual economic and technological circumstances.  The trend in this
direction is already clear and unmistakable.
The general response of Thai society to date has been to search for various
substitute arrangements that can preserve at least some of the feeling and comfort of
the older tradition.  Part of this response has been ceremonial.  Instead of living
together as an extended family, a group of relatives might meet for dinner together
once a month, or on the birthdays of their senior members.  Alternatively, the
extended family might co-sponsor a yearly ceremony at the temple, such as a Thaud
Kathin.  Such events, however, are often characterized by a certain lack of emotional
depth, and in this respect they mirror the reality that the emotional closeness that
formerly characterized the extended family has diminished.  I can find no grounds for
projecting other than that this tendency toward ceremonialization and emotional
thinning will continue.
The most optimistic projection relevant to the family that I can provide
grounding for, is that certain of the functions of the extended family will be adequate-
ly assumed by the nuclear family, or some similar family form.  I have no doubt that
in some cases the nuclear family will succeed in this, but clearly the strength and
scope of this process will vary widely from case to case—especially since, in the
modern sector, both husband and wife will often hold full-time jobs away from the
home.  Even in those cases where the mother is not absent, if no grandparent is
present, there will be a considerable loss in awareness and appreciation of family
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The question of care for the aged is even more vexing.  If the trend toward
nuclear family living continues, and if marital pairs living in their own homes fail to
take much interest in the plight of aging parents, then more and more aged Thais will
doubtless end up in nursing homes—the very sort of fate that Thais visiting America
are likely to find inhumane.  Indeed, such homes have already made their appearance
in Bangkok—though not yet, as far as I know, upcountry.  The most positive
projection I can produce in this respect is that the nursing homes will be of good
quality, with a warm and caring ambiance.
 
2.10. EDUCATION
In my judgment the Thai nation needs to raise the general level of formal
education to the point where all children will finish at least the ninth grade, in order
to be able to participate fully in processes of technological modernization and
sociocultural development.  Optimistically, this will occur.
Beyond this level most people will probably not go, though there will be
ample educational facilities for those who wish to go further, and also facilities for
lifelong education, both nonformal and informal.
2.10.1. THE ROLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
I conceive of our institutions of higher education as having a three-fold
charter.
1. They should respond to social needs that arise.  Here, our universities
have done an excellent job throughout the past several decades.  When the national
leadership has pointed to a problem, the universities have generally been effective in
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2. They should anticipate future social needs.  Here, our universities
have done at best only a fair job.  They have not been as future-oriented and
proactive as I would like.
3. Finally, they should stimulate social consciousness and provide
moral and ethical leadership.  Here, our universities have not been effective.  The
only point in history when they made a serious effort to be effective was during the
1973-76 "democratic" period—and they largely failed, due to overconfidence and
general immaturity.
But Thai universities have been changing rapidly, and optimistically, over the
projection period, they will substantially improve their performance in these latter
two respects.  In this connection, I find it possible to ground considerable optimism
on the enormous inflow of new young academics possessed of high enthusiasm,
energy, and ability.  Optimistically, our institutions of higher education will discard
certain dysfunctional notions of academic prestige that are often part of a somewhat
snobbish Western academic tradition which tends to value non-practical knowledge
above practical.  Instead, with proper leadership, our institutions will become more
focused on applied research geared closely to the solution of specifically Thai
problems.  Of course, we do need a certain number of PhDs deeply educated in
theory—but not nearly as many as some people think.  By contrast, we need many
more people of lesser theoretical background to work on practical problems.
Optimistically, people will become available who are well enough trained
theoretically to keep abreast of world developments in their scientific or
technological specialties, yet motivated to take such knowledge and transform it into
processes and routines that will yield practical results in terms of an improved life for
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To pick just one example out of hundreds, we need people in our universities
or teacher training institutions who will find ways to prepare or treat our tropical
fruits so that they may be successfully marketed in Europe, Japan, and the U.S.  A
kilogram of longans that fetches 20 baht in Thailand would bring at least five times
that amount if sold in France.  However, we have not yet found a safe, technically
sound, and commercially viable way of treating and sending our highly perishable
fruits overseas, so they arrive either fresh or in a condition in which the taste and
texture are as they would be in Thailand itself.  Applied research on this problem, if
successful, would make a genuine contribution to our national well-being, would
help the less advantaged rural sector, and would provide valuable teaching
opportunities.  Optimistically, applied research of this mundane but useful nature will
become more and more common, and our academic prestige system will reward it.
More broadly, our universities must face the challenge of technology and
ecology.  The destruction of ourselves and our planet, or our survival with happy and
full lives, depends on our choice and use of the right kinds of technology.
Optimistically, our universities will focus their research and training on technology to
fulfill basic human needs.  A balance between technological progress and a quality of
life which is good and humane, compassionate and considerate of the good health
and well being of the planet, and all who exist on it, should be the thrust of our
research.
2.10.2. "DISTANCE LEARNING" AT THE TERTIARY LEVEL
Over the past ten years Sukhothai Thammatirat University, one of the nation's
two "open enrollment" universities, has pioneered in the development of "distance
learning," using the mails, radio, television, and video.  Its impact to date has been
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attainment and a more traditional outlook, such as young village residents, or monks
in upcountry temples.  Since Thailand's two open-enrollment universities currently
have between them over 500,000 registered students, or about one percent of the
entire Thai population, it is not difficult to project optimistically that distance
learning will produce an enormously better informed, educated, world-aware Thai
populace by the horizon date.
2.11. BUDDHISM AND OTHER BELIEF SYSTEMS
Buddhism is overwhelmingly the religion of the Thai people.  Indeed, in
casual speech it is common enough to hear someone simply equate being Thai with
being Buddhist.  Except for relatively small Muslim, Christian, and other minorities,
it can be said that all Thai people respect Buddhism, and that many practice it.  Those
who practice it seriously are found, in much higher percentages, in rural villages
(1.10).  Sad though it is to contemplate, the clear truth is that there are now some
millions of Thais whose experience with urbanization has brought about a diminution
of religious activity, and probably of religious commitment as well.  There are many
aspects of city life that help explain this phenomenon, but I will here mention just
three.
♦  Urban residential patterns are such that people often do not know
their neighbors, and do not live in distinct neighborhoods with the type of intense
community solidarity which, in the countryside, supports a particular temple and its
ritual life.
♦  Urban living leaves less time for ritual participation, study of the
Dharma, or meditation.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 123 of 219 ===
♦  Urban living contains within it a certain tendency to value material
things more, and this undermines the Buddhist teaching against craving for sensual
gratification.
While I would agree that urbanization and modernization need not deeply
damage Buddhist understanding and commitment, the particular kind of
modernization experienced by millions of Thais has, I fear, had that effect.
2.11.1. BUDDHISM AND EDUCATION
The above-described secularization process is doubtless to some extent
inexorable, just as it has been in other nations with respect to other traditional
religions.  However, in my Optimistic Scenario I am not prepared to give up easily.  I
am deeply impressed by what I perceive to be both the truth and the viability of
Buddhism.  As an educator, I look to schools and universities actively and
affirmatively to teach Buddhism to the young—or at the very least to go out of their
way not to undermine the faith.  I ground much of my confidence in our nation's
religious future on our schools and other educational institutions, including, of
course, those intended specifically for our Buddhist monks and novices.
I grant that to date most of our schools and universities have NOT done a very
good job in this respect.  Even so, on the face of it, what I am optimistically
visualizing does NOT seem to me to be a utopian dream.  Why?  For one thing,
because the very nature of Buddhism lends itself remarkably well to this goal.  For
example, a course in science can be taught so as to emphasize that Buddhist
philosophy, like modern science, is based on notions of causality.  And a course in
philosophy can be taught so as to emphasize the remarkable fact that the Lord
Buddha, unlike the founders of other world religions, stressed the use of one's critical=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 124 of 219 ===
intellect, and urged his followers to believe his teachings only if those teachings
stood the test of logic and personal experience.
2.11.2. REINTERPRETATION AND REFORM OF BUDDHISM
There are at present a number of hopeful signs that Buddhism remains strong
in Thailand.  Many of these signs take the form of attempts to reinterpret our
Dharma, or to reform the existing social organization of Buddhism, nationally and
locally.  While some Thais are upset by all of these efforts, and most are upset by
some of them, the fact yet remains that thousands of people are actively involved in
these efforts precisely because they take Buddhism seriously—and this is a most
encouraging fact.
Reform movements such as the controversial Santi Asoke take the position that
the orthodox Thai Buddhism of today is corrupted, and that the hierarchy does not
really preach or model the essence of the Lord Buddha's teachings.  Some of these
reform movements call for renewed efforts to make his teachings more relevant to
problems of modern life.  There is a tendency to move away from the superficial
externals of behavior—quasi-ritualistic deference gestures, for example—and to
emphasize the actual living of Buddhist precepts.
While I will not here discuss the particulars of any of these reform movements
or controversies, my Optimistic Scenario projects a continuing active national
concern with problems of relevance, adaptation, and interpretation.  It also projects
good leadership within the official governance structure of the monkhood, especially
the Ecclesiastical Council, so that new efforts to make our faith relevant to modern
conditions will be given a fair hearing.  Optimistically, some of these efforts will be
so sound as to find acceptance, so that new interpretations of our Dharma will=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 125 of 219 ===
gradually be woven into the syllabus of Dharma instruction offered to junior monks,
and into the fabric of our national belief system.
2.11.3. BUDDHISM AND DEVELOPMENT
Buddhism remains generally much stronger in our rural subculture—though
not nearly as strong as it was a few decades ago when, in thousands of rural villages,
the true and respected local leaders were monks.  Optimistically, our ecclesiastical
leaders will find ways to nourish the strength that remains in this village tradition.  As
part of a reinterpretation process, both the content of the Dharma and the structure of
the monkhood will more adequately serve the overall goal of true development at the
village level.
I ground my optimism here on various recent developments, notably the
active, though still small, movement of so-called "development monks."  These are
village monks who have successfully initiated a number of needed changes at the
village level that have raised living standards, such as producers' cooperatives, credit
unions, child care centers, and the like—while also espousing continued commitment
to the Lord Buddha's teachings, and to awareness of the limited nature of the
connection between material progress and true happiness.  Development monks
teach, for example, that increased income deriving from agricultural production
ought not to be devoted to gambling or to unnecessary purchases of material goods
that serve primarily as status symbols.
Optimistically, the Buddhist hierarchy will recognize the value of this sort of
activity, and revise the content of its Dharma instruction so that junior monks will be
exposed to this Buddhist development philosophy.  All this can be done without
requiring any particular monk to undertake any particular development project.
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spontaneous and locality-specific.  It is not the sort of movement that the central
hierarchy ought to try to administer or "replicate."  It should remain spontaneous and
locality-centered.  The most the hierarchy can hope to undertake successfully is to
provide legitimation for these activities as Buddhist activities, and to put senior
monks who have actually done this kind of work successfully, into touch with junior
monks who would like to become involved.  Optimistically, this is what will
happen.
21
The phenomenon of development monks is, however, only one ground for
optimism out of many that might be cited.  In my own case, I ground my optimism
also on broader matters of faith.  As one who is deeply committed to both Buddhism
and development, I remain convinced that development is NOT just a process of
providing physical infrastructure, material products, and modern medical care.
Providing such materials and services is, of course, necessary, but in itself is not
sufficient, to the attainment of true fulfillment.  In truth, such material change is best
regarded merely as the proximate cause of development—NOT development itself.
For development is also a process of the spirit.  Material goods do NOT, in
themselves, make one happy or fulfilled.  This is a profound truth, and one that
Buddhism teaches with great clarity.
                                            
     21It is not part of my Optimistic Scenario that the government
become involved.  Some involvement by non-government
organizations, however, would be helpful, as well as some invol-
vement by community development-oriented professors at our
universities, who might seek to understand this movement as a
development process, and involve their students, selectively, in
programs to support the work of development monks.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 127 of 219 ===
2.11.4. SPIRIT WORSHIP
It is instructive, for various reasons, to contrast Buddhism with spirit worship,
even though the latter is certainly a less prominent feature of Thai village culture than
it was a generation ago.  I regard spirit worship in an entirely different light than
Buddhism.  While in my Optimistic Scenario Buddhism will endure and grow
stronger, spirit worship will gradually assume an ever less important role in the lives
of our people, since it is quite clearly counter to a scientific way of life.  While it is
true that spirit worship still serves positive social functions in parts of our rural
subculture—such as maintaining a sense of continuity with deceased kinfolk, and
preserving social order—these functions can gradually be assumed by other belief
structures, and by a modern social structure.  Optimistically, this is what will
happen—but gradually enough so as not to be broadly disruptive.
2.12. THAI IDENTITY
Inevitably the Thai identity will undergo considerable change at the hands of
modernization, urbanization, tourism, and the world media.  In most cases, these
changes will occur more rapidly, and more deeply, in the urban-modern sector than
in the rural.  Optimistically, overall change processes will be gradual enough so that
people born into either sector will not lose motivation, morale, or reason for living
life with enthusiasm and a sense of self-worth.  Thai culture is, has been, and should
be broad enough to permit a situation of "harmony within diversity" (1.1).  Just as
Thais have been tolerant of other cultures, so, optimistically, will they remain
tolerant of variation within their own overall "umbrella" culture.
While my Optimistic Scenario envisions such tolerance of variation, however,
it does not envision tolerance or indifference when it comes to the clear economic
and cultural disadvantages that are the lot of most of our rural populace.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 128 of 219 ===
Optimistically, our society and polity will take steps to reduce these disadvantages,
which are closely related to the equity gap (1.5).  I project continued growth of
various organizations, governmental and non-governmental, which will send
educated urban young people to work in development projects in rural poverty areas.
This volunteer approach is fully consistent with the basic values of our Buddhist
religion, and, with the right leadership, will fit well into an evolving structure of
relatively non-bureaucratic organizations emphasizing education for self-help.
So much for variation within the overall Thai culture.  I turn now to the nature
of that overall "umbrella" culture itself, a culture that gives identity to all Thais,
urban and rural.  Here I find no difficulty in grounding an Optimistic Scenario in
which many aspects of the overall Thai identity will survive more or less
intact—even assuming realization of the broad process of technological and
economic modernization that I am optimistically projecting.
In approaching this problem, by the way, I consider the entire Thai identity.  I
do not restrict myself, as do some observers, primarily to drama, dance, and other art
forms.  Indeed, these latter aspects of the uniqueness of the Thai way of life, while
certainly important, are in my opinion not as basic as certain other aspects.  I shall
now deal with four of these basic aspects.
2.12.1. EMPATHY AND THE "CARING HEART"
A salient traditional Thai characteristic is generalized empathic kindness
(namcaj).  The Thai morpheme caj, which may roughly be glossed as "heart," is
found in well over three hundred Thai terms (Lee 1987: 149-93).  This is a truly
remarkable pattern, and suggests, to me at least, that the notion of heart, feeling, and
empathic concern is pervasive in our culture, and that the "caring heart" can
legitimately be considered a basic aspect of the Thai identity.  I am projecting=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 129 of 219 ===
optimistically—and indeed most probably—that this feature of our culture and
identity will survive essentially intact.
22  This feature of kindness is related to the
open nature of our society, and to our willingness to entertain cultural alternatives,
and to consider other ways of doing things (1.1).  In this sense, the very fact that
many foreign ideas and values are pouring into our country, via tourism or the
international media, might actually serve to reinforce our "caring heart."
Our tendency to be open and empathic is in turn related to our strong tradition
of avoiding open confrontation.  We do have culturally acceptable ways of telling
each other the truth, but we strongly prefer to do this in a manner that is kindly and
empathic, and that minimizes emotional upset.  Especially in unequal hierarchic
interaction (2.12.3), but even among friends, peers, and spouses, we prefer to avoid
open confrontation (2.12.4).  By my values, this is a worthy emblem of our identity,
and one that optimistically will survive in many areas of our national life.
There are, however, a few areas where intact survival of this feature is so
unlikely as to be utopian.  These are in the modern-urban sector, and especially in
financial and political affairs, such as wage labor agreements, commercial property
transactions, and competition for political power.  In the rural sector, these values
have a much better general chance of survival.
                                            
     22No cultural feature as broad as this one could exist without
exceptions.  Among the situations where the caring heart feature
is likely to be absent or weak are those in which overly selfish
factory owners pay their workers extremely low wages, or in which
village girls are illegally exploited by brothel hoodlums.  This
entire matter is further dealt with in my Pessimistic Scenario,
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2.12.2. JOYFULNESS
Another essential feature of our national culture and identity that optimistically
will survive is a certain joy in life, a playful attitude (khwaam khiilen), a preference
for things that are fun (sanug), and a proclivity toward comfort (khwaam sabaaj) in a
general sense.  This proclivity is not just toward material comfort, but toward
interpersonal relations that make everyone feel comfortable at heart (sabaajcaj).
Along with this goes a tendency not to take the troubles of the moment too seriously.
Our cultural tendency to emphasize "knowing" in a wide sense (1.1) is related to a
tendency not to take any one set-back too seriously, and to value the Buddhist notion
of equanimity (ubeegkhaa).  This view of the world, and of the potentials of life, is
useful in helping the individual deal with the inevitable disappointments of life—and
with stresses of participation in modern, competitive, highly technologized living
situations.  Optimistically, the very utility of this aspect of the Thai culture and
identity will help insure its survival.
2.12.3. THE DECLINE OF HIERARCHICAL RIGIDITY
A third aspect of our national identity is a tendency to defer to hierarchical
superiors—and here my optimistic projection calls more for change than persistence.
The roots of our traditional sense of hierarchy are deep.  The Thai monarchy
was heavily influenced by the Khmer culture several centuries ago, following the
Thai subjugation of the Kingdom of Angkor.  The Khmer political culture
emphasized the notion of the god-king (theewa-raacaa), and since that time the Thai
political culture and social organization have become characterized by steep
hierarchical social arrangements.  Since Western influence became prevalent in the
late Nineteenth Century, there has been an erosion of the more extreme forms of
hierarchical deference—especially those forms based on status ascribed at birth.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 131 of 219 ===
Since economic modernization became settled national policy during the 1960s, the
attenuation of hierarchy as a basis for interaction has become a truly general process,
hand in hand with the growth of meritocracy and creativity.  And even where
meritocratic criteria have been minimal, the erosion of hierarchy has occurred.  For
example, over the past twenty years even personal servants have shown, on the
average, less deference toward their employers.  I project, optimistically, that this
broad de-hierarchization process will continue.
What will drive this process?  In brief, I anticipate that the structures in which
hierarchy will erode most rapidly will be those in which it is most visibly and
seriously dysfunctional: where people can see clearly that it "just doesn't work," and
where its failure to work is clearly costly.  More specifically, I anticipate very rapid
erosion in those structures that relate most intensely with the world outside Thailand.
Such structures include private business firms in competitive market situations.  In
order to survive economically, such firms must make flexible, technically complex
responses to outside opportunities and risks.
This is not to say, however, that all hierarchical arrangements are
dysfunctional and will prove themselves so.  To the contrary, there will doubtless be
many factories in which hierarchical arrangements will survive because they permit
rational control and coordination of a production process, to insure greatest economy
and efficiency.  Such hierarchies, though, will typically be participatory hierarchies
where junior employees may readily submit innovative suggestions and designs.
In university life, tight hierarchical constraints have been withering for some
years, and today junior lecturers use their right to disagree with senior professors in
many situations where, thirty years ago, overt disagreement would have been
unthinkable.  Optimistically, this broad process will continue, and the degree of
academic freedom available to a Thai academic will more and more approximate that=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 132 of 219 ===
of his or her colleagues in the U.S.—where, indeed, a large percentage of these junior
academics will have been educated.  The creative benefits that will flow from such
freedom will far outweigh any negative consequences—especially in the sciences
and technology, where progress is now so rapid that senior professors, unless they
keep up scrupulously with developments in their fields, are likely to be less qualified
than their juniors, in many respects.
A broadly similar relaxation of hierarchical constraints will characterize the
relationship between university professor and student, with generally similar and
positive results.
It remains to deal with that citadel of hierarchy, the civil service.  The various
ministries and departments vary widely as to the degree of their hierarchical
rigidity—and, indeed, as to how much rigidity is optimal, given the tasks that a
particular governmental organization must perform.  In general, however, it is my
judgment that our government is characterized by too much hierarchy and rigidity.
In particular, I regard the Ministry of Interior in this light, and feel that its
hierarchical tradition is part of the explanation for its limited ability to serve as an
agency actively fostering development (as distinct from merely maintaining sheer
control).  This enormous ministry has always been conservative, with a strong
tradition of control.
Optimistically, I project that modernization and professionalization will
gradually bring about a relaxation of this hierarchical tradition throughout our public
bureaucracy, and with it an improvement in efficiency, creativity, and active,
resourceful responsiveness to public need.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 133 of 219 ===
2.12.4. HARMONY AND THE AVOIDANCE OF CONFRONTATION
Since some of the traditional pattern of avoiding confrontation is related to that
of hierarchy (in the sense that the individual is especially inclined to avoid
confrontation with a status superior in the same organization or group), it follows that
an erosion of hierarchical orientation might in some cases spur an erosion of the
cultural value placed upon non-confrontational harmony.  Thus, non-confrontation is
more likely to remain a controlling norm in, say, the Ministry of Interior, than in a
small modern start-up business firm.
Modern elective politics is another area where hierarchy has been eroding.
Since political parties are not as hierarchically structured as civil service
bureaucracies, and since politicians can often gain advantages by "bashing"
bureaucrats, the net effect of elective politics on the principle of hierarchy has been
erosive.  I expect this trend to continue, though I am not sure whether it belongs in
my Optimistic or Pessimistic Scenario.
It is important to emphasize, finally, that only a part of the Thai penchant for
harmony is rooted in hierarchy.  Thais also treat their social peers in this spirit.  It is a
valued part of the quality of Thai life to be treated this way.  This fact provides
additional grounding for my projection that, except to some degree in the domains of
commerce and politics, Thais will continue to emphasize harmony and non-
confrontation to a marked degree, for some decades to come.
.oOo.
This concludes my Optimistic Scenario.  In it I have included all major
domains that I consider to be of most vital concern.  There is more that I would like=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 134 of 219 ===
to say about each of these domains, but a monograph like this does have space
limitations, and hence must be quite selective.
In the next chapter, I turn to some pessimistic projections.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 135 of 219 ===
CHAPTER THREE:
THE PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO
Principally because I am by temperament an optimistic person, this chapter
will be quite brief.
Another factor explaining this brevity is that my Pessimistic Scenario is
generally similar to that of the 24 Chiang Mai University professors who received
Ethnographic Futures Research interviews in 1981, and whose conglomerate
Pessimistic Scenario is reported in Chapter Four of Bhansoon, Sidhinat, and Textor
1984.  The interested reader may therefore consult that monograph.
I hasten to add, however, that I regard my inclination toward optimism as
being more than just a matter of personal temperament.  I believe it is rooted also in a
number of what are, in my judgment at least, relatively objective factors in the total
Thai situation.  I begin with a consideration of domestic factors, then move to foreign
factors.
3.1. THAILAND'S INTERNAL ASSETS
As it confronts its future, Thailand possesses a number of internal assets that
are imbedded in its ecological situation and sociocultural system.  To the proverbial
visiting anthropologist from another planet, who is by temperament neither optimistic
nor pessimistic, an examination of these assets would suggest that Thailand's chances
for achieving a desirable future during the projection period are strong.  Among these
assets, five stand out:
  ♦  a rich natural resource base;
♦  a satisfactory person-to-land area ratio (2.1);=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 136 of 219 ===
♦  a relatively high degree of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity (2.11,
2.12);
♦  an open and assimilative culture (1.1); and
♦  a stable and responsive polity (1.2).
These assets make Thailand somewhat more fortunate than some other nations
in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines—and vastly more
fortunate than others, such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar (formerly
Burma).  Indeed, when one considers the five above-stated factors in the aggregate,
in my judgment no other Southeast Asian nation, aside from small but extremely
resource-rich Brunei, comes close to being as fortunate as Thailand.  Thus, while
there are many sorts of highly pessimistic scenarios that one could plausibly
conceptualize for most other Southeast Asian nations, such a facile pessimism would,
in my judgment, be inappropriate in the Thai case.
23  One could, for example,
pessimistically project:
♦  for Cambodia, food crop failure as a consequence of the fundamental
disruption of normally productive irrigation systems by the Khmer Rouge regime; or
♦  for Malaysia or Indonesia or Myanmar, bloody inter-ethnic conflict
of a type that has occurred there in recent decades, and plausibly could occur again.
Such undesirable realities have not characterized Thailand within the historical
period, and I see no grounds in the present situation on which to base such dire
                                            
     23In more technical parlance (Appendix, Section A.3), in my
judgment there are a number of pessimistic projections one could
make for certain other Southeast Asian nations which would not be
dystopian (below zero on the 0-to-100 scale of possible
projections) but which would be dystopian for Thailand.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 137 of 219 ===
projections for Thailand within the projection period.  In sum, I judge Thailand's
present internal situation to be fundamentally sound.
3.2. THAILAND'S EXTERNAL DANGERS
The objective nature of Thailand's external situation is, unfortunately, quite
another story.  At bottom, my position is that while both our internal and external
situations are characterized by both opportunities and risks, the former is tilted
toward opportunities, while the latter is tilted toward risks.  This is true not just
because, as is obvious, our polity is more in control of its internal opportunity/ risk
situation, than its external.  It is true also because the objective nature of our internal
situation is more favorable, in terms of the ratio of opportunities to risks.  To take a
simple example: with respect to basic food supply, not only is it true that our polity
can control the situation (in terms of providing irrigation facilities, incentives to
farmers, farm-to-market infrastructure, family planning programs, etc.)—but it is also
true that the situation itself is inherently favorable (because we have enough good
soil to feed our people).
   In viewing our external situation, by contrast, we are disadvantaged on both
counts.  Not only is the objective situation in some respects less favorable (e.g.,
certain goods and services we need to import are scarce and expensive), but our
polity has far less capability of regulating or even influencing the situation so as to
maximize benefits and opportunities, and minimize costs and risks.  It is simply a fact
of life, in an increasingly interdependent world, that there are real problems affecting
Thailand which are almost totally beyond its control.  Thailand is, after all, a small
and relatively weak nation.  It is thus not difficult to imagine possible changes in our
external situation that could serve to ground a truly painful Pessimistic Scenario.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 138 of 219 ===
While a Thai leader should resolutely resist the temptation to "cop out" of
taking decisive and strong action of the type that could solve a national problem by
blaming the problem on "foreign powers," nonetheless it is true that in many ways
our country is almost totally at the mercy of events and processes outside Thailand.
Five possible sources of major difficulty should be mentioned.
♦  Competition and conflict among the world's military and economic
powers, especially the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the Middle East,
could produce disharmony serious enough to threaten Thailand profoundly.
Moreover, if Thai leaders sense a clear and present danger to the nation's
independence, they are likely to involve the nation in defensive alliances.  While such
alliances probably would have a positive effect on national security, past experience
suggests strongly that they would also probably produce serious political, economic,
or cultural side-effects that would constrain the Thai polity's freedom and capacity to
pursue the kind of development most suitable to meet Thai needs as determined by
Thais.
♦  The world price of commodities we must import, especially oil,
could rise disastrously.  For example, the 1990 UN naval blockade of Iraq, plus other
possible subsequent disruptions in the Persian Gulf, could severely limit the oil flow
from the Middle East to other parts of the world.
♦  The world price of raw commodities (such as tapioca) and finished
products (such as ready-to-wear clothing) that Thailand exports, could fall
disastrously.  Countries constituting major markets for such products could restrict
their markets by various tariff and quota devices.
24
                                            
     24For example, the new European Economic Community to be
established in 1992 will remove tariff barriers within its area,
but might, in effect, raise them vis-a-vis imports from countries=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 139 of 219 ===
♦  The value of the baht internationally could fluctuate unfavorably.
♦  There could be a drastic increase in the already burdensome number
of political refugees and displaced persons Thailand would need to care for,
accompanied by little genuine assistance from other nations.
25
For reasons such as the above five, when I construct a Pessimistic Scenario I
assign great weight to the international political and economic situation.  And my
task is further complicated by the sheer fickleness of this situation.  For example, the
political pressures to which Thailand must adjust could shift abruptly if there were:
♦  a sudden change of government in some world power;
♦  a stock market crash in some distant financial center;
♦  a sudden rise in energy prices; or
♦  a bumper crop of a primary commodity in some nation with which
Thailand must compete on the international market.
   In this Pessimistic Scenario I cannot possibly hope to do full justice to all of
these international complexities and vagaries; I will simply deal with them briefly as
best I can and try to make my assumptions reasonably clear as I proceed.
                                                                                                                                                
like Thailand.  Recent experience suggests, for example, that this
might be the case with Thailand-produced animal feed which
competes with that produced in Europe.
     25In 1989 there were about 120,000 refugees and 250,000
displaced persons from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam living in camps
along Thailand's northeastern border.  Although support from
international agencies and foreign governments has been received,
and some foreign governments have been reasonably willing to
accept some of these refugees as immigrants, the bottom line fact
has always been that a considerable administrative burden for
looking after these unfortunate folk has fallen on Thailand.  If
this burden were multiplied several times, it could become a
severe constraint on the nation's ability to support development
programs for its own people.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 140 of 219 ===
3.3. KEY DYNAMICS IN THE PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO
With the above external dangers and internal assets in mind, I turn to an
outline of the key dynamics of my Pessimistic Scenario.
3.3.1. DEMOGRAPHY
Pessimistically, over the projection period our national population will
increase at a rate close to the maximum projection provided by experts, and reach
about 85 million by A.D. 2020.  This will place great burdens on the capacity of our
nation to provide the economic, social, and educational infrastructure necessary to
meet the needs of such a large and young population.  The result will be widespread
individual frustration and anomie, social dysfunction, and cultural decay.
On similar grounds, pessimistically I project that the efforts of the government
to encourage industry in middle-sized cities, and in the countryside, will largely fail.
Instead, the already-serious Bangkok situation will be further aggravated, as more
and more young people from the countryside flock to the metropolis in desperate
search for economic opportunities that do not exist.  While considerable new
technology will be imported and put in place, less sophisticated people from the
countryside will learn the bitter lesson that the new technology most benefits those
who already possess sophisticated educational and skill backgrounds appropriate to
mastering and using the new tools.  So, the gap between affluent and needy will be
exacerbated—as will congestion, pollution, and general human degradation.  Almost
everyone's quality of life will suffer in one way or another.
As the population growth rate vastly outpaces the ability of the economy and
polity to provide education and health services, the overall quality of our population
will inevitably drop.  Exacerbating this process will be an accelerating trend toward=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 141 of 219 ===
better-educated parents having smaller families.  The resulting less-educated
population will in turn be less trainable for modern technology, and this will
adversely affect the nation's ability to attract, adopt, and adapt foreign technology.
The result will be lowered productivity, and perhaps even a negative trend in gross
national product.  Under such circumstances, the "vital surplus"—which facilitates
education and research, makes developmental activity possible, and underwrites
social experimentation—will be lost, and all these adaptive and enhancing activities
will further shrink.  Even the best of leaders cannot lead unless they have resources at
their disposal, and under this Pessimistic Scenario, such resources will be limited,
indeed.
3.3.2. RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
An excessive population growth rate will place even greater pressure on
Thailand's natural resources and environment than was true in 1988.  Irresponsible
use of our resources, and abuse of our environment, will further reduce sustainable
productivity.
Some elements of the Biotechnical Revolution will reach Thailand, but
pessimistically will contribute little toward the solution of the nation's escalating
woes.  The generally poor economic and leadership situation will permit little truly
social use to be made of the Biotechnical Revolution.  And even in the exceptional
cases where positive use is made of these new tools, the benefits will go largely to the
wealthy.
Notable among the looming environmental disasters is the Bangkok
subsidence problem.  During the Seventies and Eighties, Bangkok was sinking
several centimeters each year as a consequence of the over-pumping of its
groundwater for industrial and other purposes.  Since many parts of Bangkok are=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 142 of 219 ===
only one meter above sea level, it is likely that much of the nation's capital will sink
below sea level during the projection period—and indeed, parts of the city already
have.  Pessimistically, inept and corrupt political leadership will fail adequately to
slow down this over-pumping.  If, in addition, the world greenhouse effect causes
substantial melting of polar ice caps, and a consequent rise in sea level, Bangkok will
be flooded for a greater portion of each year—with severe implications for public
health, economic efficiency, and general quality of life.  Whether our government
could safeguard Bangkok by the construction of extensive sea dikes, after the model
of the Netherlands, is problematic.  The same seems true of other suggested
solutions, such as slowing down the Bangkok in-migration rate, or the groundwater
pumping rate—since these are difficult matters to police.
Bangkok and the entire nation could also be endangered by an unusual but
readily conceivable pattern of unbalanced rainfall, in which:
♦  unusually heavy rains would fall on the Lower Central Plain below
the southernmost dam system at Chainat (thus making it impossible to store this
water and gradually release it over several months to meet irrigation needs); and
♦  unusually light rains would fall north of Chainat (thus denying
farmers there the water they need for established crops).  This imbalanced pattern, if
repeated several years running, could devastate Thai agriculture and consign some
millions of our farmers to destitution.  Recent experience suggests that the danger of
such an unbalanced pattern is real.  And the fact that global climatic conditions have
recently been changing quite fundamentally, yet with an ominous unpredictability, do
nothing to relieve this pessimistic prospect.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 143 of 219 ===
3.3.3. THE VICIOUS DOWNWARD MORAL SPIRAL
As more and more consumers compete to share a less and less adequate
national economic product, a "big fish eat little fish" mentality will emerge.  While
our Buddhism will certainly help us to sustain our tolerance, patience, and
forbearance, nonetheless many will find it less and less practical to take the Buddhist
moral code seriously, and will breach it with increasing frequency.
Buddhist ethical standards will still be nominally invoked, but less and less put
into action.  This will be a consequence of a tendency that had been building for
several decades, in which modern Thai intellectuals more and more came to feel that
Buddhism was for the uneducated—in part because they themselves, statistically
speaking, had tended more and more to go through life ignorant of Buddhist
philosophy and ethics.  One reason for this ignorance has been the growing tendency,
since at least World War II, for Thai schools and universities to confine their
curricula to scientific and professional subjects, to the detriment of teaching
humanistic, ethical, and religious subjects (2.11.1., 6.2.1).  Also, there has been a
growing tendency for educated Thai males to go through life without becoming
monks, thus denying themselves the culturally provided opportunity to study the
Dharma systematically.
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     26It should be noted in passing that even if most Thais were to
learn more about Buddhism and take it more seriously as a guide to
behavior,  this  would  by  no  means  totally  solve  the  problem  of
social  order  and  political  responsibility  (though  it  would
certainly  help).    The  reason,  in  my  view,  is  that  Buddhism,  at
least in its prevailing form in Thailand, tends to be centered, to
a  marked  extent,  upon  the  individual,  and  tends  to  offer
individual rather than societal guidance.  I realize that this is
a  complex  analytical  matter,  but  suffice  to  say  here  that,
historically and culturally, standards for societal propriety and
political responsibility have tended to come more from the monar-
chy, and to some extent the armed forces, than from Buddhism, seen=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 144 of 219 ===
Not only will Buddhist faith prove unavailing against the forces of self-
concern at the national level, but spirit worship, too, will lose much of its former
efficacy (2.11.4).  Due to the penetration of village society by commercialism and
certain forms of social modernization, traditional spirit worship will atrophy.  The
social control function formerly served by the fact that people were afraid to commit
anti-social or criminal acts because they would be going against the wishes of the
ghosts (phid phii) will be largely lost, and no alternative means of enforcing morality
will emerge to take its place.  The result will be an increase in crime and a weakening
of social order in the countryside.
3.3.4. CORRUPTION AND ITS FURTHER CONSEQUENCES
In such a moral climate, privileged elements in society will strive desperately
to protect their privileges, and be prepared to buy the cooperation of whatever
politicians and officials can help them toward this end.  Politicians and officials, for
their part, will find it increasingly difficult to be "both expert and ethical"
(1.14)—expert, perhaps, but less and less ethical.
This corruption could take the classic, straightforward form of officials selling
influence, permits, etc., to privileged private entrepreneurs.  It could also take a
variety of subtler forms.  Pessimistically, Parliament will be studded with members
who possess very limited qualifications, and are essentially "hired guns" for narrow
constituencies of wealthy business interests.  Such parliamentarians will essentially
be "for sale," and will serve, not the people, but those interests who have bought
them.  They will become expert at maneuvers designed to favor their own political
                                                                                                                                                
either as a social organization or a cultural system of beliefs
and standards.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 145 of 219 ===
cliques, in effect allowing clique insiders to make windfall profits from projects that
contribute little directly to true development (such as real estate speculation), while
shielding them from the discipline of true free market competition.  
Pessimistically, the "mafia"—in and out of Parliament—will seize many new
opportunities to use the computer, networking, remote sensing, and similar
technologies for their own purposes.  This projection is readily grounded; such
antisocial use of all sorts of new technology has often occurred in the recent past.
In such a political and moral climate, fewer and fewer key decisions will be
made in the interest of our society as a whole.  More and more often, those who do
not suffer directly will retreat to a "maj pen raj," "couldn't care less," attitude.  The
public will more and more lose confidence in the political process.  They will also
lose respect for the bureaucracy, and this in turn will make it harder for the
government to find and hold honest, capable, dedicated public servants.  And such
civil servants of this type as do remain in the service, will find it harder and harder to
initiate and carry out effective economic development and environmental protection
programs.
As corruption becomes more serious, the government will sometimes attempt
to control it be resorting to a variety of highly rigid, red-tape-bound measures.  On
the whole, however, such measures will result primarily in rendering the bureaucracy
so inflexible that it will be unable to respond to rapidly changing conditions, or to
secure the best financial arrangements for Thailand in its dealings with foreign
markets and technology sources.  In such fashion, anti-corruption measures will often
boomerang, creating the very kind of irresponsibility they were designed to correct.
Poor government leadership, planning, and administration will in turn lead to
other inadequacies.  For example, the licensing of oil exploration and drilling rights
to foreign concerns will be both ineptly and corruptly handled, leading to a decrease=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 146 of 219 ===
in the finding of our petrochemical resources; or a decrease in the fruits of our
petrochemical resources that actually are socially shared among all the Thai people;
or both.
Lack of cheap energy will discourage new foreign investments in
development-relevant projects, and in turn cause a lag in the industrialization process.
Industrialization will fail to create the vast number of new jobs needed, partly
because too much of Thailand's limited savings will be invested in an overabundance
of luxury highrise buildings, golf courses, and shopping centers—all of which will
further fan the flames of mindless consumerism.  In general, the economy will falter,
and there will be less of a gross national product to tax and redistribute, even if the
political will to redistribute were existent—which it will not be.  For such reasons,
the gap between rich and poor, already wide in 1988, will grow ever wider.
The desperately poor, including some bilked of their land by real estate
developers, will increasingly seek employment in a well-established non-industrial
field, namely tourism.  To a considerable extent these people, unable to sell their
manufacturing labor, will instead sell either their dignity or their bodies, or both.  In a
too-real sense, Thailand will become a nation of low-income service workers, pimps,
and prostitutes, both female and male.  In time, this new situation will bring about a
general diminution of national self-esteem.
National anomie will be accompanied and abetted by a sharp increase in the
use of heavy drugs.  Through both sexual and needle contact, an AIDS epidemic of
gigantic proportions will develop, just at a time when the government's health budget
will have become dangerously thin.
   To sum up: pessimistically, there will be an interactive downward spiral,
which will link demographic hypergrowth, resource depletion, and environmental
abuse, on the one hand, with leadership and management that are deficient in both=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 147 of 219 ===
expertise and ethics.  As favoritism, corruption, and waste eat away at our nation's
surplus available for social welfare and developmental advancement, in due course
these phenomena will provoke a sharp and abrupt political response.
3.4. THE POLITICAL RESPONSE
Pessimistically, the political response to this vicious downward spiral will take
the form of an ever more desperate population waiting for the "man on a white
horse," the hero who can create order out of chaos.  The result will be one or more
coups d'etat, and the assumption of power by an authoritarian ruler, either of the far
left or the far right.  A far left ruler would enforce a degree of authoritarianism that
would make virtually the entire Thai nation, with its deep cultural preference for
individual autonomy, exceedingly unhappy.  A far right ruler would probably handle
problems roughly as Ferdinand Marcos did in the Philippines, with the net result that
both freedom and economic progress would sooner or later be set back drastically.
Regardless of political stripe, such a new leader would pose the universal
dilemma of authoritarianism.  If he remained in power too short a time, he could not
be effective.  If he remained too long, his regime would almost certainly become
more and more corrupt and less and less effective.
There are, however, limits to my ability to ground this Pessimistic Scenario.
Given the Thai system of governmental stability outlined in 1.2, I consider it to be
unrealistic to project that a highly authoritarian, irresponsible ruler could hold onto
power for decades.  Such an outcome would be dystopian (A.4.2).  Sooner or later,
events and processes will take a positive turn, as the forces of equilibrium—"Phra
Sajaam Theewaathiraad"—restore a more moderate regime.  Supporting this=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 148 of 219 ===
bounce-back process will be the nation's well-developed human resources.
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However, these resources might not become effective enough, soon enough, to
prevent the great downward moral spiral from negating many of the highly positive
development processes of the Seventies and Eighties.
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To summarize: in my view the key imponderables in a pessimistic view of the
Thai future are international in one sense or another: natural or political-economic.
Thai climatic conditions could shift for several years running, as a consequence of
the fate of natural events, or of our abuse of nature, or both.  Or, the Thai politico-
economic situation could be placed under crippling pressure by unfortunate shifts in
the relations among the great powers.
On the domestic side, in my view Thailand is inherently less subject to
pessimistic projection, due to its wealth of natural resources and the increasingly
strong development of its human resources.  If, however, through tempocentric
leadership and anti-social behavior we mismanage our economy, squander our
resources, and abuse our environment, this situation could change—and in time
undermine our ability to create a situation where everyone will be able to "eat
sufficiently, live sufficiently."
The "bottom line" of the Pessimistic Scenario, then, is that, given reasonably
good luck in Thailand's external situation, there is solid grounding for an overall
projection of general success in the middle-range future.  In other words, there is a
                                            
     27For example, in 1990 elementary education was almost
universal, and some 40% of age-eligible youngsters were in
secondary school, while close to a million Thai adolescents and
adults were enrolled in one university or another.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 149 of 219 ===
good chance that the Optimistic Scenario summarized in Chapter Two will end up
being considerably closer to actual reality, as the future becomes the present—than
will the Pessimistic Scenario just presented.  To explore this matter further, I proceed
to the Most Probable Scenario.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 150 of 219 ===
CHAPTER FOUR:
THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO
This Most Probable Scenario is fundamentally different from the previous two,
in that my task is strictly limited to forecasting outcomes that I consider to be most
probable—regardless of whether I would regard those outcomes as desirable or
undesirable.  I am asked to suspend my own values, and simply imagine that I am
betting my own money on a particular scenario to come true.
After due reflection, I must say that my Most Probable Scenario turns out to be
fairly similar to my Optimistic Scenario, though it does fall short of the latter in some
respects.  I feel confident that at least 60 to 70 percent of the projections in my
Optimistic Scenario will become reality by the horizon date.  Although such a
statement is necessarily intuitive, I do believe that my Optimistic Scenario is
reasonably sound in a scientific and technological sense, and adequately rooted in
extant reality or in solid, demonstrable trends.
Because my Most Probable Scenario closely resembles my Optimistic, this
chapter need not be long.  I forecast that the population of Thailand in A.D. 2020 will
most probably be between 75 and 85 million people, with the percentage of Thais
living in the rural areas reduced to 60 percent, or perhaps 50.  In general, the Thai
people will probably be living in a manner fairly similar to that portrayed in Chapter
Two.  The nation will enjoy a greatly improved infrastructure of transportation and
communication facilities, and this will in turn promote a more effective outreach of
commercial, technical, and social welfare services even to the most remote parts of
the nation.  Primary health care will be available even in villages distant from large
cities, as will elementary and secondary education opportunities.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 151 of 219 ===
Because of a great expansion of the mass media and widespread use of the
new information technology, the gap between rural and urban Thais, in terms of
overall sophistication and lifestyle, will have become much smaller, and less serious
as an obstacle to further overall national development.  While regional dialects will
persist, along with certain local customs, in general we will all be "Thais together" to
a greater extent, culturally speaking, than was true in 1990.
How will all this come about?  I will summarize my answer under the rubrics
of Thailand's external context, internal situation, and political leadership.
4.1. EXTERNAL CONTEXT
In 3.2 I viewed in the pessimistic mode the complex and changeable
international context with which Thailand must deal as it attempts to survive and
develop.  Viewing the same phenomena in the "most probable" mode, however, I
take the position that on the whole this international context will be at least as
favorable over the next 30 years as it was during the past 30—and perhaps con-
siderably more so.  A key reason for this lies in the reforms so far accomplished since
Soviet President Gorbachev came to power.  Under Gorbachev, in just a few years
Soviet relations with the rest of the world have improved dramatically, and the
objective threat of Soviet expansionism has greatly decreased.  It no longer seems at
all wishful to forecast a lengthy period of peace and cooperation among the world's
great powers.
I grant that I might here be suffering from "recentism"—that is, attributing too-
great significance to very recent events.  I might be failing to consider adequately the
possibility that there could be a change in Soviet leadership, perhaps sudden and
profound, which could result in a reversal of some of the gains in world stability
made under Gorbachev.  However, one must also recognize that at least some of=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 152 of 219 ===
these recent positive changes would be likely to survive, with or without
Gorbachev—if only because many Soviet leaders and citizens would have acquired a
stake in them, while others would simply recognize that reversal would not serve the
desperate Soviet need for technological and economic modernization.
Another extremely solid development will be the 1992 emergence of the
European Community.  This new politico-economic unit will constitute the world's
largest market, and its most populous industrialized political unit.  It will be a new
prime actor on the world stage, an actor committed to democratic values and peaceful
coexistence.
At this writing, prospects for some sort of peace in the Indochina area seem to
be improving.  This permits at least some hope for a considerable reduction in the
heavy economic and political burden that the Thai state currently bears in helping to
care for almost half a million refugees and displaced persons from Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam.  Most probably some of these people will be resettled in various Asian
and Western nations; others will return to their homelands; and a small minority will
find niches in the Thai economy and society as permanent residents earning
legitimate livelihoods.
I find it more difficult to lay out a Most Probable Scenario for energy, but feel
reasonably comfortable with the notion that the world has fifty years of economically
recoverable petroleum resources left (2.3).  That gives world science and technology
a considerable period of grace in which to develop workable substitutes.
Related to the energy situation are the crucial monetary and debt problems that
the world currently faces.  Whether these problems will be wisely and humanely
handled is an immensely complex question, but certainly the above-noted prospect of
overall stable peace among the great powers offers reasonable grounds for expecting=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 153 of 219 ===
that such problems will not get dangerously out of hand, at least insofar as Thailand
is directly concerned.
4.2. INTERNAL SITUATION
As stated in 3.1, I judge the "internal assets" possessed by Thailand to be
favorable indeed.  I consider the momentum toward true development that Thai
society generated during the Sixties, Seventies, and Eighties to be powerful enough
to overcome a great deal of political and social inertia.
The capacity of the polity to perform major proactive planning will improve
substantially.  The Eastern Seaboard Development Project will most probably be
successful in reaching its major goals, and will set the tone for other regional
projects, such as the Southern Seaboard Project and the Greening of the Northeast
Project.
The Northeast will, however, remain the region in greatest need of concerted
development effort.  This effort will be substantially supported by the construction of
modern deepwater port facilities at Laem Chabang and Map Ta Phut on the Eastern
Seaboard.  Transportation by already-existing highways, and by a new railroad route,
will avoid the congestion and delay of transiting through Bangkok, and connect
directly with the Northeast.  Despite such efforts, however, the Northeast will almost
certainly remain the least affluent region in the nation.
On the ecological side, my Most Probable Scenario is sharply different and
dark indeed.  Already we have drastically overcut our forest cover and brought about
unnecessary erosion and soil destruction—damage that will, even assuming our very
best efforts, take long years just to bring to a stop, let alone to repair.  Indeed, much
of this damage will prove to be beyond repair—with pervasively negative
consequences in terms of resources, environment, productivity, and quality of life.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 154 of 219 ===
4.3. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Crucial to the entire process of development is the quality of political
leadership that will be available to Thailand.
28  I forecast that this quality will most
probably improve, perhaps even dramatically.  I ground this forecast basically on the
reality that our electorate in 1988 was vastly more sophisticated than thirty years
earlier, as a consequence of the fact that millions of Thais had been educated at the
secondary level, and hundreds of thousands at the tertiary.  Since this educational
expansion will doubtless continue, a better functioning electorate seems highly likely,
one that will demand more responsible political leadership at the local, provincial,
and national levels—as well as more direct participation by the citizenry.
This new national leadership will be more professional and imaginative.
Corruption will decline, as more and more leaders assert a new ethic defining such
behavior as simply unacceptable.  In recent years it has become increasingly evident
                                            
     28A general methodological point is worth making here.  In
Textor's experience to date with the application of Ethnographic
Futures Research to various nations and systems, political
leadership has generally proven to be a crucial variable.  In all
polities, whether democratic or authoritarian, there is a special
"luck of the draw" aspect to political leadership—for example, as
between whether the system somehow gets a Chernenkov or a
Gorbachev, a Kennedy or a Nixon, etc.  This "luck of the draw"
consideration is relevant to the distinction between one's Most
Probable Scenario, and one's Optimistic or Pessimistic Scenario.
In developing one's Optimistic Scenario, one is quite free to
imagine that the luck of the draw produces political leadership of
a type that one would consider highly desirable; in one's
Pessimistic, highly undesirable.  In one's Most Probable Scenario,
by contrast, one does not have this freedom.  Rather, one simply
articulates one's most plausible expectation, taking into account
all the contextual, demographic, structural, cultural, and
situational factors that seem important.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 155 of 219 ===
that more and more of the nation's top governmental administrators are essentially
incorruptible—though sometimes their subordinates have partaken of corruption,
often perhaps because of low salary levels.  Most probably the polity will gradually
provide more realistic salaries for government officials, though this will, of course,
depend in part on the general level of economic prosperity.  However, in any case it
is not likely that government officials will achieve anything like full parity with
comparably qualified persons in the private sector, and for this reason alone,
corruption will remain a serious problem even at the end of the forecasting period.
The government's basic approach to the problems of growth without excessive
corruption will be to progressively de-emphasize the government's role as regulator
of the economy, in part out of a conviction that attempts to regulate the economy
typically tempt some of the officials who administer the regulations to enrich
themselves in the process.
This leaves, of course, the question of whether drastically reduced government
involvement in the economy will give private interests a greater opportunity to take
unfair advantage of their workers and the consuming public—and whether they will
seize this opportunity or exercise humane restraint and reasonable responsibility.  In
this Most Probable Scenario, I am forecasting that a national political consensus will
steadily coalesce, which will enable an increasingly vigilant media community, and
an alert public opinion, to handle this general problem in an adequate way.  While
certainly some will disagree, I would suggest that this forecast takes on considerable
plausibility when one considers the rapid maturation in recent years of the Thai press
and television professions, which have been producing more and more serious news
coverage for a rapidly growing audience of well educated readers and viewers.  And
recent experience does indeed suggest that public opinion has been growing more
effective politically, at an encouraging rate.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 156 of 219 ===
This brings to an end my brief Most Probable Scenario.  In the chapter that
follows, a somewhat different kind of probable-realizable scenario is presented.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 157 of 219 ===
CHAPTER FIVE:
PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND
POSSIDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Having finished with my Most Probable Scenario, I move now to a fourth
scenario which is not normally a part of the EFR approach (A.5).  This scenario is
one that I consider less than the most probable, but still reasonably probable of
realization.  It consists of nine "possidictions."  The term "possidiction" is sometimes
used by futures scholars to refer to a conditional prediction of the possible.  More
specifically, in this chapter a possidiction is a statement as to a future process that I
consider to be definitely desirable—typically more desirable than found in my Most
Probable Scenario—and to have a reasonable chance of realization, provided:
♦  that there are appropriate national policies, and
♦  that there is national political leadership with the will and skill to
carry out those policies.
In this chapter I will relate my possidictions to various key ideas that have
undergirded Thailand's national plans since the Kingdom began systematic planning
in 1961.  Since then, except for the First Plan of 1961-66, the basic planning period
has been five years, and at this writing the nation is in the midst of its sixth plan and
in the process of formulating its seventh.
29
                                            
     29The First National Plan was issued under the administration
of Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat in 1961.  It was divided into two
sub-plans, 1961-63, and 1964-66.  The Second Plan spanned the
years 1967-71, the Third, 1972-76, and so on until the present
Sixth Plan, 1987-91.
The first two or three plans concentrated heavily upon the
improvement of basic physical infrastructure of transportation,=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 158 of 219 ===
This chapter will not be organized in terms of sociocultural domains, as were
the previous three.  Instead, I will phrase my possidictions in terms of nine key
themes, each of which cuts across several domains.
I consider each of these themes to be of fundamental importance to the future
of our country.  So do other planners and members of what may be termed our
"national planning subculture."  I define this subculture as a set of more or less
coherent standards concerning the true, the valid, and the good, that are generally
shared among those experts and intellectuals who have participated in the process of
national planning in one way or another, or else have taken a deep and abiding
interest in it.  I have been an active member of this planning subculture for thirty
years, during which I have participated in countless discussions with my planning
colleagues.  I have thus observed the formation of this subculture, and shared in
shaping it.
The order in which I present these nine themes is roughly chronological and
processual.  It generally proceeds from themes that are more clearly formed and
widely shared within the planning subculture to those less so, and from those that
have been more thoroughly realized in Thai society, to those less so.  Thus, to
anticipate, the ninth theme is not yet even clearly shaped, much less shared, within
the subculture—and even less has it been realized in society.  Yet even the ninth
theme, I would argue, is "in the air" within the subculture, and worthy of our
attention.
                                                                                                                                                
communication, etc., and on economic development.  Some attention
was also directed toward human resources development, including
the establishment of the first upcountry (out of Bangkok)
universities.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 159 of 219 ===
The first four themes have been articulated with great clarity by Dr. Snoh
Unakul (Snoh 1988).  Dr. Snoh was for many years Secretary-General of the
National Economic and Social Development Board, and in this capacity has earned
the gratitude of all Thais for his leadership in the macro-planning of our national
development.  The remaining five themes are those that reflect my experience within
the subculture, and that I regard as "emerging"—that is, apparently in the process of
being shaped and shared in that subculture, with the prospect of becoming realized in
Thai society at large, sooner or later.  The selection and formulation of these
"emerging" themes—indeed, the very judgment that they are emerging—is, of
course, my personal responsibility.  I have no doubt that other members of the
planning subculture might have rendered such selections and formulations somewhat
differently, but at the same time feel confident that most of them will regard my
selections and formulations as reasonable.
5.1. ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH STABILITY
The first four themes have to do with processes of economic growth and
various associated attributes, namely: stability, diversity, participation, and decen-
tralization.  This focal emphasis on growth is appropriate, because since the Sixties
Thailand has been, economically speaking, one of the great "success stories" of the
world.  Growth has been substantial and steady.  Even during the oil-pinched years of
the early Eighties, when some countries actually experienced negative growth, the
lowest yearly growth rate for Thailand (in constant baht terms) was a respectable
3.8%.  In 1988, this figure reached a phenomenal 11%.
One reason why our economic growth pattern has been stable is that our
society as a whole has been stable.  There has been a benign cycle: a general climate
of sociopolitical stability has increased investors' confidence, which in turn has led to=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 160 of 219 ===
greater investment, which has stabilized the economic growth pattern, which has
further contributed to sociopolitical stability—and so on.
My first possidiction is simply that our polity will continue to preserve stable
economic growth, with overall social stability.  This will not always be easy, and
implies that from time to time our polity must make tough policy decisions to keep
the national economy from overheating or overcooling.
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5.2. ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH DIVERSITY
Related to stability is the theme of diversity.  The Thai planning subculture is
deeply aware of the historic and tragic lesson of many Third World nations that have
become overly dependent on just one or two export crops.  All else equal, it is best
for Thailand to produce a diversity of export products (including some agricultural
commodities to which we add value through in-country processing)—and to sell
these products to a diversity of markets both domestic and foreign.  This policy has in
fact been implemented, and the nation has been transformed from one that thirty
years ago depended heavily on the export of rice, rubber, and teak—to one that today
exports a rich variety of crops, including tapioca, sugar, and fruits.  We have also
diversified into the secondary sector, and our exports now include a wide variety of
manufactures, including ready-to-wear clothing and electronic devices.  Our
diversification has also extended into the tertiary or service sector, to the point where
today our greatest single source of foreign exchange is tourism (2.6).
                                            
     30An example of the kind of tough decision our polity is
capable of making occurred in 1981, when our Deputy Minister of
Finance took the politically unpopular but highly statesmanlike
decision to devalue the baht, so as to increase exports and
discourage excessive imports.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 161 of 219 ===
Complementing all this, we have taken steps to diversify our sources of needed
imports.  Twenty years ago we depended for petroleum imports largely on just one
country.  Since then we have diversified to several.
My second possidiction is that by means of appropriate government policies
Thailand will continue to pursue and implement this policy of favoring greater
diversity in many areas, including exports and imports.
5.3. ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH PARTICIPATION
Prior to the Sixties, and to some degree even through the Seventies, the general
tradition of innovation in Thailand was characterized by a quite strict separation, at
least in theory, between government and private enterprise.  As the government has
moved to promote a more modern economy, the complexities inherent in the
modernizing process have made increasingly clear that cooperation between
government and the private sector is essential if problems and opportunities are to be
dealt with in adequate and timely fashion.  Indeed, in the Eighties it sometimes
occurred that even a Prime Minister would be seen visiting a bank to discuss national
problems with financiers—something quite unheard of a few decades earlier.  Of
course, to avoid both the fact and the suspicion of corruption, such government-
private cooperation must be transparent to the public—and in fact progress has also
been made in this direction.
My third possidiction is that there will be a continuation and expansion of this
new spirit of encouraging more active participation by non-governmental groups in
important development processes.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 162 of 219 ===
5.4. ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH
DECENTRALIZATION
Bangkok is one of the classic "primate" cities of the world.  Its metropolitan
area, with some seven million inhabitants, is well over forty times as populous as that
of our second city of Chiang Mai.  While this phenomenon is understandable in
historic terms, it is in many respects highly unsuitable to today's conditions.  Many of
Thailand's most important natural and human resources are to be found far from
Bangkok.  If these resources are to be fully harnessed, then some considerable degree
of decentralization of the nation's growing urban population must be pursued.
Decentralization has a number of additional advantages.  It will relieve
pressure on an enormously overcrowded and congested primate city, with obvious
ecological dividends.  Moreover, decentralization of population (and especially of the
better-educated population) is likely to lead also, sooner or later, to a measure of
decentralization of political power and authority, with more scope for middle-sized
cities and upcountry regions to take developmental initiatives in their own way.
Existing government policy does in fact favor decentralization.  The Eastern
Seaboard Project along the Gulf of Thailand shore east of Bangkok, and the Southern
Seaboard Project in Peninsular Thailand, are designed to promote decentralization of
manufacturing and commerce.  Government policy has also identified a half dozen
cities for promotion as regional centers of industrialization and development.
To date, these policies have met with mixed success.  However, the reasoning
behind these policies is so sound that I do not hesitate to possidict that they will be
implemented by appropriate government policies and resource allocations, and will
produce solid results through time, especially as more and more genuine local
initiative emerges.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 163 of 219 ===
5.5. SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUITY
So much for the four well-established thematic orientations so clearly
articulated by Dr. Snoh.  Is it appropriate to try to go further?  Members of the
planning subculture, including Dr. Snoh, tend to believe that it is, and I agree.  It is
now time to go beyond our emphasis on "economic growth with...", and examine
other themes that are of clear relevance to the overall well-being of the Thai people.
This I shall attempt to do, in the form of five additional possidictions for the next
fifteen to thirty years.
I begin with socio-economic equity.  On the dimension of income distribution,
few cross-national scholars would characterize Thailand as highly egalitarian.  The
gap between rich and poor is relatively wide (1.5).  Indeed, during recent years of
rapid growth this gap has actually been growing wider—although it is also true that
the percentage of Thais living in abject poverty has been getting smaller.
Thai industrial wages are low by world standards.  A young Thai man or
woman from the countryside is quite willing to work a long day at unpleasant,
irksome labor for about three dollars.  This fact doubtless helps attract foreign
investors who might otherwise take their money elsewhere.  And such investors are
doubtless further attracted by other features of the Thai situation, such as that:
♦  the government-mandated minimum wage is very low by world
standards;
♦  labor unions in the private sector are generally not militant or
effective; and
♦  the overall culture places a strong value upon the avoidance of
confrontation (2.12.4).=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 164 of 219 ===
As the nation matures educationally, however, I regard it as virtually inevitable
that more and more Thais will come to consider "the gap" as morally
unacceptable—and hence, ultimately, politically unacceptable as well.  Unless
reforms are undertaken in time, such dissatisfaction could result in the serious
destabilization of our society, to the severe detriment of our overall efforts at
modernization and development.
What reforms would be desirable?  Possible?  There are, of course, many ways
to promote socio-economic equity, of which raising the legal minimum wage is only
one.  In theory, the polity can also use its power to tax income or wealth.  As
indicated in 2.9.1, experience to date shows that it is politically possible to tax
income, but not politically possible to tax accumulated wealth—e.g., through an
effective progressive inheritance tax.
Regardless of the way government revenue is obtained, another major avenue
toward greater socio-economic equity is through redistribution, in the form of the
government's providing the people with various needed services in the health,
education, and welfare fields.  Here the prospects for Thailand are quite bright,
because the provision of such services is in many ways consistent with long-standing
Thai Buddhist traditions.
My possidiction in this area is that the nation will continue with progressive
income taxation and liberal redistribution, and that fairer wages for workers will
gradually become a reality, through processes both of specific legislation and broad
cultural evolution.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 165 of 219 ===
5.6. DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION,
AND TRAINING
It is clearly recognized by all educated Thais that education and training are
essential keys to technological modernization and overall sociocultural development,
and as such have a high claim on the national budget.  And within the planning
subculture it is clearly recognized that this education and training must be oriented
much more toward a limited number of carefully chosen professional and technical
specialties than has traditionally been the case.  My possidiction is that this will
occur.  Detailed commentary appears in 6.2.
5.7. DEVELOPMENT AND THE
NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Within the planning subculture there is growing consensus that the state must
increasingly encourage the types of technology that will most effectively permit the
harnessing of our natural resources, and otherwise keep us competitive in world
markets (2.2).  Our macro-planners must carefully strategize so as to take fullest
possible advantage of the new "revolutionary" technologies now breaking upon the
world.  My possidiction is that there are three such revolutionary areas that will
receive highest priority in our national educational and scientific budgets:
biotechnology, materials science, and microelectronics.  In all three areas we have
already begun to train Thais in the relevant scientific foundation fields and in specific
technological applications.  It is highly likely that we will expand these initiatives,
with a view to relating these revolutionary technologies to Thai needs and Thai
resources.  While it is not difficult to possidict that our government will assign high
priorities to the development of techniques in these three areas, it is exceedingly
difficult to possidict just what the longer-term results of such investment will be, due=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 166 of 219 ===
to the very nature of the technologies themselves.  In any case, it is worth listing what
a few of these results could possibly look like, in broadest outline.
♦  Biotechnology: Thailand has intensive sunlight and a warm, wet
climate.  It is botanically rich and genetically diverse.  Under such conditions, it
seems reasonable to imagine that there might well be great potential in our country
for the development of new biotechnical processes, and of whole new species, that
will help provide the Thai people with more ample food, clothing, gems and jewelry,
medicine, and shelter—in environmentally sound ways.  These new processes and
species might also provide the basis for major expansions in our export trade.
  ♦  Materials Science: This flourishing field could yield new
technologies that would take advantage of Thai natural resources, such as
petrochemicals, to help meet our needs.  The result could be new ceramic or polymer
materials that would raise our standard of consumption and contribute to our export
competitiveness.  We might, for example, develop new building materials to replace
wood, which would be an important contribution, given the fact that we have
grievously over-cut our forests.
♦  Microelectronics: This area cuts across the above two areas, and
indeed all science and technology, since most types of research and development
today are impossible without the use of computers, and since industrial production
systems are increasingly dependent upon microelectronics for tool activation,
accurate sensing, quality control, etc.  There are in Thailand today hundreds of
flourishing microelectronic firms of one sort or another, and I anticipate that this
growth trend will continue.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 167 of 219 ===
5.8. DEVELOPMENT IN HARMONY WITH
THE ENVIRONMENT
Within the planning subculture the consensus has now been formed that there
can be no true development except in harmony with the environment (1.3).  A
poignant example of the problem is that it takes only a few weeks to clear-cut a
forest—but many, many years to change a political culture to the point where
destructive clear-cutting will be made illegal, and more years before culprits are
consistently punished for their crimes against our shared heritage.  In general, our
society has been far too slow in realizing just how seriously we have been plundering
our resource base, and destroying the capacity of our biosphere to regenerate itself.
My possidiction in this respect is that the general Thai culture will catch up
with the planning subculture fairly quickly, as the result of:
♦  the increasing generality and visibility of environmental
destruction—as when, in late 1988, scores of village people in southern Thailand
perished in mudslides that were a direct and obvious consequence of the over-cutting
of hillside forests by greedy businessmen;
♦  greatly increased public education; and
♦  much greater responsibility on the part of the news media, which
have the capacity of making environmental problems visible to the public.
Already, some appropriate environmental protection laws have been passed,
and some success in executing them has been achieved.  In recent years, for example,
countless new factories have sprung up, and especially the larger among them have
been obeying these laws.
My possidiction is that this process will expand with each passing year.  I am
mindful, though, that in all probability the process will still be a painful one.  Too=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 168 of 219 ===
often, crops will be lost; soil destroyed; lives snuffed out.  Too often, around the
world, we observe the cruel irony that it is only when highly visible and dramatic
suffering takes place, that a polity will move quickly enough to save a situation from
total disaster.
5.9. DEVELOPMENT IN HARMONY WITH
CULTURE AND ETHICS
Compared with the foregoing eight themes, this ninth one is the least clearly
formed in the planning subculture, the most controversial among its members, and
the farthest from actual realization in Thai social life.  Nonetheless, I include it here,
if only because it deals with a matter about which I have considerable concern,
namely Thailand's achieving both modernization and development.  The first can be
achieved without any close harmonization of new techno-economic mechanisms with
our overall system of values and ethics.  The second cannot.  That is, in my lexicon,
true "development" implies that a new situation be realized which, both overall and
in its major individual features, is congruent with the way our people conceive and
define the good life.  I grant that every modernizing nation finds it necessary in some
cases to compromise some of its values in various ways in order to build
infrastructure and achieve growth.  My possidiction in the case of Thailand, however,
is that these compromises will be relatively minor, temporary, and subject to later
adjustment so as to achieve harmony with value and ethical standards that are basic
to the culture at that point in time.
Our national population is, of course, overwhelmingly Buddhist—even though
important minorities espouse other faiths.  Our political culture has thus been deeply
influenced by Buddhist standards.  The standards we use in evaluating our progress
toward true development will thus tend to be consistent with Buddhist standards.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 169 of 219 ===
I heartily endorse the notion that we should seek to apply Buddhist standards,
appropriately adapted, to some of the key questions that every student of develop-
ment must ask:
♦  Development for whom?
♦  Who benefits?
♦  Who loses?
♦  In what terms?
An example is seen in the Buddhist principle of the "Middle Path."  Buddhism
stresses moderation in all things—and the avoidance of undue attachment, especially
to that which is non-essential.  For more than 2500 years Buddhist teachings have
specified "the four" basic needs (padcaj sii): food, clothing, medicine, and shelter.  If
one adds education and a few other items, one has a list of basic needs that will
permit "sufficiency for all" (1.4).
I should add that I have no objection to development providing luxury for
some, after it provides necessities for all.  I recognize that a desire for some luxuries
is a long standing element in the Thai national economic incentive system.
   My final possidiction, nonetheless, is that as modernization and growth
proceed, as our educational and communicational institutions mature, and as our
political culture evolves, there will be an ever greater tendency for those
modernizational activities that transgress our ethics and morals to be called into
question, and to be rectified and adjusted to better fit our culture.  In short, sheer
modernization will gradually yield to more and more true development.
This process will require good leadership, which in some cases might be
provided by leaders directly associated with formal Buddhism.  More likely, though,
it will be provided by activist citizens who hold no formal religious status, but are=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 170 of 219 ===
simply acting on the basis of deeply held beliefs and ethical standards rooted in our
Buddhist tradition, and applied to modern circumstances and problems (2.11.2).
.oOo.
This completes my list of nine possidictions.  I believe that, with good
leadership characterized by political will and skill, Thailand stands a good chance of
making these possidictions part of reality as the future becomes the present.  We can
build our national and cultural future in a way that provides an abundant, free, and
fair life for all Thais.  Such a future is definitely worthy of our best efforts today.
In the next and final chapter, I will identify three policy strategies that I
consider to be of the highest priority in Thailand's efforts to realize these nine
possidictions, and otherwise to secure its best possible future.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 171 of 219 ===
CHAPTER SIX:
THREE TOP POLICY PRIORITIES
In the previous four chapters I have presented to you scenarios respectively
embodying:
♦  what I hope will happen;
♦  what I fear might happen;
♦  what I consider most likely to happen; and
♦  what I believe can be made to happen through leaders with
commitment and skill.
In this final chapter, I want to leave you with just three broad priority
recommendations for national policy at this point in our history, recommendations
that will, I believe, significantly help us realize the best possible future for all the
Thai people.  These recommendations have been developed through thirty years of
involvement in Thai planning and development, and brought into perspective through
the EFR interview experience.  In briefest form, the three recommendations are:
♦  a basic stance of attacking challenges rather than merely responding
to problems;
♦  an approach to developing crucially needed human resources; and
♦  a selective expansion of the role of Thailand internationally.
6.1. ACTIVELY ATTACKING CHALLENGES AND
PROBLEMS AT THEIR ROOTS
We as a nation and a government have come a long way since 1960.  We have
learned how to macro-plan our national economic development, and have created a=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 172 of 219 ===
substantial pool of human resources capable of successful performance in the modern
sector. Many of our plans have been implemented, and the results woven into the
fabric of our national culture.  The process has hardly been painless, but the net
effects have certainly been positive.  Given the fact that we have learned and grown
so much during the last thirty years, it seems reasonable to believe that we can do at
least as well during next thirty—and perhaps much better.
To pick up on a theme I introduced in Section 1.13: it is understandable that
much of the early work of our planners had a certain reactive quality: problems
arose first, and then we would search for ways to deal with them.  Or perhaps we in
fact anticipated a problem, but our plan dealt only with how to respond to it, not how
to attack it at its roots.  Though our Buddhist religion places great emphasis on
getting to the roots of human problems, in our national planning we have often not
done so, but have dealt simply with symptoms.
I believe the time has now come for us to fundamentally change our approach,
and to concentrate our resources on attacking the roots of our problems.  We must
move steadily away from this older reactive/ responding stance, toward a new
proactive/ attacking one.  Instead of anticipating problems in order to plan a response
that will serve as a palliative, we must anticipate problems in order to plan a
response that leads to a sound solution.  We must resist the temptation, which is
often politically easy, to deal with mere symptoms, and instead deal with root causes.
In using the attack approach, we first assess the context of Thai development,
the resources available, and the structure of available opportunities.  We ask
ourselves where our strongest assets lie among our total resources—physical and
sociocultural.  These assets are then deployed in development projects in such as way
as to attack problems definitively and achieve benefits for all the Thai people.  As we
do so, though, we must keep in mind the need for maintaining harmony with the=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 173 of 219 ===
totality of our culture and our environment.  Further, in pursuing benefits for
ourselves, we would do well to take seriously the Buddhist injunction against
excessive egoism, and take into account the well-being of other nations and peoples
besides our own.
This problem of excessive egoism is by no means minor, as it is often the case
that individuals of a problem-attacking temperament are likely also to be of an
egoistic temperament.  Examples are sometimes seen in cases where foreign
governments or corporations do have proactive/ attacking stances, and deal with Thai
government agencies or corporations that do not.  The result is that the Thai side,
unless it is extremely careful, will be unfairly exploited.  Or, to take a domestic
example, it might happen that a Thai central government agency proactively attacks a
problem by initiating a certain project in a certain province or district, without
consulting the local people, and without any inclination or system to monitor their
reactions to the project through time.  Here again, the result could be that people on
the side lacking a proactive/ attack stance—i.e., some local residents—could end up
being exploited.
In other words, where one side of a relationship is oriented toward reaction and
responding, and the other side toward proaction and attacking, the latter side will
often have a considerable advantage.  The outcome of such a relationship is likely to
be exploitation in some form or other, and in any case will not be
"developmental"—for true development, by my definition, always allows and
encourages participation by all parties concerned (1.11).  Development is, after all, a
process of learning and evolving in which all parties experience improvement in their
well-being—as they define that well-being.
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Specific areas where the proactive/ attacking approach is likely to produce
excellent results over the next generation of time include these:
♦  Fundamental development of agriculture, through the use of new
biogenetic technologies, as well as new methods of cultivation, processing, and
marketing.
♦  Development of Thai factories producing a diverse range of products
that will be in steady demand in both domestic and overseas markets.
♦  Design and implementation of creative and truly proactive programs
of education and human resources development, which will equip the Thai people to
deal with the major anticipatable problems and challenges of the future (6.2).
                                                                                                                                                
an initiative taken by Chatichai Chunhawan shortly after he became
Prime Minister in 1988.  He took note of the fact that portions of
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia had become relatively peaceful but
remained seriously undeveloped, especially after many years of
domestic warfare and unrest.  He conceived of the idea of
converting battlefields into marketplaces, and actively encouraged
Thai businessmen to become involved commercially, where possible,
in each of these countries—in new and energetic ways.
Although this initiative is an example of the proactive/
attacking stance, whether the policy will end up producing results
that could be characterized as "true development" is quite a
different question.  The answer will depend on a number of
factors, such as:
♦  whether the relevant decision-makers on the
Myanmaran, Laotian, or Cambodian side are themselves taking a
proactive/ attacking stance, and otherwise dealing with the Thais
as relative equals.
♦  whether the businessmen involved take a reasonably
long-term view, or concentrate only on quick profits, through such
means as clear-cutting the jungles.
♦  whether Thailand can manufacture products that
people in these neighboring countries can use, priced cheaply
enough so that these people can afford the products, yet
expensively enough so that the Thai manufacturers can realize a
reasonable profit.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 175 of 219 ===
♦  Development of educational and environmental tourism, capitalizing
on the Thai people's natural friendliness and openness to outsiders.  Thailand has the
opportunity to pioneer in new ways of intercultural learning, involving direct person-
to-person contact and guided experiential learning situations (6.3).
6.2. RE-DESIGNING HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT
The task of human resources development in Thailand requires a national
education policy characterized by two basic thrusts:
♦  The first thrust should be toward selective conservation and re-
assertion of certain aspects of Thai culture which many thoughtful Thais consider to
be of high value on grounds of promoting a sense of Thai cultural continuity and
identity (as well as on general humanistic grounds).
♦  The second thrust should be toward selective augmentation of the
total content of Thai culture, in ways that will help the nation adapt to changing
conditions, both at home and internationally.
In my view, it is not only selectivity that is needed, but also balance between
the two thrusts.  Neither thrust should dominate the other.  The thrust toward
selectively conserving the old should not dominate the thrust toward selectively
creating the new—but neither should the latter dominate the former.  In other words,
both continuity and change are needed.  It is the task of good leadership to provide a
climate within which the interplay between the forces of continuity and the forces of
change can proceed harmoniously and constructively, toward the end of producing a
future that is better for all the Thai people.  Let us briefly examine the first thrust.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 176 of 219 ===
6.2.1. SELECTIVELY "RE-THAI-IZING" THAI EDUCATION
Since at least the beginning of the present century the Thai polity, notably
through the Ministry of Education, has been busily involved in systematic attempts to
develop the nation's human resources.  In some respects these efforts have been quite
successful.  These relative successes have, however, been less common on the
"identificational" side than on the "augmentational."  Without going into detail, let
me simply state my opinion that Thai education has not, in general, been especially
successful at the inculcation of selected Thai values and traditions—partly because it
has not tried particularly hard, and partly because it did not, for the most part, employ
approaches that were pedagogically effective.  Thus, a number of unique or special
aspects of Thai-ness—including some that many foreigners find particularly
enviable—have been neglected.  Examples include our Thai cultural emphasis on the
caring heart, on personability, and on patience (2.12).
In urging this thrust toward selective cultural conservation I do NOT intend to
suggest that we should attempt merely to "turn the clock back"—which would be
impossible anyway.  I DO suggest, however, that this identification-enhancing thrust
be balanced and blended with a thrust toward adaptation to the outside world and
toward modernity in general.  I visualize that the results of each thrust will enrich,
and become integrated with, the results of the other.  I move now to a discussion of
the second thrust.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 177 of 219 ===
6.2.2. SELECTIVELY PROMOTING EQUITY, RELEVANCE, AND QUALITY
IN THAI EDUCATION
With respect to the second, or "augmentational" thrust, there are three crucial
considerations that should guide national policy in the human resources development
field, namely:
♦  equity of access to education;
♦  relevance of the content of education to the real conditions of life in
the present, and the anticipatable conditions of life in the future; and
♦  quality of the education offered.
Each of these three considerations is important at every level of education, but
the relative emphasis to be placed on each will vary from level to level.  Since I do
not believe in micro planning, my remarks below will be confined to just a few
macro priorities.
At the elementary school level, equity is vitally important, since only by
reaching our entire national population can we hope to tap the talent and potential of
every Thai, and insure his or her full identification with our national culture, and full
participation in the fruits of its development.  Education at the elementary level must
also emphasize that which is relevant to current and future life—such as general
scientific thinking that will enable people to keep learning new and useful skills
throughout their lives.  In my judgment, we have already succeeded reasonably well
in both these respects at the elementary level.  We now need to work especially hard
at improving quality, such as by providing better pre-service and in-service education
for elementary teachers.
At the secondary school level the equity consideration remains important, but
somewhat more relative emphasis must be placed on relevance to the kind of life=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 178 of 219 ===
challenges that the young person will face in the future.  But what are these
challenges?  The problem is rendered more complex because Thailand is really a dual
society, with considerable cultural distance between the rural and urban sectors
(1.10).  A curriculum that is relevant to future urban-culture conditions will not be
entirely the same as one that is relevant to future rural-culture conditions.
The problem is rendered even more complex by the fact that an important
incentive for rural young people to finish secondary school is that this greatly
improves their chances for entering occupations that will allow them to move into the
urban sector.  While they should, of course, enjoy this freedom as a right of national
citizenship, one cannot ignore the vital fact that massive urbanization poses serious
problems in terms of a generation gap, and hence in terms of family stability.  While
it is important to the overall national well-being that talented young villagers be
enabled to occupy jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors, it is also important that
not all talented youngsters desert the villages, for their skills are needed there as well.
Here again we note a need for balance between the conservation and adaptation
thrusts of educational policy.
At the college and university level, Thailand's priority needs are for relevance
and quality.  It is utterly essential that rich resources be earmarked for science,
technology, and certain applied fields such as medicine—as these fields are, in my
view, the most important at this level of education, from a national development
standpoint.  Such an earmarking of educational resources will require great political
courage, because it will necessarily imply that other fields will receive a smaller
portion of the total budgetary pie: fields such as the social sciences and humanities.
Ultimately what this selective emphasis on relevance and quality implies is
that Thailand will be increasing the quality of the scientists and technologists it
produces, and perhaps also the quantity, at least in the most development-relevant=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 179 of 219 ===
sub-fields.  In the lower priority areas such as the social sciences and humanities, we
should also emphasize quality, but this will probably mean, since resources are finite,
that there will be fewer graduates in those areas.  In other words, although I believe
that the social sciences and humanities are important (as all of my foregoing
scenarios suggest)—I contend that what we need are good social scientists and good
humanists, and not necessarily tens of thousands of mediocre specialists in these
areas.
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These choices are hard ones—the very kinds of choices that politicians usually
prefer to dodge if they can.  Politically, it is usually easier to simply raise the
education budget modestly and leave to the political process at each university the
question of allocating the available pie.  The position I here take is that this hands-off
approach is highly unwise for the future of Thailand, however temporarily
comfortable it might make some politicians.  Earmarking means taking clear
positions that permit the attacking of problems, and not just responding to them.
And to me, the need for relevantly educated, high quality scientists and technologists
is so overwhelmingly important that attack is needed, which means that earmarking
is needed (1.13).  I am convinced that only by pursuing such clear and courageous
policy priorities are we as a nation likely to realize our most promising future.
                                            
     32I here refer to the production of good graduates who would
normally be expected to pursue careers as full-time specialists in
the social sciences or humanities.  We also need adult citizens
who have received adequate education in these areas as part of
their general education, for that renders their lives more
meaningful and their citizenship more useful.  Moreover, those
young people who opt to go into elementary or secondary teaching
or the human service fields, will certainly do appreciably better
work as a consequence of having received good grounding in
relevant areas of the social sciences and humanities.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 180 of 219 ===
As this process of developing our human resources goes forward, much use
should be made of "distance learning"—an approach that our country has already
developed to a higher degree than most developing nations (2.10.2).  This approach
should continue to use conventional media—such as the mails, radio, and TV—but
should also take advantage of the new information technologies, such as the
computer, interactive video, and multi-media pedagogy.  In this respect, I am inclined
to see the primary need to be in the realm of software rather than hardware.  Some
pedagogical software can be imported, but will need to be adapted to Thai culture
and conditions.  Other such software will only become available if Thais proceed to
develop it.  And the fact that hundreds of thousands of Thais have already taken a
serious interest in the new information technology certainly bodes well.
What should be the end product of all these policies?  At a minimum, the Thai
university graduate of the future should possess the following assets:
♦  a good knowledge of the Thai language and the ability to write good
expository Thai;
♦  a good knowledge of the English language, which effectively
provides exposure to new ideas from the outside;
♦  awareness of conditions in the world outside Thailand;
33
♦  solid professional competence and integrity;
♦  good management skills;
34
                                            
     33Strong  encouragement  should  be  provided  young  Thais  to
actually  visit  other  nations,  such  as  Cambodia,  Malaysia,  or
Myanmar.
     34Historically, ethnic Thais have tended to be oriented toward
the "making a living" (tham maa haa kin) lifestyle.  Chinese in
Thailand have been more oriented toward the "commercial and
selling" (khaa khaaj) lifestyle.  The first lifestyle has tended=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 181 of 219 ===
♦  high standards of ethics, consistent with the basic principles of
Buddhism and other religions found in Thailand; and
♦  a respect for the world's natural environment and a feeling of
responsibility to care for it, and for humane values in general.
6.3. BUILDING THAILAND'S ROLE
IN THE WIDER WORLD
In this monograph I have shared with you a number of my ideas as to how
things have worked in Thailand's past, and how I believe and hope they will work in
Thailand's future.  I have explained at some length why I believe my Optimistic
Scenario for my country is also a highly probable one.  In short, I am enthusiastic
about the ability of the Thai people, working through the channels of the Thai social
structure, and applying the value standards of the Thai culture, to design and realize a
successful, satisfying future.
I would feel less than responsible, though, either to my own people or to those
of the world, if I did not proceed to the next logical question, namely: Are there
aspects of the Thai system of sufficient universal value as to warrant that they be
more systematically shared with the rest of the world?  What, if anything, can
                                                                                                                                                
to be associated with village living and an inward-looking
orientation.  The second has tended to be associated with urban
living and an outward-looking orientation.
Although some management skills have certainly been required
for "making a living," these have generally been of a lesser order
of complexity than those required for "commercial and selling"
activity.  Given the current and foreseeable pattern of rapid
change toward an ever more complex and global economy, the latter
type of orientation is clearly the one that ethnic Thais must
adopt, as part of their adaptation.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 182 of 219 ===
Thailand offer, that it is not already offering, as a contribution to the peace and well-
being of the world?
6.3.1. THE ROLE OF SMALL NATIONS TO DATE
Since World War II, small nations have enjoyed steadily increasing
opportunities to play significant roles in world affairs.  Among the great powers there
has evolved a tendency to rely on certain kinds of smaller nations for various kinds of
political, economic, and sociocultural tasks.
On the whole, I view this tendency as highly positive, for at least the following
reasons.
♦  It emphasizes the idea that creative ideas for world peace, and
intercultural harmony, might come from small as well as large nations.
♦  It underlines the notion that mere might does not make right, and that
the world will be better off if there is input into world policy from various of the less
powerful nations.
♦  It takes practical advantage of the fact that a small nation can play an
important role for world peace precisely because its smallness makes it a threat to no
other nation.
Generally speaking, the countries most often invited to carry out these tasks
have been those that share a number of attributes, including:
♦  a stable polity;
♦  a good record for keeping the peace.
♦  an efficient, yet small and non-threatening, armed force;
♦  an able civil service;
♦  an electorate that supports this sort of international involvement.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 183 of 219 ===
Historically, the nations most often tapped for "small nation peace-building"
roles have been European, especially Scandinavian.  This is well and good, but I
believe that in the future it would be desirable, as a matter of general political and
cultural principle, for non-European and non-Western nations to share more fully
and systematically in these international roles.
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6.3.2. THAILAND'S EXISTING CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE
Would Thailand be suitable to serve in international roles of this general sort?
One can begin to answer this question by noting that Thailand has already served in
such roles frequently.  Because of our open attitude toward members of other
cultures, and indeed our active interest in them, we have strongly encouraged a
number of United Nations and other international agencies to locate their regional
offices in Bangkok.  At present some thousands of UN professional personnel are
located in our capital city.  My perception is that, on the whole, these foreigners find
Thailand an interesting and attractive country in which to sojourn, and find local
conditions reasonably conducive to productive work.
However, it is not only to international officials of a certain status and
visibility to whom our hospitality has been extended.  We have also opened our
borders and our hearts to hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons
from the war-torn areas of Indochina and elsewhere.  At present, in Northeastern
Thailand alone, we are helping to house and care for almost half a million of such
                                            
35These smaller European democracies possess populations on the
order of one-fifth of Thailand's, and gross national products per
capita on the order of ten times ours.  However, at our current
rate of economic growth, within a decade or so we will have
attained a level of economic wealth sufficient to sustain a
substantial contribution to international peace efforts.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 184 of 219 ===
unfortunate people, some of whom have been there for many years awaiting return to
their homelands or transfer to some foreign nation willing to accept them.  (We
should note, by the way, an enormous variation in the willingness of various
industrial nations to accept such troubled and tormented people.)  Providing the
infrastructure of asylum for so many unfortunate people is a significant burden on
our country—and yet the Thai people, leaders and led, have rarely complained.  In
my view, this fact constitutes a moral credential of considerable validity.
I do not wish, however, to let the case rest only on the basis of friendliness and
effective organization, important though those considerations can be.  Rather, I
would prefer to move the discussion to the other, less tangible potentials of my
country and its culture, which might be realized at some level—diplomatic,
administrative, consultative, or educational—in ways that will be of value to other
nations, and to the world itself, seen as a system struggling toward stable peace and
better integration.  In short, I am repeating my earlier question: Are there cultural
resources possessed by Thailand which, if applied or shared, could be of benefit to
the rest of the world?  This time, I will answer this question.  Yes, I believe there are!
At the risk of committing un-Thai immodesty, I would suggest that our openness
toward change (1.1) and our emphasis on harmony, joyfulness, and the caring heart
(2.12) constitute cultural resources well worth sharing with the world.
6.3.3. ENHANCING THAILAND'S CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE
Assuming for the moment that I am correct in my assessment of Thailand's
cultural resources, it follows that national leaders should try to develop and expand
these resources.  They should encourage as many Thais as possible to find practical
ways to gain experience in actually applying these resources in intercultural
situations.  In particular, it is important to involve young Thais, and to provide=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 185 of 219 ===
opportunities for learning and development to those whose economic resources are
limited, and who were not born into privileged families and situations.
In general, we should encourage more home-stay and exchange programs, so
that foreigners will learn from the ordinary day-to-day reality of life in Thailand.  If a
group of young Thais and foreigners go camping for a week in Khao Yai National
Park, for example, or take a two-week trip to Northeastern rural villages, they will get
to know Thailand, and each other, a hundred times better than by taking a highly
organized bus-and-photo tour of half a dozen Bangkok temples.
And the converse of all this is obviously true for Thais journeying abroad.
Some excellent programs of this general sort have existed for a long time, but there is
a need for deliberate, steady expansion of this sort of program.  In time, a whole
movement could be created, as "graduates" of such interchange programs move into
positions of leadership.  In this manner we will be expanding the base on which our
next generation can develop cross-cultural awareness and knowledge, and put itself
into a better position to help Thailand play a meaningful role in the wider world.
This kind of intercultural learning must come from the heart.  Freedom,
flexibility, and spontaneity are essential parts of it.  Programs to promote such
learning should therefore be led primarily by non-profit, non-governmental
organizations in as non-bureaucratic a manner as possible.
36
                                            
     36At present over five million foreign tourists visit Thailand
each year (2.6).  Many of them, I am afraid, do not really learn
very much about Thai culture, for they are herded from temple to
temple in tour busses in which the travel guide is often a native
of Japan, Germany, etc., or else a Thai attempting to act like
one.  They then return to a Western-style hotel where, very often,
they are served their own national style of food rather than Thai
food.  They meet few Thais in other than perfunctory situations,
usually of an economic nature—such as shopping or paying their
hotel bill.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 186 of 219 ===
6.4. TO THE HORIZON
In this chapter I have outlined three policy priorities that I consider to be of
topmost importance if Thailand is to move swiftly and confidently to a desirable
horizon: attacking problems at their roots; developing our human resources for both
selective cultural conservation and adaptation to rapidly changing conditions; and
greatly expanding true contact with other cultures.
These priorities have a coherence in principle.  The first priority of actively
attacking challenges and problems at their roots, if it is to truly serve the priority
needs of all Thais and not just some, must be carried out at all levels of Thai society
by people who possess the necessary motivation and ability.  And the second priority,
human resources development, will promote that motivation by enhancing a sense of
pride in being Thai; and promote that ability through educational policies that
optimize appropriately across equity of access, relevance to new and anticipatable
conditions, and sheer quality.
Unlike some peoples, we Thais thrive on contact with folks from other
cultures.  Such contact extends our own awareness and that of people from other
lands.  It nourishes our sense of humanity—and theirs.  With the right policies and
                                                                                                                                                
While such tourists do learn something about Thai culture,
often it is not much.  Conceivably, they could learn much more if
just a few modest changes were made in their routine.
In any case, tourism in Thailand will continue apace, driven
by its own private-sector entrepreneurial economic dynamics.
Where true leadership is needed, however, is in arranging for
serious foreigners to learn more about the realities of Thai
culture, and for serious Thais to learn more about the realities
of a variety of foreign cultures.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 187 of 219 ===
initiatives, this process of extending contact and promoting awareness can be
rendered far more effective than is today the reality, by means of carefully designed
international exchange programs.
Thus are linked together the three priority policy orientations I have outlined in
this final chapter: attack, educate, internationalize.  If our leadership is both expert
and ethical, if it has both the will and the skill, we can move to the horizon with
confidence.
It promises to be an exciting journey!=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 188 of 219 ===
AFTERWORD: THE FUTURE BEGAN YESTERDAY
Sippanondha Ketudat
  In my early childhood, I always wondered why we only learned of the past.
History and social studies dwelt upon the past, and even geometry and arithmetic
involved principles discovered and taught by the Egyptians and the Greeks a long
time ago.  Astrology aside, couldn't teachers teach something of the future?
My inquisitiveness about such matters was inculcated by my father from my
earliest years.  He was an airman, and one of the three young Thai army officers
whom King Rama VI first chose to study aviation in France, and then to return home
and initiate and build the future of Thai aviation.  He held a high position in the
Department of Aviation of the Ministry of Defense.  The Department later became
the Royal Thai Air Force.
Soon after I was born, however, my father was relieved of his duties, for he
was a royalist and did not believe that Thailand, at that time, was prepared and ready
for a democratic form of government, as claimed by the populists in the 1932 coup
d'etat that transformed Thailand into a constitutional monarchy.  His untimely early
retirement deprived him of an opportunity to further develop Thai aviation during
this critical period.  It was an event of keen disappointment for my father, who had
worked hard and served his country well for almost two decades.  It was also, in
retrospect, a great loss for the Department.  
It was, however, an event of immense good fortune for me, because for the
fourteen years from then until he died, I had the benefit of his spending his entire=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 189 of 219 ===
days and nights with me, teaching me everything he knew.  He taught me arithmetic,
foreign languages, politics, Buddhism and other religions, science, and calculus, as
well as his values, his craftsmanship as carpenter and gardener, etc.
During those days I went to school simply to play with friends of my own
age—for due to my father's tutoring, I had already learned everything the teachers
presented in class.
It was my father who taught me to think and to search for knowledge.  He was
my first teacher and my first friend.  Without him and my mother—now ninety-six,
who even to this very day always tries to make sure I am happy—I would not have
come this far.
From these earliest years, the question of time has always intrigued me, and
continues to do so.  Eleven years of study and research in physics in the United States
during the late Forties and Fifties only served to make me more curious about the
future, and eager to understand it.  Studies and pursuits relating to the future, and
planning and development for the future, have been the main hidden principle of my
career.
Let me begin with physics.
In classical physics, although there are certain limitations, one can predict the
future path of a single body—its position and velocity—with a high degree of
accuracy if the initial conditions and boundary conditions are known.  This was
clearly demonstrated by the spacecraft Voyager 2, which was launched for the grand
tour of the planets on August 20, 1977 from Cape Canaveral in Florida.  It made
rendezvous with the planets Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune on July 9, 1979,
August 26, 1981, January 24, 1986, and August 25, 1989 respectively—just as calcu-
lated and predicted.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 190 of 219 ===
Even in modern quantum theory, certain characteristics of the future of a
particle or system of particles can be predicted, not as deterministically as could be
described in classical theory, yet in a probabilistic way.
In the early Sixties, I had the extreme good fortune to be invited to join a
research group at the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, U.S.A., headed by Dr.
G. R. Ringo, to work on the problem of time reversal invariance.  The problem our
group pursued, stated simply, was: Does a particle governed by the laws of physics in
weak interactions
37 recognize the differences between the past and the future?  Is a
weak interaction past- or future-oriented?  We conducted an experiment by aligning
neutron beams from the Argonne Reactor upward and downward to see if the neutron
beam decays were the same.  To a very high degree of accuracy, statistically the
decays proved to be the same.  We therefore concluded that the time reversal was
invariant—that past and future are indistinguishable with regard to the laws of
physics in weak interactions.
Let me now turn to my faith in Buddhism.
The ultimate happiness, or the state of least suffering leading to non-suffering,
is nirvana.  This concept is based upon causality.  Causes in the past determine the
present.  Actions in the present point to happenings in the future.  Does the future
really begin yesterday?  Can the Western sciences based on rationalism and the
Eastern wisdom really meet?
When Professor Robert B. Textor invited me in late 1987 to participate in an
Ethnographic Futures Research project on Thai society, I accepted without hesitation,
in the hope that I would be able to contribute my experience, however limited, to the
                                            
     37For example, in the beta decay parity is not conserved, or in
a beta decay the radioactive nucleus prefers to decay to the left
rather than to the right.  The beta decay is left-handed.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 191 of 219 ===
field of EFR.  The experience of my four careers—in academia, in government as a
planner, in politics as a senator and a minister, and presently in industry—might, I
hoped, contribute to an understanding of Thai society and its potential.
I first learned of Dr. Textor's work and his well known study of life in Bang
Chan village from my wife, Emilie, over twenty-five years ago.  Dr. Textor was one
of Emilie's first teachers about Thai life and culture, when she joined the U.S. Peace
Corps in 1961.  Our families are good friends.
Because of my very close friendship with him, and with Professors Bill
Klausner, M.L. Bhansoon and Sidhinat, during our EFR interviews I did not have the
feeling that I was being interrogated by examiners.  Instead I felt, and still feel, that
the interviews—from the first session at my rural farm home in Chiang Mai to the
last one at the San Francisco Airport—were intellectually stimulating discussions,
with many piercing questions raised.
Through working intensely with Prof. Textor and collaborating with him for
almost three years I learned a great deal about EFR.  I am now convinced that the
future really began yesterday.  If such is the case, what should we do next?
At the present rapid rate of change in all aspects of Thai society, it is not
possible for planners and policy makers to take action reactively, since in general it
takes time to react—and the reactive response is too slow and in many cases creates
even more problems than solutions.  Proactive actions based on wise vision seem to
be the only alternative for the future.
Holistic anticipation of the future through the use of the EFR technique, by
many informants with varying backgrounds, can provide useful frameworks for
planners and policy makers.  Furthermore, in the process of generating the Most
Probable Scenario for the future, one identifies logical actions that would stimulate
movement toward one's desirable vision, as well as conditions that would inhibit such=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 192 of 219 ===
movement.  Elucidating such stimulating actions and inhibiting conditions, and
effectively communicating them, can be beneficial to development planning.
This monograph would not have come into existence without the collaboration
and assistance of all those acknowledged by Dr. Textor and me in the Introduction.
There are, however, two persons to whom I am especially grateful.  The first is Dr.
Textor, who is not only a good friend and excellent interviewer, but also the one who
taught me Ethnographic Futures Research, its methodology and implications.
Through his gentleness in delivering piercing questions, and his writing and rewriting
of text, he taught me, once again, to be patient.  It was a privilege to work closely
with him.  The second is Emilie, who has been an inspiration since before we were
married close to thirty years ago.  It was Emilie who introduced me to Dr. Textor.  It
was Emilie, who knows me best, who helped by editing the whole manuscript, and
constantly raising questions requiring clarification.  It was indeed a happy and
productive experience to work on the monograph with Emilie.
As an optimist, I believe that the future of Thailand lies not in the extreme
paths but the middle.  The middle path is not static but changes with time.  The
verdant jungle, the calm rural life on the farm, and the flowing canals of Bangkok are
all gone—but their virtues still exist in our minds.  The serene temples are still here,
though they may be fewer.
We cannot turn the clock back.  Let us face a future with limited resources
with courage and wisdom.  We have to learn how to utilize our knowledge.  We have
to choose the knowledge, the technology, wisely.
  The purpose of living, learning, and working is not to exploit nature or to
overpower it, but to understand, appreciate, and love it, and to live in harmony with
it.  If this is the way we treat nature, is it not also the way we should live with our
fellow men and women?  We must learn to live peacefully with other human beings,=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 193 of 219 ===
with society and its cultural heritage, and with nature.  We must learn to harness our
knowledge and technology for the betterment of mankind and all creation.
Technology for human and societal development is technology in harmony
with culture and environment.
  Sippanondha Ketudat
19 September 1990
National Petrochemical Corporation 
21st Floor, Sino-Thai Tower
32/51 Asoke Road, Sukhumwit 21
Bangkok 10110, Thailand=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 194 of 219 ===
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
Robert B. Textor
This Appendix is written for the more technically oriented reader.  Its purpose
is to make the essentials of the Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) method
sufficiently clear so that you may:
♦  more fully understand how Dr. Sippanondha's ideas were elicited;
and
♦  more knowledgeably decide whether the EFR method would be
useful in approaching a research or educational problem in which you are
interested.
38
  Although a casual reading of this book might give one the impression that the
EFR method is a simple and straightforward approach, this is not quite so.  True, the
basic rationale for the method is straightforward, but its actual execution is far from
simple.  Indeed, it could hardly be simple, for EFR ambitiously undertakes to explore
what is obviously a highly complex subject, namely various possible, probable, and
preferable alternative futures for a whole sociocultural system.
                                            
     38In this Appendix, pronouns have the following references
unless a different reference is clear from context.  "You" refers
to the reader who is considering using EFR for his or her own
research purposes.  "We" refers to Textor and Sippanondha jointly.
"I" refers to Textor.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 195 of 219 ===
Some of the complexities and subtleties of conducting an EFR interview are
difficult to communicate, and best learned through training and experience of the
type I have been offering at Stanford University for the past ten years.  However, the
basic approach can be explained in a short statement, leaving out some of the
subtleties—and that is what I am attempting here.
To begin with, let me emphasize that conducting an EFR interview is a
disciplined undertaking.  While it may seem to some to be "just conversational" in
form, it is much more than merely conversational in its underlying intellectual and
logical structure.  While it centers on getting the interviewee to create scenarios,
there is nothing "passive" about the role of the interviewer.  Indeed, the interviewer
must constantly be listening actively and reviewing mentally the structure and gaps in
the interviewee's presentation.  This is demanding work, and after several hours of
interviewing it is normal to feel quite fatigued.
A.1. THE HANDBOOK ON E.F.R.
Since I invented and began developing EFR in 1976 I have worked with
numerous students and several colleagues in applying the method to a wide variety of
problems involving a broad range of sociocultural systems, driving forces, and policy
concerns.  While the topics we investigated were of interest to me in their own right,
the investigations were also useful in helping me learn the complexities, potentials,
limits, and pitfalls of EFR as a method.
From the beginning it was my intention to incorporate the lessons learned from
these various research experiences into A Handbook on Ethnographic Futures
Research, to enable researchers who wish to use EFR, to do so conveniently,
efficiently, and effectively.  During the first four years I was able to bring out a
number of informal editions of this Handbook, and a number of people who used=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 196 of 219 ===
these editions were kind enough to give me their criticisms and suggestions for
improvement.
Since 1980, however, the evolution of EFR has been so rapid that I have not
had time for further updating, and the Handbook is now seriously out of date.
However, I am now working on a comprehensive updated edition, and expect it to be
ready during 1991, in a form suitable to be of use to fellow researchers.  If you
should find yourself considering the use of EFR for your own research or educational
purposes, I advise you to consult the latest available edition of the Handbook first.
To obtain a copy, you may contact me at 3435 N.W. Luray Terrace, Portland, Oregon
97210.  If you advise me of the nature of your problem, I may also be able to send
you other relevant material.  Examples of such material appear in the Bibliography.
A.2. PREVIOUS USE OF E.F.R. IN THAILAND
Since 1978 I have taught practicums in EFR at Stanford University many
times, used it in many research projects, and administered EFR interviews (including
training interviews) to almost a hundred people from many cultures and walks of
life—principally intellectuals, civic and political leaders, and students.  Various
colleagues and graduate and undergraduate students at Stanford and other American
universities have used EFR for numerous research projects involving a variety of
sociocultural systems.  Typically, such a project will deal with alternative futures for
a particular nation—e.g., Austria, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, or the U.S.  Sometimes
the project will posit a particular "driving force," e.g., microelectronics or
biogenetics.  Examples of resulting publications appear in the Bibliography.
With respect to Thailand itself, the present monograph is the fourth publication
to result from the use of EFR.  The previous three were:=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 197 of 219 ===
♦  The 1977 California Study (Textor 1978b), which involved 25 Thai
interviewees, mostly graduate students, then resident in the San Francisco Bay Area.
This was the first EFR project ever, and dealt with broad general sociocultural futures
for Thailand.
♦  The 1981 Chiang Mai University Study (Bhansoon, Sidhinat, and
Textor 1984), which built upon the experience developed in the 1977 study, and
involved a probability sample of 24 professors in three faculties of Chiang Mai
University.
♦  The 1988 Higher Education Study (Suphang, Samang, and
Kulvitra 1988), which involved 14 leading national thinkers (including Dr.
Sippanondha), focused on cultural changes and ethical problems in the Thai future,
and examined the potential role of higher education in fostering a favorable overall
future for Thailand.  Their monograph is one of 21 parallel research efforts
undergirding the formulation of a 15-year plan for the development of Thai higher
education.
In my opinion, these three studies constitute an encouraging start toward
understanding how to deal with the Thai future, and I see the present monograph as a
significant further step in this direction.  The present work also breaks new ground in
the development of the EFR method itself, in that it is the first EFR study ever
published, on any culture, on the basis of interviewing just one interviewee.  Another
important departure is that this study deals far more ambitiously with science and
technology in general as driving forces, than any previous EFR study on any country.
Since I accord a central place to science and technology in my own theorizing about=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 198 of 219 ===
how sociocultural systems change, I found Dr. Sippanondha's insights in this domain
to be especially valuable.
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A.3. SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS
Ethnographic Futures Research is one sub-type of Futures Research.  Because
Futures Research, and the general futures literature, will probably be at least
somewhat new to many readers, it is appropriate to provide basic definitions of a few
key terms as they are used in this monograph.
A.3.1. FUTURES RESEARCH
To recapitulate from Section I.6 in the Introduction, Futures Research, at least
as I practice it, does NOT involve prediction in the traditional social science sense.
Indeed, my experience in developing EFR has made me MORE skeptical, and
humble, about predictability in this sense, than I ever had been as a practitioner of
conventional ethnography.
                                            
     39My colleague Stephen Jay Kline and I are in agreement that in
the overall sweep of world history, it is appropriate to regard
technology as the most common force for change, and usually also
the strongest.  Speaking very broadly, we hold that usually the
only stronger forces have been (1) natural disasters; and (2)
subjugation by people from another culture—which latter process
itself has typically been abetted by the use of a superior
technology.
Not only has technology been causally quite central, but this
very centrality has increased over the past 100 years, owing to
the institutionalization of research and development programs,
public and private, principally in the West but more recently also
in Japan and elsewhere.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 199 of 219 ===
Rather, the definition of Futures Research (FR) used here is considerably more
modest.  Broadly speaking, FR is any systematic inquiry into alternative futures that
are considered to be possible or probable for a given population.
More specifically, FR attempts to:
♦  Describe alternative futures that are deemed to be possible or
probable for a particular population.
♦  Determine the state of our knowledge (or uncertainty) about this or
that possible future.
♦  Identify implications and possible consequences of this or that
possible future.
♦  Provide early warning signs of undesirable possible futures.
♦  Understand underlying change processes (adapted from Institute for
the Future 1976: 1).
A.3.2. CULTURE
     "Culture" is one of the most general and abstract constructs that can be conceived.
For this reason, there are innumerable definitions of "culture" and "a culture" used by
anthropologists and others—literally hundreds of them.  The loose and approximate
definition used in this monograph is that a culture is a learned and shared set of more
or less stable, consistent, and patterned standards of and for behavior, characteristic
of a particular population, which standards often condition actual behavior (adapted
from Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:181).  These standards become involved in
decisions made by members of a population as to:
♦  what is;
♦  what could be;=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 200 of 219 ===
♦  how one feels about what is and what could be;
♦  what can be done about what is and what could be; and
♦  how one goes about doing it (adapted from Goodenough 1971:22).
Especially when we wish also to emphasize the specifically structural aspects
or manifestations of these standards, we often use the term "sociocultural system"
more or less interchangeably with "culture."
Like all definitions of "culture," the above is far from perfect.  It is inadequate
in part because to some readers it might tend to imply a greater degree or stability of
consensus as to standards than is likely to exist within a large and complex society
such as that of Thailand.  In this monograph, certain ambiguities of reference may
occur, as between the overall culture of all Thais, and certain subcultures—such as,
for example, that of Thai professional development planners, or rural farmers.  We
have done our best to keep these distinctions clear.
A.3.3. CULTURAL FUTURES RESEARCH
Loosely speaking, Cultural Futures Research (CFR) is simply that branch of
Futures Research (FR) in which central use is made of the concept of culture.  More
strictly speaking, CFR refers to those research undertakings in which the concept of
culture (or "cultural system" or "sociocultural system") is employed with some
measure of directness, explicitness, consistency, and sophistication.  In CFR, there is
at least some noticeable effort to employ an explicit model or set of propositions as to
how a particular sociocultural system changes from Time 1 to Time 2.
Just as conventional research on culture change takes into account both
cultural and non-cultural variables, so does CFR.  In CFR, a cultural system is seen=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 201 of 219 ===
as being in interaction with a variety of types of (primarily or exclusively) non-
cultural phenomena, processes, or systems.  Examples might include the following:
♦  Natural change, e.g., earthquakes, typhoons, climatic changes,
erosion, drought, desertification, soil exhaustion, crop failures, or epidemics.
♦  Political change, e.g., a change in a country's ruling regime (perhaps
induced by international events) not associated with any very significant change in
the country's cultural standards for behavior.
♦  Economic change, e.g., a sudden depression or inflationary spurt
(usually induced at least in substantial part by the world economic system) not
associated with any very significant change in the country's cultural standards for
behavior.
A.3.4. ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH
Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) is one method by which the cultural
futures researcher can go about her or his task.  EFR stands to CFR in much the same
relationship that conventional ethnography stands to cultural anthropology.  Just as
the cultural anthropologist conventionally uses ethnography to study an extant
culture, so he or she can use EFR to elicit from members of an extant social group
their images and preferences (cognitions and values) with respect to possible or
probable future cultures for their group.  In developing EFR, I have attempted to keep
the method as ethnographic as possible—cultural, holistic, comparative,
macrotemporal, and emically-etically balanced—while at the same time gearing it to
both the needs and the constraints of Futures Research.
These constraints are, of course, formidable.  Foremost among them is that, in
the ontology I use, there are NO future facts—only facts about the present and past.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 202 of 219 ===
The future is simply a construct and has no independent or objective existence.  Thus,
in doing EFR I make no claim to "studying the future."  Epistemologically, I could
not make such a claim, because of my ontological position that there are no future
facts.  What do exist, though, are a person's present set of images as to possible or
probable future cultures, and his or her preferences among those hypothetical
cultures.  These images and preferences can in some cases be crucially important in
influencing the process of change as the future becomes the present.  It is these
images and preferences that an EFR project elicits, describes, analyzes, interprets,
and diagnoses—all in a manner generally consistent with the overall tradition of
ethnography.  For a more detailed discussion, consult Textor (1991) or Bell and Mau
(1971:1-44).
A.3.5. PROJECTION
A projection is here defined as a conditional anticipatory statement of what a
person believes could possibly occur, or might probably occur, in the future.  It might
take the form of:  "If A remains constant and B increases at a constant rate, then
within 30 years C will occur."  A projection normally focuses upon a rather specific
and limited topic, and draws as heavily as possible upon available data about said
topic in the past and present, and on models deemed applicable to such data.
In EFR, projections are used as building blocks for the first two scenarios,
namely the "Optimistic" and "Pessimistic" Scenarios.  In the former, projections
embody optimistic assumptions as to how the sociocultural system will deal with its
opportunities and dangers; in the latter, they embody pessimistic assumptions.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 203 of 219 ===
A.3.6. FORECAST
A forecast is, as it were, an "expectational" projection.  It is simply that one
projection which, in the judgment of the interviewee, is most probable or
plausible—as compared with all the other alternative projections cognized or
considered by the interviewee.
In EFR, forecasts are used as building blocks for the third and final scenario,
namely the "Most Probable Scenario."  In this case, neither optimistic nor pessimistic
assumptions are made as to how the sociocultural system will deal with its
opportunities and dangers; instead, the assumptions are as "realistic" as possible.
A.3.7. SCENARIO
As suggested above, the scenario is central to the EFR interview.  Typically,
the interviewee is asked to provide the three above-indicated scenarios.  These
scenarios collectively constitute most of the recorded summary, or protocol, of the
EFR interview.
A scenario is a story, an imagined "future history," and deals essentially with:
♦  what a particular situation could, might, or is most likely to, be like
as of an approximate horizon date; and
♦  what could, might, or is most likely to, be the process by which the
situation changes between now and that date.
The scenario should not be confused with the projection or the forecast, so we
here note some distinguishing differences among these terms as we employ them.
1. A scenario is usually much more complex and holistic than a
projection or forecast, and indeed will usually embody a number of projections or
forecasts.  The converse will not occur.  A projection or forecast might deal with just,
for example, air pollution rates for the Bangkok metropolitan area as of=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 204 of 219 ===
approximately A.D. 2020.  A scenario, by contrast, would quite likely deal with a
whole range of phenomena between the present and that approximate horizon date, as
these pertain to the environment, as well as the impacts of these phenomena on
people's lives.  In addition, a scenario would deal with people's reactions to these
impacts through time, resulting in individual or political decisions that have the effect
of altering the pollution rates, which decisions thereafter might have economic
impacts, and so on.  In EFR, as distinct from other types of FR (discussed in Fowles
1978), the notion of scenario is pushed virtually to its limits, since the interviewee is
asked to build scenarios about a whole sociocultural system, rather than about some
more limited phenomenon, such as a particular institution, community, or
organization.
2. Consistent with the fact that the scope of a projection or forecast is
relatively limited is the fact that either of them is more likely to be expressed at least
partly in quantitative terms, while the scenario is more likely to be largely qualitative
in form.
3. A scenario is more likely to specify the process of change from Time
1 to Time 2, while a projection or forecast might say little or nothing explicitly about
process.
4. While a forecast is defined as the most probable of several alternative
projections, a scenario need only be probable enough to be plausible.  Thus, in the
EFR interview, when the "Optimistic Scenario" and the "Pessimistic Scenario" are
elicited, no probability assessment need be made, other than that, in the interviewee's
judgment, the projected events or trends are merely possible—that is, judged to have
a probability of occurring that is greater than zero.  After these two scenarios have
been completed, a "Most Probable Scenario" is then elicited, which is judged to have
the highest probability of occurring.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 205 of 219 ===
A.4. INTERVIEW STRUCTURE
With respect to the actual procedure for conducting an EFR interview, some
comments would seem appropriate here, to supplement those in the Introduction
(I.7).
A.4.1. EMPHASIS ON FLEXIBILITY AND OPENNESS
Any interview of any kind will, by definition, have some structure.  Some
phenomenon must be identified as the focus of the interview.  This automatically
implies to the interviewee that you are less interested in other subjects.  Since this is
so, it follows that all interviews run the risk of introducing some bias.
In the tradition of ethnography, you make a deliberate effort to minimize such
bias by keeping the interview loosely structured.  This means that you treat the
structure that you have initially created, in a tentative manner—and actively engage
the interviewee's cooperation in altering that structure, reshaping its categories,
dropping some categories, or adding new ones.
EFR shares this spirit.  As an EFR interviewer you try to provide enough
structure to insure adequate coverage of all the broad subject matter areas in which
you are interested—but, beyond this, to "put the interviewee in charge,"
40 and to
restrict your role to that of an active, sensitive, and sympathetic listener, non-
directive stimulator, and careful recorder.  You keep the interview moving
productively by showing interest, offering encouragement, and posing questions
                                            
     40Dr. Sippanondha was also "in charge" of his interview in
another respect: he could go on talking as long as he wished; the
EFR interview is open-ended.  Each interview sitting can continue
for as long as the interviewee wishes, and there can be as many
sittings as he or she wishes.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 206 of 219 ===
where needed to insure a reasonable degree of clarity, comprehensiveness,
contextualization, and coherence (A.4.3).  You take extreme pains to insure that your
questions are non-directive and non-manipulative in both content and style.
A.4.2. THE THREE SCENARIOS
I explained to Dr. Sippanondha that the EFR procedure required that all three
of the scenarios he provided should be perceived by him as possible (whether or not
his notions of the boundaries of the possible coincided with mine).  "Possible" was
defined simply as having a probability judged to be greater than zero.
Only in the case of the third scenario did the degree of probability matter.
Thus, the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios were complex images held by Dr.
Sippanondha of sociocultural futures for Thailand that he personally considered
possible and desirable or undesirable, respectively—even though the degree of
probability that he assigned to them might be rather low.  The Most Probable
Scenario, by contrast, was defined as the scenario he judged to be just that: most
probable—regardless of whether he saw it as desirable or undesirable.
In order to supply a framework for elicitation, I asked Dr. Sippanondha to
imagine a continuum of 100 possible future sociocultural systems for Thailand in
approximately the year 2563 of the Buddhist Era—or A.D. 2020.  Moving from the
left pole to the right, there would be, in theory, 100 positions on this continuum.
Position No. 1, located at the left pole, was defined as being, by his values, the worst
possible sociocultural future for Thailand, while Position No. 100, at the right pole,
was defined as the best possible.  Futures located farther right (more desirable) than
No. 100 were defined as utopian and impossible.  Futures located farther left (less
desirable) than No. 1 were defined as dystopian and, likewise, impossible.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 207 of 219 ===
In eliciting Dr. Sippanondha's Optimistic Scenario, I asked him to concentrate
on a possible future sociocultural system at roughly Position No. 85 or 90 on the
continuum—not the very best system that could possibly occur, by his personal
values, but clearly very desirable.  He was then asked to describe that system in his
own words, emphasizing whatever aspects of it he chose.  In most EFR interviews,
the Optimistic Scenario takes much longer to elicit than the Pessimistic and Most
Probable Scenarios combined, and the interview with Dr. Sippanondha was no
exception in this respect.
When the Optimistic Scenario was completed, I then asked Dr. Sippanondha
to move to the Pessimistic Scenario, by visualizing a possible sociocultural system at
roughly Position No. 10 or 15 on the continuum—not the very worst that could
possibly occur, but clearly very undesirable.  As is usually the case in an EFR
interview, his Pessimistic Scenario turned out to be much less concrete or elaborated,
than his Optimistic.
When Dr. Sippanondha had finished building his Optimistic and Pessimistic
Scenarios, I then elicited his Most Probable Scenario.  At this point I was careful to
point out that what he wanted or feared now no longer mattered: all that mattered
was what he expected to be most likely to occur.
To summarize in simplest terms, then, the overall strategy of the EFR
interview is to "stretch" the interviewee first in an optimistic direction, and then in a
pessimistic direction—where "optimistic" and "pessimistic" are defined strictly and
solely in terms of the interviewee's own value standards.  He is told, though, that this
stretching should not exceed the realm of the possible.  Just where the boundaries of
the possible lie, however, is for him alone to decide.  Only after this is the
interviewee asked to build his "Most Probable" Scenario.  Much of the educational
value of the EFR interview for the interviewee is realized at this point, for it is here=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 208 of 219 ===
that he is stimulated to perceive—in terms that are unusually clear, concrete, inter-
institutionally articulated, and culturally contextualized—the contrast between what
he wants for his people, and what he believes they are most likely to realize.
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A.4.3. PROBING FOR CLARITY, COMPREHENSIVENESS,
CONTEXTUALIZATION, AND COHERENCE
Much of what the EFR interviewer does is to ask probing questions designed
to insure that the protocol that eventually results from the interview will have a
reasonable degree of clarity, comprehensiveness, contextualization, and coherence.  It
is important to stress that in conducting an EFR interview you strive actively to
fulfill these four desiderata.  The challenge, though, is to probe successfully in a non-
directive manner, to be a stimulating inquirer and listener while at the same time not
introducing bias into the discourse.
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Below I introduce, in briefest possible form, these four types of non-directive
probe, which I used with Dr. Sippanondha both in interviewing him, and in the
numerous editorial conferences we held to go over successive drafts of protocol.  The
consultants, when they joined me in working with Dr. Sippanondha, used a generally
similar approach.
                                            
     41Incidentally, experience in using EFR through the years has
demonstrated clearly that unless the scenarist first experiences
the "stretching" effects of the Optimistic and Pessimistic
Scenarios, his Most Probable Scenario tends to be brief, bland,
and uninteresting—to himself and to the researcher.
     42In the case of a strong person like Dr. Sippanondha, who is
extremely well versed in the subjects he deals with, the danger of
inadvertent interviewer-induced bias was, in my judgment, minimal.
However, in most other cases the danger would be greater, and in
all cases the danger is one that the interviewer should constantly
bear in mind, and guard against.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 209 of 219 ===
Since Dr. Sippanondha was such an informed, exciting, and helpful
interviewee—overall, the most interesting I have interviewed to date—a number of
the guidelines that appear below apply principally to the more typical or average
interviewee, rather than to him.  Indeed, given the broad range and deep richness of
his ideas, the remarkable fact is that I needed to do so little probing.
Nonetheless, below is presented a brief summary of the four major types of
probe, so that you can get a general "feel" for the nature of EFR probes.  Please bear
in mind that the presentation is oversimplified,
43 and risks portraying the EFR
experience as somewhat desiccated—whereas in fact Dr. Sippanondha and I had
numerous laughs together and enjoyed excellent rapport.
♦  Clarity.  If, at any point, some aspect of the interviewee's
presentation of a given projection is not clear to you, you find a polite way to tell him
this, and ask for a clarification.  In addition, the EFR interview process calls for
feedback to the interviewee, as needed, in which you make remarks like "What I
think I hear is...," and request that he tell you if your understanding is correct or not,
and if not, that he clarify or amplify.
♦  Comprehensiveness.  Since the sociocultural approach is broad and
holistic, the material provided by the interviewee should be reasonably
comprehensive.  If you feel that the coverage of a given domain is too narrow or
sparse, and not adequately informative, you probe for a more comprehensive or
complete coverage.  If the interviewee has not yet covered a particular sub-domain
that you think should be covered, you ask him whether he would like to cover it.  If
he declines, however, that is the end of the matter.
                                            
     43The whole matter of probing will be discussed in detail in
Textor 1991.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 210 of 219 ===
♦  Contextualization.  An emphasis on context is one of the hallmarks
of ethnography.  It is desirable that the protocol provide at least the broad outlines of
the general sociocultural context within which a given change process is projected to
occur.  If this kind of context is not specified or at least implicitly clear, then you
need to probe for it in a non-directive manner.  This is a crucial strategy for helping
people to escape from tempocentric thinking.  In the present case, Dr. Sippanondha
readily made clear numerous assumptions or projections about contextual changes.
Some of these were domestic, such as population growth (3.3.1).  Others were
essentially external, such as economic and political pressure upon Thailand from the
outside (2.3.2., 3.2), or new technologies available to Thailand from the outside (2.2).
♦  Coherence.  It is always important that the basic causal process of a
given projection be "grounded" in some sort of explicit reasoning.  Where it is not,
you probe non-directively with a remark such as, "That's interesting, but I'm not quite
clear what would cause that to come about.  Could you ground that a bit more?"
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A.5. THE ADVANTAGES OF FLEXIBILITY
                                            
     44In addition to insuring clarity, comprehensiveness,
contextualization, and coherence, most EFR projects also require a
fifth desideratum, namely cross-interview comparability.  That is,
a typical EFR project involves interviewing a sample of between
ten and thirty interviewees, and the monograph resulting from such
a study involves summarizing across ten to thirty protocols.
Obviously, no such cross-interview comparison and summarization
can be very satisfactory unless all or most of the protocols cover
more or less the same broad domains.  Hence, a fixed structure of
domains is needed, as a guide for conducting each interview.
The present study is highly atypical, since it is based on a
sample of one.  For a discussion of various ways of designing a
sample of interviewees, see Bhansoon, Sidhinat, and Textor 1984,
Appendix 1.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 211 of 219 ===
By this point it should be clear that the EFR approach is quite flexible.  In the
present case this flexibility produced handsome results, of which three should be
mentioned here.
♦  The elicitation of an interviewee's Optimistic and Pessimistic
Scenarios often proves to be a quite effective way of getting him to clarify and
elaborate the general values and principles he uses in approaching the scenario-
building task.  In the present study, Dr. Sippanondha soon found himself outlining his
entire working philosophy of development.  I was so impressed by the richness and
clarity of this philosophy that I suggested he build a whole separate chapter out of it.
The result is his Chapter One.
♦  As we proceeded with Dr. Sippanondha's Most Probable Scenario, it
became increasingly clear that my definition of this scenario as the one he considered
most probable, was leaving him less than completely satisfied.  More and more, he
came to feel that he should add a whole chapter that would embody his projections
for a positive scenario of reasonably—though not necessarily maximally-probable
events and processes: a "possidictive" scenario that he felt could be realized if
Thailand were to have wise and good leadership, plus a measure of good luck
(especially in its international relations).  In effect, he was saying: Who cares if it is
the most probable scenario, as long as it is probable enough to be worth working
hard to achieve?  I encouraged him in this respect, and the result is his Chapter Five.
♦  By the time Dr. Sippanondha had finished laying out Chapter Five,
he felt that it would be appropriate, finally, to stress a few priority policy matters to
which he assigned the highest priority for public policy action in the near
future—and the result is his addition of Chapter Six.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 212 of 219 ===
A.6. THE END PRODUCT
Chapters One through Six, then, constitute the end product of Dr.
Sippanondha's and my work together.  Essentially, this product is an elaborated,
documented, edited EFR protocol.  To the technically oriented reader, the question
may now arise: What are the essential characteristics of a successful EFR protocol?
My short answer is that the protocol should assist the reader in reducing his or
her tempocentrism.  In more common parlance, the protocol should "make the future
seem real," so that the reader can "relate to" it.  In order for this to happen, the
protocol ought to be adequate with respect to the four desiderata indicated above,
namely clarity, comprehensiveness, contextualization, and coherence.
A slightly longer answer would be that an EFR protocol will be most helpful
in reducing tempocentrism to the extent that it, as a whole, presents ideas that are:
♦  non-obvious (for the obvious is usually not stimulating); and
♦  creative in identifying new opportunities and dangers; while at the
same time
♦  plausible in specifying the causal processes it projects; but
nonetheless
♦  richly suggestive of possible changes in short-range policy designed
to maximize chances for a desirable middle- and long-range future and minimize
chances for an undesirable one.
Whether the present effort has succeeded in these respects is, in the first
instance, for each reader to judge.  A more final judgment can be rendered after some
years have passed, when it will be possible to assess the effect of this monograph on
public policy.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 213 of 219 ===
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AMNUAY VIRAWAN
   1988 "Thai Economy in the Year 2000: What to Expect?" Bangkok Post,
August 9, p. 28.
ASEAN SCHOLARS
   1980 "Alternative Futures for ASEAN: An Educational Perspective."  Journal
of Cultural and Educational Futures, Vol. 1, No. 4.  Reprinted as Appendix Five in
Textor 1980a.  The ASEAN Scholars were: from Indonesia: Agustina Nasution,
Samuel Pamantung; from Malaysia: Asiah binte Abu Samah, Isahak Haron; from the
Philippines: Josefina R. Cortes, Miguela B. Flores; from Singapore: Teo Lye Huat,
Yee Sze Onn; from Thailand: Songsak Srikalasin, Sutichai Liangjayetz.  Robert B.
Textor served as editor.
BAIER, KURT, and NICHOLAS RESCHER
   1969 Values and the Future. New York: Free Press.
BELL, WENDELL, and JAMES A MAU, EDS.
   1971 The Sociology of the Future.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
BHANSOON LADAVALYA, SIDHINAT PRABUDHANITISARN, and
ROBERT B. TEXTOR
   1984 Thaang Lyag naj Anaakhod khaung Sangkhom Thai: Naj Thadsana
khaung Nagwichaakaan. 212 pages.  Also published in an English version, under an
author listing of Textor, Bhansoon, and Sidhinat, entitled Alternative Sociocultural
Futures for Thailand: A Pilot Inquiry among Academics, 155 pages.  Chiang Mai,
Thailand: Chiang Mai University Faculty of the Social Sciences.
BULLER, ANN, Compiler
   1987   Proceedings of the International Conference on Thai Studies.  Canberra:
Australian National University.
ENCEL, SOLOMON, PAULINE K. MARSTRAND, and WILLIAM PAGE
   1975 The Art of Anticipation: Values and Methods in Forecasting.  London:
Martin Robertson.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 214 of 219 ===
FOWLES, JIB, ED.
   1978 Handbook of Futures Research.  Westport CN: Greenwood.
FRY, GERALD W., and CLARENCE E. THURBER
   1989   The International Education of the Development Consultant.  Oxford:
Pergamon.
GOODENOUGH, WARD H.
   1971 Culture, Language, and Society.  Reading MA: Addison Wesley
Anthropology Series, Module 7.
HAQQ, CHRISTOPHER M.
   1987 "The Biotechnical Revolution and Alternative Futures for the World."
Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University Archive on the Sociocultural
Implications of High Technology.
INSTITUTE FOR THE FUTURE
   1976   Institute for the Future Newsletter, Winter.  Menlo Park CA.
KLINE, STEPHEN JAY
   1990 A Measure for the Complexity of Systems: The Concept and Some
Implications.  Stanford CA: Stanford University Department of Mechanical
Engineering.  Report-INN No. 5.
KROEBER, A. L., and CLYDE KLUCKHOHN
   1952 Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.  Cambridge
MA: Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard
University.  Vol. XLVIII, No. 1.
LEE, CHOTIROS K.
   1987 "Heart Language," Vol. 2, pp. 149-93, in Buller 1987.
MEDHI KRONGKAEW
   1988 Matichon Weekly, 18 September 1988, Vol. 9, No. 420, pp. 14-16.  [Dr.
Medhi is Director of the Center for Thai Studies, Thammasart University.]=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 215 of 219 ===
MOFFITT, LINDA M.
   1987 "Superconductors: The Race and the Impact."  Unpublished manuscript,
Stanford University Archive on the Sociocultural Implications of High Technology.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD
   1987 The Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-
1991).  Bangkok: National Economic and Social Development Board, Office of the
Prime Minister.
RAHIMAH HAJI AHMAD, T. MARIMUTHU, and NORJANNAH ISMAIL
   1987 Education and Polity:  Interface of Education with Employment and
Leisure in the Context of Alternative Futures.  Bangkok: UNESCO Principal
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.  Asia and the Pacific Programme of
Educational Innovation for Development.
SNOH UNAKUL
   1988 Address to the Board of Directors of the Ford Foundation.  Bangkok.
   1990 Thailand's Development Strategies.  Bangkok: National Economic and
Social Development Board.
SIPPANONDHA KETUDAT
   1983 "Popularization of Science and Technology in Harmony with Culture
and Environment."  Keynote Address, Regional Meeting on "The Popularization of
Science and Technology in Southeast Asia," co-sponsored by the Science Society of
Thailand under the Patronage of H.M. the King, the UNESCO Regional Office for
Science and Technology for South-East Asia, and Chulalongkorn University.
   1985 "Widthajaasaad kab Udsaahakam: Naewthaang Phadthanaa" [Science
and Industry: The Way to Development].  Address to the students in the Faculty of
Science, Chiang Mai University.
   1986 "Caag Sabphajaakaun Thammachaad suu Prachaachon Jaang Pen
Tham: Piitrookheemii" [From Natural Resources to the People, with Fairness:
Petrochemicals].  Address to the Twenty-Fourth Technical Conference of the
Agricultural University.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 216 of 219 ===
   1987a "Phaabruam khaung Kaancadtang Udsaahakam Piitrookheemii Naj
Pratheed Thaj" [An Overview of the Establishment of the Petrochemical Industry in
Thailand].  Address at Chulalongkorn University.
   1987b "Khunnaphaab khaung Pandid Culaa naj Anaakhod" [The Quality of
Scholars at Chulalongkorn University in the Future].  Article in Culaa naj Raub Sib
Pii [Chulalongkorn University in Ten-Year Cycles].  Book commemorating the
seventieth anniversary of the founding of Chulalongkorn University.
   1987c "Kaan Phadthanaa Nagbaurihaan taam Naewthaang khaung
Sangkhom Thaj" [The Development of Administrators in the Thai Manner].  Address
at the Institute for the Development of the Civil Service.
   1987d "The Petrochemical Industries in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on
the Thai Experience."  Keynote address to the International Seminar  on Research
and Development in Petrochemical and Polymer Technology.  Bangkok:
Chulalongkorn University.
   1988a  "Bodbaad Khaung Mahaawidthajaalaj naj Pratheed Udsaahakam Maj"
[The Role of the University in the Newly Industrialized Nations]."  Address to the
Thai Development Research Institute, December 4, 1988.
   1988b "Development of Science, Technology and Industry in Harmony with
Culture and Environment."  Address to the Law and Economic Development
Workshop, jointly organized for the ASEAN Region by the Faculty of Law,
University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, and the Faculty of Law,
Chulalongkorn University.  Supported by the Management for Change Program,
Canadian International Development Agency, and Chulalongkorn University.
   1989   "Development of the Petrochemical Industry in Thailand: Technology in
Harmony with Culture and Environment."  Plenary Lecture to the International
Conference on Recent Developments in Petrochemical and Polymer Technologies,
organized by the Petroleum and Petrochemical College, Chulalongkorn University.
Bangkok, December 12-16.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 217 of 219 ===
   1990   "The University and Technological Progress: Technology in Harmony with
Culture and Environment."  Address to the Ninth Triennial Conference of the
International Association of University Presidents, Valladolid, Spain, July 8-14,
1990.
SIPPANONDHA KETUDAT and WICHAI TANSIRI
   1982 "Kaan Phadthanaa Sangkhom Samaj Maj: Thegnooloojii lae Mauradog
Thaang Wadthanatham, Maung Naj Ngae Thaj" ["Modern Social Development:
Technology and Cultural Heritage Seen in a Thai Sense.]  Address presented to the
Seminar on "The Machine in the Garden: Nature Versus Technology in Thai and
American Contexts.  Bangkok: American University Association.
SUGANYA HUTASERANI and SOMCHAI JITSUCHON
   1988   "Thailand's Income Distribution and Poverty Profile and Their Current
Situation," Thailand Development Research Institute 1088 Year-End Conference,
December 17-18, Regent Cha-am, Petchburi, Thailand.
SUPANG CHANTAVANICH, SAMANG HIRANBURANA, and KULVITRA
BHANGANADA
   1989   Khroongkaan Waang Phaen Udomsyksaa Raja Jaaw 15 Pii (2531-2545):
Kaanplianplaeng Thaang Wadthanatham lae Panhaa Cirijatham.  (Program for
Planning Higher Education for 15 Years (1988-2002): Cultural Changes and Ethical
Problems Relating to Higher Education.  Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.
TEXTOR, ROBERT B.
   1961 From Peasant to Pedicab Driver: A Social Study of Northeastern Thai
Farmers Who Periodically Migrated to Bangkok and Became Pedicab Drivers.  New
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report No. 9.  Revised and
updated from an earlier version which appeared in The Social Implications of
Industrialisation and Urbanization: Five Studies in Asia.  UNESCO Research Centre
on the Social Implications of Industrialisation in Southern Asia, Calcutta, 1956.
   1975a  "President's Report on Education and the Ecological Crisis," Anthropology
and Education Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2.
   1975b  "President's Report on the Need to Internationalize Educational
Anthropology," Anthropology and Education Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 23-5.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 218 of 219 ===
   1977   "Future Horizons in Anthropology and Education:  The View from 1976."
Presidential Address to the Council on Anthropology and Education.  Anthropology
and Education Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 31-4.
  1978a   "Ethnographic Futures Research and the Anticipation of Culture Conflict in
Southeast Asia," in S. Eto and S. Ichimura,  Eds., Proceedings of the International
Colloquium on Cultural  Conflict in Asia,  Kyoto: The Japanese Society for Asian
Studies.
  1978b   "Cultural Futures for Thailand: An Ethnographic Enquiry."  Futures,
October, pp. 347-60.
  1979a   "The Natural Partnership between Ethnographic Futures Research and
Futures Education."  Journal of Cultural and Educational Futures,  Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.
13-8.
  1979b   "Ethnographic Futures Research and Its Educational Potential," in  Fred
Kierstead, Jim Bowman, and Christopher Dede, Eds., Educational Futures:
Sourcebook I.  Washington DC: World Future Society. Pp. 159-71.
  1979c   "Ethnographic Futures Research as a Tool for Educational  Diagnostics: A
Brazilian Case Study."  (With five Stanford students.) Journal of Cultural and Educa-
tional Futures, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 13-24.
  1980a   A Handbook on Ethnographic Futures Research.  Third Edition, Version A.
300 pages.  Stanford: Stanford University School of Education and Department of
Anthropology.  Currently under revision.
  1980b   "The Art of Anticipation: Ethnographic Futures Research."  Practicing
Anthropology, November.
  1981   "Development Education and Futures Research: An ASEAN Experiment."
Journal of Cultural and Educational Futures, Vol. 2, Nos. 2-3, pp. 34-41.
  l982   "Silicon Images: An Assessment of the Future Cultural Implications of the
Computer Revolution."  (With five Stanford students.)  Journal of Cultural and
Educational Futures.=== Sippanondha Ketudat, “The Middle Path,” Electronic Edition, p. 219 of 219 ===
  1983    Austria 2005: Projected Sociocultural Effects of the Microelectronic
Revolution.  (With Kurt Steiner, three students from the University of Vienna, and
seven students from Stanford University.)  Foreword by State Secretary Dr. Ernst
Eugen Veselsky.  Published in joint English-German version under the sponsorship
of the Austrian Association for Future Policies. German version entitled Oesterreich
2005: Einfluesse der mikroelektronischen Revolution.  l38 English pages and 142
German pages.  Vienna: Verlag Orac.
  1985   "Anticipatory Anthropology and the Telemicroelectronic Revolution: A
Preliminary Report from Silicon Valley."  (With 19 members of the Stanford
Anticipatory Anthropology Team.)  Anthropology and Education Quarterly, Vol.
XVI, No. 1, pp. 3-30.
  1986   "Shaping the Telemicroelectronic Revolution to Serve True Development."
In: Mohan Munasinghe, Michael Dow, and Jack Fritz, Eds., Microcomputers for
Development.  Sponsored by the Computer and Information Technology Council of
Sri Lanka and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.  Colombo: Sri Lanka
Department of Government Printing, 1985.  Library of Congress Catalogue No. 85-
71396.  Also in: National Academy of Sciences/ National Research Council,
Washington: Microcomputers and Their Applications for Developing Countries,
published by Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1986.
  1991    Ethnographic Futures Research.  (With a chapter by Ernest E. Boesch.)  This
book will sum up experiences to date with the use of Ethnographic Futures Research
and the Ethnographic Monitoring of Rapid Change, place these methods in broader
theoretical and methodological frameworks, and relate the anticipatory approach to
the general tradition of North American anthropology.
WYATT, DAVID
   1969 The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King
Chulalongkorn.  New Haven: Yale University Press.